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KHRUSHCHEV AND STALIN'S GHOST

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BERTRAM D. WOLFE

Author of THREE WHO MADE A REVOLUTION; SIX KEYS TO THE SOVIET SYSTEM and Other Soviet Studies

KHRUSHCHEV AND STALIN'S GHOST

Text, Background and Meaning of Khrushchev's Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress on the Night of February 24-25, 1956

In five years it may be as dangerous to praise Stalin as it was to attack him two years ago. But I should not regard this as an advance. Nothing is gained by teaching a parrot a new word. —GEORGE ORWELL
September, 1946.



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BOOKS THAT MATTER

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Part I

SINCE STALIN DIED

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I. ONE MORE PURGE.

When his Father Confessor asked Narvaez on his deathbed, "General, have you forgiven your enemies?" the General answered: "I have no enemies. I had them all shot."

So Josef Stalin might have answered, too, had he believed in deathbed confession for himself, as he did for his victims. Yet one cannot have all one's enemies shot, for shooting enemies is a chain reaction. Each gap is filled by tens and hundreds who knew, believed in, loved, or identified themselves with the slain.

Thus when Marshal Tukhachevsky and his seven top officers were executed in 1937, all the "Judges" who were compelled to sign the protocol of a Court Martial that was never held, automatically became suspect. If they had refused to sign they would have died. Having signed, they had to die, too.* Next all the high command had to be executed for "prophylactic" reasons. Then came the turn of their subordinates who owed instruction, appointment or advancement to them and knew their merits and services. Soon the whole officers' corps was disquieted and in an "unhealthy mood," a sickness requiring a radical cure by shooting.** Tukhachev-

* The "Court Martial" was declared to have consisted of a Presiding Judge, two assistants, and eight top generals. Nine of these eleven perished within the year. The survivors were Budyenny, Stalin's crony, faction tool and drinking companion since the Civil War, and Shaposhnikov, an old Tsarist officer who had been a monarchist until the Bolshevik seizure of power, and was employed by Stalin as his personal instructor in military science.

** Under totalitarian justice men are guilty by categories rather than individual actions, and punishable not for what they have done but for what they may do.

sky and his fellow officers were shot in June, 1937. In June, 1941, as we now know from Khrushchev, Stalin was still imprisoning and executing officers "literally down to the company and battalion level," when Hitler attacked his partner in the Pact and Stalin had no more officers to waste as "Hitler agents." Though he had had 70 per cent of all officers executed from the rank of colonel up, Stalin was still not able to say: "I have no enemies; I had them all shot."

At the Eighteenth Congress (March 1939), Stalin let it be known that there would never again be a need for "mass purges." Zhdanov, reporting on the new Party Statutes, explained that the mass purge had been introduced by Lenin in 1921 at the beginning of the New Economic Policy (NEP) because that policy gave new impulse to capitalistic elements. "However, now that the capitalist elements have been eliminated, now that Bolshevik order has been introduced into party affairs, now that the party has succeeded in ridding itself of unreliable and dubious elements, the method of mass purge obviously no longer conforms to the new conditions." The purges which had been going on on a mass scale from 1921 to 1939 were henceforth to be "on an individual basis," and "*expulsions from the Party must be reduced to a minimum.*" If expulsion from the Party—as Comrade Stalin has said—is equivalent to the supreme penalty in the army, that is shooting, it cannot be imposed right and left.*

This was the rainbow of promise after eighteen years of storms, the last four a steady deluge of blood. Secretly, as Khrushchev now tells it, an order went out to continue the use of torture "in stubborn cases." The purge continued, too, among the officers. But the long mass purge was ended. Now

* *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow: Reports and Speeches at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), March 10-21, 1939.* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1939). pp. 188-199. Emphasis as in the original, here and throughout this book, unless otherwise stated.

there were hundreds where there had been thousands, and twenty-five year sentences where there had been death penalties. Stalin's last fourteen years were "gentler" ones.

But in the final year, he was manifestly planning another bloody mass purge like that of 1935 to 1939. At the beginning of 1953, some of the top Kremlin physicians were "discovered" to have poisoned the late Andrei Zhdanov and Alexander Shcherbakov, both of whom had earlier been supposed to have died a natural death. The doctors soon confessed that they were also engaged in the slow poisoning of some of the top army marshals and generals.

The revelation of the Doctors' Plot was accompanied by the familiar frenzied calls to "vigilance" against spies, saboteurs, and wreckers, and by charges that the Security Organs, under Lavrentii Beria when the poisonings occurred, had failed through lack of vigilance to protect the beloved victims or uncover the plot. There was talk of the "idiotic disease of gullibility, carelessness, blundering and complacency."

The purge had international as well as domestic implications. The doctors, all but three of whom were Jewish, admitted that they were "connected with the International Jewish bourgeois nationalist organization, 'Joint,' [The Joint Distribution Committee] established by American Intelligence . . . to conduct extensive espionage, terrorist and other subversive work in many lands, including the Soviet Union," and with a world "Zionist Conspiracy." The remaining three "proved to be agents of British Intelligence."*

At the same time, the purge, with its anti-Semitic overtones, struck the satellite states. In the trial of Slansky and thirteen co-defendants, eleven were not listed as Czechoslovaks but, after their names, the indictment read, "of Jewish origin." They, too, confessed that they were part of an "International Jewish (Zionist) Conspiracy." In all the satellites and all over

* Tass Communiqué, *Pravda*, January 13, 1953, p. 4; *Bloknot Agitatora* (Agitator's Notebook), No. 3, January 1953, pp. 10-22.

the Soviet Union, emphasis was put upon the Jewishness of traitors, spies, embezzlers.

Such menacing language had not been heard since 1939. If Jews seemed the most exposed victims, as at the beginning of the thirties it had been engineers and agronomists with which the "vigilance campaign" had begun, it was clear that the former Security personnel was to be involved and the army's support enlisted against it. Lavrentii Beria was target No. One. But Malenkov had been Zhdanov's rival for Stalin's favor; Khrushchev had carried on a muted war of intrigue against Shcherbakov as well as Beria; Marshal Konev, who was said to be a poison target, was known to be a rival of Zhukov, who was not so honored. Who knew where the purge would stop?

Khrushchev now reports that Voroshilov and Andreyev were already in disfavor and excluded from Politburo meetings, that Stalin had attacked Molotov and Mikoyan at the January, 1953, Central Committee Plenum, as "guilty of some baseless charges." We know, too, that Molotov's wife (Jewish) was arrested and sent to Siberia; that Stalin had accused all his Politburo members of being "blind as kittens." "Stalin," says Khrushchev ominously, "had plans to finish off all the old members of the Political Bureau."*

* For more on this ripening purge, see pp 221-3. The arrest of Molotov's wife was reported by Harison E. Salisbury: *An American in Russia* (New York, 1955). Khrushchev follows the words about "finishing off the old members of the Political Bureau" with the apparently less horrendous "He had often stated that Political Bureau Members should be replaced by new ones." But in a totalitarian state, purge is the normal method of replacement and promotion. In 1939, Stalin reported to the Eighteenth Congress that one of the great achievements of the preceding four years of blood-letting had been the "bold promotion of new and young cadres; during the period under review, the party succeeded in promoting to leading state and party posts over 500,000 young Bolsheviks." ("Report to the Eighteenth Congress," in J. Stalin: *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 784-786).

II. DEATH COMES FOR A DICTATOR.

It was on January 13, 1953 that the poison doctor plot was announced. Less than two months later, "during the night of March 1-2, Comrade Stalin had a hemorrhage of the brain," lost consciousness and the power of speech.

"The best medical personnel has been called in to treat Comrade Stalin. . . . The treatment is under the Minister of Health. . . . The treatment is under the continuous supervision of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government. . . ." Nine doctors watching one another; the Minister of Health watching the doctors; the Central Committee and the Government watching the Minister. And all of this, by an inner compulsion, declared to the world. Certainly, the death that was announced three days later was either timely or well timed. Who could fail to sense as the bulletins succeeded each other that the laws of life and death are somehow different behind the Kremlin walls?

The Minister of Health, Tretyakov, under whose direct supervision Stalin's last treatment had been carried out, disappeared without a trace. Lieutenant General Poskrebyshev, Chief of Stalin's personal Secretariat, who had the developing purge in his charge, disappeared the same night that Stalin died. Stalin's son Vasily, Commander of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District, was missing at his funeral and has not been heard of since. "Together with these, the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin, Lieutenant General Spiridonov,

disappeared as well as the Commandant of the City of Moscow, Lieutenant General Sinilov, and the Commander of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General Artemev.*

Josef Stalin had been dead for six hours and ten minutes before the Men in the Kremlin announced that the Dictator was no more. In an age of split-second announcements of the death of the great, there is something strange in this delay.

The announcement was without love or grief. It began with a tribute:

The heart of Lenin's comrade-in-arms and the inspired continuer of Lenin's cause, the wise teacher and leader of the party and the people has stopped beating. Stalin's name is boundlessly dear to our party, to the Soviet people, to the working people of the world . . .

but immediately it went from tribute to alarm:

Our task is to guard . . . the steel-like and monolithic unity of the party as the apple of our eye . . . high political vigilance, irreconcilability and stalwartness in the struggle against inner and outer foes . . . the most important task of the party and the government is to insure uninterrupted and correct leadership . . . the greatest unity of leadership and the prevention of any kind of disorder and panic . . .

Disorder and panic! When Franklin Roosevelt died in office, could it occur to Vice-President Truman, who automatically succeeded him, or to the leaders of his party or government, to warn against disorder and panic? When George VI of England or Gustav V of Sweden died in office, could such words creep into the communiqués, or the funeral addresses of those near to them?

Not in young states either, being born in turmoil and conflict—not in Israel when Chaim Weizmann died, not in Turkey when Kemal Pasha died, not in Pakistan when Liaquat Ali Khan, nor in India when Gandhi was assassinated, nor in

*The medical bulletins are from *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, March 4 and 6; the quotation on the fate of the Military Commanders is from A. Avtorkhanov in the *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Vol. III, No. 5, May, 1956, p. 12.

China when Sun Yat-sen's life ended, could any one think of pronouncing the ominous words, *disorder and panic*.

These strange words escaping from the lips of Stalin's closest comrades-in-arms bring us close to the heart of the mystery of the totalist state, of the nature of the men who rule over it, their relationship with each other, with the people and the nations over whom they rule, and with the world.

III. DICTATORSHIP AND LEGITIMACY.

Permanent dictatorship is a regime without legitimacy; never in history has it succeeded in devising a system of legitimate succession.

The democratic revolution of March 1917 had ruptured the ancient legitimacy of the Tsar. But it secured his abdication, and set out at once to replace the traditional Tsarist legitimacy with a new democratic legitimacy of its own, based on Duma and Zemstvo, and above all on the intention of convening an early Constitutional Convention which would adopt a new democratic constitution to provide a fresh fabric of consensus, consent and lawfulness. That convention would represent the Russian people, set up a parliament, a multi-party system, a definition of the powers and limits of power of governmental institutions. It would secure the habits of obedience and the sense of lawfulness which are the tissues of all normal governments and which make the death of a particular head of state a cause for grief but not an occasion of uncertainty and fear. The Provisional Government set up by the first revolution of 1917 was, to use the terms of the historian Ferrero, a "pre-legitimate" government which aimed at establishing a new legitimacy. That is why it called itself "provisional."

But in November, 1917, Lenin overthrew that government by a violent *coup d'état*, then dispersed the Constituent Assembly (Constitutional Convention) by force. He proclaimed

his regime a dictatorship. And a dictatorship it has been from that day to this.

The scientific concept, dictatorship—Lenin wrote explicitly—means neither more nor less than unlimited power resting directly on force, not limited by anything, not restrained by any laws or any absolute rules. *Nothing else but that.**

Nowhere in this whole regime was there any check on the flow of power towards the top. When Lenin outlawed all other parties, including the democratic and the socialist parties, he thereby drained the Soviets of all power as a “workers’ parliament.” The “Soviet Government” ceased to be a government by Soviets. These became rubber stamps, or, in Lenin’s words, “transmission belts,” through which the Bolshevik Party ruled and expressed its will.

Next Lenin drained his own party of all political life by outlawing factions and rival platforms within it. This was inevitable, for a one-party system is in truth a no-party system. Parties are *parts*: they need each other as the sexes need each other. With only one party, party life as generally understood ceases altogether, as with only one sex, sex life would cease.

Where there is only one party, every controversy within it must reflect and stir the hopes and muted support of some part of the atomized, voiceless people outside of it. Tito has learned this as well as Lenin and Stalin, and each has felt impelled to outlaw factions and controversies lest difference find support in the disfranchised populations and lead towards multi-party, i.e. genuine party life.

Under a dictatorial one-party regime the party is anything but a party. It is a praetorian guard; a privileged, dedicated, commanding caste; a band of activists to drive every one to carry out the “Summit’s” or the Leader’s plans; a sounding

* A Contribution to the History of the Question of Dictatorship,” *Communist International*, No. 14, November 6, 1920. *Collected Works*, Vol. XXXI, p. 326. All references are to the Fourth Russian Edition of Lenin’s *Collected Works*.

board to broadcast infallible commands and dogmas; the eyes and ears of an espionage system; a nucleus of penetration and control of all organizations, clubs, unions, collective farms, factories, government organs, army, police; a transmission belt to convey the Leader's will to a will-less nation, and to members and sympathizers in other lands. In short, the party is but the apparatus of the permanent dictatorship, the machine through which the Dictator rules.

Dictatorships, too, may be consciously transitory, and pre-legitimate, in the sense that they aim as fast as possible to abdicate their powers to a non-dictatorial legitimate regime. But totalitarian dictatorship has built into it the aspirations and the determination to totality and permanence. Its aim is nothing less than to embrace the whole of life, to remake its subjects according to its inspired and infallible blueprint, and to remake the entire world in its image. This involves an unending twofold war: a war on its own people to remake them according to its plan; and a war on the world to conquer it for its system. Though there are breathing spells and periods of respite, and sudden reversals of tactics and tone to avoid a dangerous defeat, to overcome a roadblock of mounting resistance, or to exploit a new breakthrough, both these wars are permanent until the "final conflict" has been won.

So, at the death of the Dictator, there were no parties to decide a legal succession by electoral contest. There was no legitimacy to provide for an heir or successor. The Soviets had long ceased to decide anything, and no one thought of asking them. The monopoly party had long ceased to decide anything and was not consulted either. There was no constitutional provision for a successor to the post of self-appointed genius. There is not even a provision in the Constitution or the Party Statutes which provides that there shall be a Dictator at all.

On the surface in such a dictatorship, everything seems designed to last forever. Thirty-six years of continuity in gov-

ernment (is it not still called *Soviet*?); thirty years of continuity of personal leadership in the person of the all-wise, all-powerful *Vozhd*; more than a third of a century of uninterrupted and progressively growing happiness of the people and of non-existence of opposition; more than two decades of unanimous decisions on everything; not the unity of fallible, variform, many-minded human beings, but the unity of a monolith. Was ever such a monopoly of power wielded so authoritatively by so completely and minutely organized a mechanism? Where is there a crevice in which might sprout a seedcorn of doubt, much less of disunity, disorder and panic?

The purges had done their work, so that the heirs inherited a totally atomized society; a completely centralized, monolithic, monopolistic, forever infallible party, possessor of an infallible, scientific doctrine; a completely collectivized and statized agriculture; a powerful, if one-sided, forced-tempo industrialization with mighty industries in the realms that relate to physical power; the techniques and momentums of a completely controlled culture; a regime commanding absolute force and absolute power of unending psychological warfare on their own people; a system of promotion, demotion, correction of error, and elimination of difference through permanent purge; a method of advance through zigzags toward invariant goals; a commitment to permanent revolution from above until the Soviet subject shall have been totally remade and Communism shall have won the world. What it had cost Lenin so much travail and cruelty and struggle to build, and Stalin so much bloodshed and travail to perfect into the all-embracing power apparatus of the total state, seemed now so perfected, so smooth in its functioning: a ready-made machine for any hand to run: the greatest power machine in all history. Yet the first words of the orphaned heirs on the death of the Dictator were not words of human sorrow, but ominous words about "disorder and panic," vigilance and uncompromising, intolerant struggle "against the inner and the outer foe."

Because it wages unending war on its own people and on the world, the reverse side of the totalist state's inordinate power is its inordinate fear. The thermometer measuring criticism, error and opposition having been deliberately broken, the quicksilver of opposition is instinctively felt to be everywhere. The strange words, "confusion and panic," escaping from the lips of the newly orphaned rulers of the world's most powerful and "most perfect" government, betrayed the fear that was in their hearts as they stood around Stalin's corpse. They feared the prostrate people over whom they rule, and to whom they give no peace. They feared the outside world which they plan to conquer and to which, even in the waging of their "peace campaigns," they give no peace. They feared the heritage of hatred which they and their Beloved Leader had earned by deeds of cruelty and terror. And they feared each other.

IV. THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP.

What debates and makeshift deals went on in those six hours and ten minutes while the orphaned heirs stood around the corpse of Josef Stalin and prepared their claims on the heritage, we may never know. They had to put a stop to the purges that had already begun, and do away with Poskrebyshv who had them in charge. They recalled Lavrentii Beria and combined the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of the Interior into a single police organ in his hand. They restored the small Politburo of ten (eleven with Stalin) which he had only recently abolished in favor of a large and formless Presidium of twenty-five. The Secretariat, which Stalin had enlarged to ten secretaries, they reduced to five, with Malenkov as First Secretary, and with Khrushchev, transferred from the post of Secretary of the Moscow Committee, to "concentrate on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU." Moreover, two other Khrushchev men were made party Secretaries as against only one Malenkov man, Shatalin. Among the new Secretaries was Ignatiev, the very one who had replaced Beria as Minister of State Security and then had hatched the Doctor's Plot. (A student of Soviet intrigue could thus suspect that neither the position of Malenkov nor that of Beria was as secure as their titles suggested.)

No less startling were the changes in Stalin's governmental arrangements. After "kicking Beria upstairs" in 1946, Stalin had continued in 1949 with the removal, one by one, of all

his old associates from their posts of direct authority as government Ministers: Molotov from Foreign Affairs, Mikoyan from Trade, Kaganovich from Heavy Industry, Bulganin from Defense. They had simply become "deputies at large" of Josef Stalin with ill-defined duties and even less defined powers. Increasingly, the General Secretary had ruled directly through sub-committees responsible to him, through his Secretariat, and through lesser Minister Specialists like Vyshinsky, who had no political authority. To be sure, the Old Guard remained on the Politburo, but as we now know from Khrushchev, that had ceased to meet, and, at the Nineteenth Congress it had been dissolved into the large and formless Presidium of Twenty-Five.

Thus all the older leaders had acquired an immediate interest in the restoration of a "collective leadership" in which they might once more play a role. With Stalin dead, for the moment all their rivalries for his favor and their intrigues against each other were put aside. Watchfully, mutually amnestying each other around the corpse, they reduced the number of Ministers and Ministries, and cut Stalin's Inner Cabinet from fourteen Deputy Premiers to a Premier and five Deputies.

Malenkov was not only made First Secretary but also Premier, thus combining in his person as Stalin had the leadership of the Party and the Government. But just as in the Secretariat he was checked by the powerful presence of Khrushchev and two of his henchmen, so in the Government he was surrounded and controlled by the "Old Guard." To emphasize the importance of the latter, the bureaucratic miracle was performed of giving Malenkov four First Deputies, plus a simple Deputy with no "First" in his title. Since they had to be mentioned in some order of significance, Beria was named as first First Deputy, Molotov as second, Bulganin as third, and Kaganovich as fourth First Deputy. The plain Deputy Premier was Mikoyan.

As Beria had been restored to the control of the combined ministries of Security, so Molotov was restored to the post of Foreign Minister, Mikoyan to Trade, and Bulganin to Defense. Voroshilov was given the honorific post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. To add some figure of genuine popularity to these unknown and unloved men whom the Stalin cult had systematically dwarfed, Marshal Zhukov was recalled from the rustic obscurity to which Stalin's jealousy had consigned him; he and Vasilevsky were made First Deputies to the Minister of Defense.

All these changes were decided on and announced when Stalin's death was made known and before his funeral was arranged. Truly an imposing amount of business to be transacted by grief-stricken mourners around a beloved corpse!

At the same time, they decided on the chief mourners, and the order of their public sorrow. Khrushchev was made Chairman of the Commission for the Organization of the Funeral. He "granted the platform" to Malenkov, Beria and Molotov, in that order. No one else was allowed to speak.

The formulae of the funeral addresses seemed to have been predetermined, too. Malenkov called the departed "the great genius of mankind," pronounced his name "infinitely dear to the Soviet people and the wide masses of the people in all parts of the globe. . . . Stalin's cause will live forever, and a grateful posterity will praise Stalin's name." His name was connected with those of Marx, Engels and Lenin, with the continuation and development of Lenin's work, with the victory of socialism, the strengthening of the Soviet State, the solution of the national question, the Soviet Army, victory in war, industrialization and collectivization, peaceful coexistence.

Malenkov pledged that the party and the people would be further trained in "high political vigilance, irreconcilability and firmness in the struggle against internal and foreign enemies." Beria repeated the warning against "confusion and

panic.” Molotov admonished the external foe concerning the strength of the armed forces and the camp of 800,000,000 living in the peace-loving states of the Soviet empire. The three addresses were more of a political platform than a cry of grief.

V. WRESTLING WITH STALIN'S GHOST

One problem with which the disciples strove around the corpse did not appear in the announcements and funeral orations. Stalin's spirit was mighty, even in death. They, the priests of his cult, had made his figure so vast that they and all their deeds were dwarfed by it. Now they would have to cut him down to size.

But to what size? Down to their own size? Otherwise how could these pygmies aspire to rule over a great people? Cut him out altogether from the apostolic succession of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Comrade X, the succession of wisdom and infallibility, of the right to speak and dictate in the name of the class which has the right to speak and dictate in the name of society? But if they broke the apostolic succession and cut out his name, who then would consecrate them? Why were they there at the head of a great nation? By virtue of what authority and what selection could they still claim to be rulers of the land and ultimately of the world? Who were they if not Stalin's men? Who had raised this little band of frightened, uncertain men to the suddenly truncated top of a vast social pyramid? Who had cleared the way of their betters and then promoted them to their present status?

How far could they go in diminishing his name without calling in question his cruel conquests, his "achievements" in industry, agriculture, the atomization of society, the monolithicization of the party, the totalization of power over body

and spirit, over industry, agriculture, politics, force, persuasion and culture? How could they diminish his name without weakening the obedience of all the conquered provinces?

Not cut him down, and they would remain forever dwarfs. Cut him down, and they ran the risk of cutting down those who had been his lieutenants, themselves, along with him.

What advantage could they take of the general expectation of change that has always surged up at the death of a tyrant, without giving such force and body to that expectation as might turn it into an irresistible power? What negative parts of the heritage of an aging, increasingly rigid, increasingly paranoiac tyrant could they now unload upon the corpse, even as he himself had taught them by his unloading of responsibility for the "excesses" of the purges upon the corpses of Yagoda and Yezhov? How far could they dare to use the plea of *sua culpa* as a means to avoid the need of a *mea culpa*?

And how far could they trust each other while they engaged in this difficult operation cutdown? Which of them might claim to be "the closest comrade-in-arms" of Comrade Stalin if the cult continued undiminished? And which might claim to have tried hardest to check and thwart him if they decided on the posthumous reduction of his stature? What moral code was there to restrain the aspirants to the succession from framing each other up, and killing each other?

In theory it was conceivable that a committee government, a *Directoire*, a triumvirate, duumvirate, decemvirate, or some other self-designated collegial body of men, might wield autocratic, dictatorial, centralized and total power. But the whole course of fifty years of party history, from 1903 to 1923 with Lenin, from 1923 to 1953 with Stalin as personal dictator; the whole course of the history of revolutions that rupture legitimacy and refuse to restore it; the whole dynamic of dictatorship and totalitarianism, testify against the permanence of such an expedient.

Even in Lenin's day, before the Central Committee and

Politburo had been completely drained of all political life, before they had yet become "monolithic," it had proved impossible to arrange a peaceful and "collegial" succession. Even the enormous authority of Lenin's dying Will had not been able to prevail.

Collective leadership, difficult at best, is impossible without democracy. Where in all fields there is dictatorship, where there are no constitutional rules binding upon the rulers, where force active or potential settles all things, where opposition, check, substitution from below, are not part of the essential game of politics but something to be eliminated and crushed, the whole momentum of the state and the system drives relentlessly towards personal dictatorship. So it was with Lenin; so it was with Mussolini; so it was with Hitler; so it was with Stalin.

The struggle might be muted and concealed, it might be long or short, it might be compromised and blunted and delayed and each fractional dictator might repeat and repeat his pledge against it, but the whole dynamics of dictatorship would continue to cry out for a dictator, autocracy for an autocrat, militarized life for a supreme commander, infallible doctrine for an infallible interpreter, infallible government for an infallible leader, authoritarianism for a supreme authority a totalitarian party-state for a *Duce, Fuehrer, Vozhd.*

The orphaned heirs concerting and trafficking around the corpse were men who had been taught in a hard school to make many cautious moves in their head before they touch one piece on the chessboard of power. The bloody list of their dead gives them every reason to combine against any man who moves too fast. That they would begin their orphaned rule with the proclamation of a "collective leadership" could have been predicted.*

* Years before Stalin died the author did predict it in a classified paper prepared for the State Department under the title of *On Death in the Family*. This portion was declassified and published in *Foreign Affairs* in the first issue

The first issue of *Kommunist* published after Stalin's death (March 9, 1953, when Stalin had been dead only four days) declared that the party's greatest strength lay in "collective work, collective leadership, and monolithic unity." That the spirit of monolithic unity (obligatory unanimity) contradicts the spirit of collectivity, was of course ignored.

On March 14, Premier Malenkov, laying down the burden of the party First Secretaryship "at his own request," told the Supreme Soviet that "the strength of the Government will consist in its collective leadership."

But on March 15, *Pravda* spoke of the departed charismatic leader in these glowing words:

The beacon of the new era shines brightly over all the world. And the stormy waves, no matter with what frenzy they may dash against it, do not have the strength to crumble even one particle from the granite rock.

The hollow inflated metaphor as a substitute for genuine emotion could have come from the style and writings of the departed himself.

But on March 23, only eighteen days after the loss of the "never-to-be-crumbled rock," an entire issue of *Pravda* appeared without so much as a single reference to his person or his name. And on April 16, *Pravda* tactfully used a quotation from Stalin himself to denounce leaders who "decide important questions personally, without consulting members of the bureaus."

Thus, even before the corpse was cold or his memory had begun to dim, the orphaned sons began to wrestle with the Father's ghost. Operation Cutdown was dangerous and difficult and even uncertain as to scope. It was intended to be carefully timed, spaced out, doled in tolerable and gradually habituating doses. Like all things in the total state, it was intended to be planned and controlled.

after Stalin's death in an article entitled *The Struggle for the Succession* (July, 1953).

The heirs tried out the ghost for size, experimented with differing formulae; tested measured doses of desanctification, recoiling from unwanted consequences like East Germany's June, 1953, riots, Czechoslovakia's strikes, the concentration camp rebellion in Vorkuta, the Tiflis riots, Poznan; they secretly quarreled with each other and sought personal advantage out of varying recipés;* they skipped the commemoration of one of his birthdays altogether (1953), then gave him on the next great and eternal renown. Even as late as November 24, 1955, Mikoyan—who was to deliver the first public attack on Stalin's memory within three months—was proud to be praised in *Pravda* on his birthday as “the true pupil of Lenin and Comrade-in-Arms of Stalin.” And on Stalin's own birthday in late December, 1955, with the Twentieth Congress less than two months away, Radio Moscow spoke of

the shining memory of the great continuer of Lenin's immortal cause, the outstanding theoretician of Marxism, whose whole life and whole activity was devoted to the service of the people.

Thus for three years the heirs were wrestling with the heritage and the ghost of him from whom they inherited, but it cannot be said that they prevailed. At the end of three years, they felt that they had sufficiently determined and stabilized the pattern to proclaim it to the party through the sounding board of a congress. But when the carefully prepared congress opened, it turned out that there was one unmanageable spirit present, one delegate that could neither be intimidated, nor completely purged, nor altogether controlled. The most important delegate to the Congress turned out to be . . . Stalin's ghost.

* In the *Encyclopedic Dictionary* of 1955, for example, Khrushchev is described as “one of the closest comrades-in-arms of J. V. Stalin,” while the other “collective” heirs, Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich are not “closest” but simply “close comrades-in-arms.” (Vol. III, Moscow, 1955, p. 567.) Fittingly it fell to the lot of the closest comrade-in-arms to give the mortal blow to Stalin's memory at the Twentieth Congress.

VI. THE FALL OF THE TRIUMVIRATE.

In a more fundamental sense, the Twentieth Congress had been in preparation during all of the three years less twenty days since Stalin's death.

From the council of war around the deathbed had emerged a triumvirate: Malenkov, Beria, Molotov. At the funeral, only these three had spoken, with Khrushchev as the Chairman to "grant them the platform." Malenkov, nominated by Beria, became both Premier and First Secretary. Beria, nominated by Malenkov, became First Deputy Premier and took over the control of both arms of the Secret Police. Molotov became second First Deputy Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and symbol of the continuity of "Old Bolshevism," Leninist, Stalinist, and Post-Stalinist.

For nine days, Malenkov was the heir-apparent as "Head of the Party and the Government." But on the ninth day, "at his own request," he was "relieved" of the post of First Secretary. After two years, again "at his own request," he was "relieved" of the Premiership as well. Having confessed to errors in agriculture, which could only have been committed by Khrushchev ("my guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture"), and to "insufficient experience in local work . . . and in the direct guidance of individual branches of the national economy," he was made Minister of Electric Power Stations. So ended the succession claims of Triumvir No. One.

On June 26, 1953, Lavrentii Beria was arrested. He had been in restored charge of the Security Forces for a little over three months. He had used his powers to release the Doctor Poisoners, to arrest those who had extorted confessions from them, to rehabilitate some of his followers who had been victims of injustice in Georgia, to proclaim a sweeping amnesty of petty offenders, to promise a revision of the Penal Code "within sixty days," to appoint new police chiefs in virtually all the Republics of the Soviet Union, to remove the Ukrainian Party Secretary, Melnikov (a Khrushchev man), for his outraging of Ukrainian national feeling. He was "tried" according to "Socialist legality" without specific charges (at least four different and contradictory versions have been given).* He was reported to have been tried before a Supreme Court which illegally included only one Supreme Court Justice, the other "judges" being two generals, two trade union functionaries, one party functionary, a Deputy Minister of the Interior, and the President of the Moscow City Court. Although he was tried under the "Kirov Law" of Dec. 1, 1934, without being present or represented by attorney, nevertheless he was reported to have "confessed." He was accused of "wrecking" activities in agriculture (an obscure hint that he and his friends, Bagirov and Arutinov, had attacked the program of agrarian boss, Khrushchev), of "reviving bourgeois nationalism" in Georgia and the Ukraine, of "maintaining and expanding his links with foreign intelligence," of carrying out but "deliberately slowing up" the improvement of "Soviet legality." Two years later, in the present Address, Khrushchev transforms his action in exonerating the Doctors into the charge that it was he who had framed the case against them.

Within 24 hours of the "trial" he was shot, made a retroactive imperialist agent, and finally an unperson. Subscribers

* See the articles on his arrest in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* of July 10, 1953, the statement in the same papers of December 17, 1953; that of December 23, 1953; and the various accounts of Khrushchev, including those in the present Address.

to the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* received a letter instructing them to remove his picture and the account of his life with a razor blade, and paste in their place an article on the Behring Sea. Thus ended the Second Triumvir.*

In September 1955, two and one half years after Stalin's death, Molotov publicly confessed that he didn't know socialism when he saw it. Thus the third Triumvir was out.

* In May, 1956, Khrushchev told the French leader, Senator Pierre Commin that Beria was actually shot at a Presidium Meeting, shortly after Stalin's death, and many months before the announced Beria trial. For Khrushchev's account to Commin see p. 316. For more on the Beria case and the cases of "The Beria Gang," see pp. 189-213.

VII. MORE EQUAL THAN THE OTHERS.

Nine days after Stalin's death, when Malenkov "requested" his removal as First Secretary, Khrushchev became *de facto* the boss of the party machine. In due course he was himself publicly designated First Secretary and began reorganizing the powerful Secretariat by adding men of his own choosing, easing out those appointed by Malenkov, or by Malenkov and Stalin, during the latter's last years. With the exception of Beria and the members of the "Beria Gang," the purge that gave Khrushchev visible control of the main power lever had been bloodless.

The belief that *knowledge is power* having been reversed under totalitarianism to read *power is knowledge*—Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev now began to exhibit mastery in every field. He told architects how to design buildings; builders how to use concrete, steel, pre-fab units and other materials; managers how to apply technology to industry; urban youth where to invest their energy and enthusiasm; farmers where corn must, should and would have to grow, why the range must be ploughed up, why cotton growing regions should eat rice instead of potatoes; milkmaids how many times a day a cow should be milked;* artists what the proportions are in which

* It is startling to learn from Khrushchev that "it has long been an unwritten law of animal husbandry that cows should be milked at least three times a day . . . and some collective and state farms have increased the milkings to four and five a day." (Pravda and Izvestia, Jan. 21, 1956). He told his bemused hearers that actual experiments had been conducted and had now established the fact that cows preferred to be milked twice a day, and gave more milk

sincerity and party spirit should be mixed to produce a proper work of art.

At the same time, Khrushchev became the authority on foreign affairs. With Bulganin, and sometimes with Mikoyan, or Shepilov, or Furtseva, he went to Warsaw and Prague, to China, Yugoslavia, Geneva, East Germany, India, Burma and Afghanistan in his pre-Congress buildup. He has since been to England, and to Yugoslavia once more, and has several times hinted that he would like to visit the United States.

On these trips he ignored the Foreign Minister, reducing Molotov to a mere head of chancery. He showed a readiness to speak off the cuff, to combine rude threats and sharp-tongued jests with lip service to "peaceful coexistence." From Geneva, where the Soviet Government had pledged itself to give serious consideration to all-German free elections, he went straight to East Germany to assure its Communist rulers that those who expected him to abandon any Communist positions (not the least of which was a belief in controlled elections) could "wait until the crayfish whistles on the mountain top." While touring India, Burma and Afghanistan he engaged in the crudest anti-British propaganda that had been heard since Lenin's day. "Had the British contributed a single thing in Asia?" he asked, and answered "No, they were gangsters in the full sense of the word." When he was getting ready for his trip to England, he repeated his "gangster" statement with the bland assurance that there was "nothing in it which could offend Britain or the British people or the British Government." He told India that he supported its claims on Kashmir; Afghanistan that he supported its claims on Pushtunistan, to be carved out of Pakistan; and to the Pakistan Government

on less labor time of milkmaids in two milkings than in three, four or five. This any peasant could have told the boss of agriculture if he had but been asked or permitted to speak. But the wisdom of the countless ages since animals were first domesticated had to be learned afresh by time studies of milkmaids and their yield, and then proclaimed by the First Secretary.

he gave a four paragraph lecture on the might of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, beginning "We do not want to frighten anybody" and ending "we are certain that the people of Pakistan will realize what an invidious position their country has placed itself in and will draw the right conclusions."* In England he openly threatened the British political leaders and then their leaders in trade with the speed of Moscow's jet planes and the accessibility of England to "ballistic intercontinental missiles which cover such distances in several minutes." While Zhukov and Bulganin continued a polite exchange of notes with Eisenhower, Khrushchev called the President's open-skies proposal "little different from espionage," then added rudely: "We do not like people to look into our bedroom."** The sharp jests and homely figures of speech are a welcome relief from Stalin's intolerable dullness, but he yields nothing in rudeness or belicose tone. These incautious, off-the-cuff utterances show how little he troubles to consult with the "collective leadership." It is the self-confident voice of authority.

The execution of Beria and his associates, and the humiliation of the other members of the post-Stalin *troika* were but the first stage of a purge that prepared the Twentieth Congress. In July, 1955, the Congress was announced and its date set for February 14, 1956, at which time it actually convened. Simultaneously with the issuance of the call, two new members were introduced into the Presidium: Suslov, of the Central Committee Secretariat, and Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Ukraine. These were added, not by the "sovereign Congress," but by way of preparation for it. Both were Khrushchev men. At the same time, three new Secretaries were added to Khrushchev's Secretariat: Aristov, who became his Chief of Cadres; Belyaev, and Shepilov, also Khrushchev men. Shatalin, a Malenkov follower, disappeared from the roster of Secretaries.

That same July began changes in Party Secretaries and other

* Address to the Supreme Soviet, December 29, 1955.

** *New York Times*, April 20, 1956; *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, April 25, 1956.

high officials in all republics, provinces, regions and industrial centers. In a few cases, Khrushchev personally visited the region and superintended the change. More often he sent Aristov. They were reminiscent of the change of First Secretaries by Stalin in 1937 (Khrushchev speaks of “imaginary plots—in 1937—in all Krai, Oblasts, Republics . . . the heads of which—for no known reason were first secretaries of Oblast or Republic Communist Party Committees”). Though he removed the same key power men for the same “unknown” reason, in this case the purges were bloodless, except in Georgia and among Security Police officials. All the other changes can be summed up in the general formula: key officials 100 per cent faithful to the collective leadership were replaced by others more than 100 per cent faithful. The new men were drawn in their overwhelming majority from Khrushchev’s former Ukrainian machine, from his former Moscow machine, from subordinates he had placed in White Russia, and from those whom he had sent to supervise the ploughing up of the new lands. These in turn have been changing their subordinates so that the changeover has been filtering down, and is still continuing.

As late as February 1, 1956, with the Congress only two weeks away, Kruglov was removed as Minister of the Interior, and replaced by Duderov, from Khrushchev’s Moscow apparatus, a man with no high police experience. The process of “renovation” reached its climax at the Congress itself, where out of 255 members and alternates of the incoming Central Committee, 113 or 44 per cent were new. Of the 44 per cent that disappeared from the “summit of the collective leadership” Khrushchev had this to say:

Bolshevik criticism, without regard to persons . . . included a number of members of the Central Committee. A number . . . not having justified the high confidence placed in them by the Party were dropped from the Central Committee. Is it necessary to prove that the unity of the Party did not lose by that but only gained?

No one thought it was necessary . . .

The Congress left no doubt that the First Secretary was "more equal than the others." Opening Address, Khrushchev; Report on all matters, Khrushchev; Chairman of the Committee to draw up a resolution on the Report, Khrushchev; Closing Address, Khrushchev; Chairman of the newly created Bureau for Party Affairs of the Russian Republic, Khrushchev; Secret Report on Stalin's Ghost, Khrushchev. Even Bulganin's Report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan was nothing more than an extended gloss on the Report of the Central Committee delivered by its First Secretary. It took Josef Stalin three or four congresses of "collective leadership" before he got to be that much of a factotum.

The photographs in *Pravda* were carefully regulated as to size and the central position given to Khrushchev in all delegation chats. The applause, determined by protocol, controlled by the example set by those on the platform, then solemnly noted in the stenogram, made clear the order of precedence.

No one but Nikita Khrushchev received "stormy, prolonged applause, transforming itself into an ovation. All rise."

Bulganin got "continued, long-lasting applause. All rise." But no ovation.

Mikoyan got "stormy, long-lasting applause," but no one rose.

Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Suslov got "stormy, continued applause." Kaganovich and Pervukhin only "stormy applause." Kirichenko only "continued applause." Saburov only "applause."

Such is the code that measures spontaneous enthusiasm at the new Byzantine Court, a code devised by Stalin and continued by his heirs.

Of course, there may be reasons for Khrushchev's haste in monopolizing the stage while all the slogans proclaim a collective leadership. He is sixty-two; Stalin got his hand on the main power lever when he was more than fifteen years

younger. Khrushchev has no galaxy of stars to get rid of, comparable to Lenin's associates. He has taken over a party which, in his words, is now "more monolithic than ever." It took Stalin more than a decade of experimentation before he could engineer his first trial, confession and execution of a Communist such as was worked on Beria within three months of Stalin's death. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev had no prior "theoretical" work to his credit. His 50,000 word public report to the Congress and his 30,000 word secret report constitute his first claim to the stature of interpreter and infallible repository of sacred doctrine.

One has only to compare Stalin's last Congress with Khrushchev's first to become aware of the latter's sense of urgency. At the Nineteenth Congress, the Opening Address was by Molotov; the Report of the Central Committee by Malenkov; on the National Question by Beria; on the Fifth Five-Year Plan by Saburov; on Party Statutes, Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan; on Program, Kaganovich; on Political Education, Suslov; Closing Address, Voroshilov. Stalin signed the basic document, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, a 50,000 word tract published on the eve of the Congress and glossed and celebrated for its wisdom and genius by every speaker. But he spoke for only ten minutes to the foreign delegations, laying down some general lines on international questions. The aging *Vozhd* secure in his patriarchal dominion over the sons and confident of their zeal in praising his name, could allow far more semblance of "collective leadership" than could the *parvenu* leader on his anxious way up.

VIII. THE CONGRESS AS SOUNDING BOARD.

A Party Congress is supposed to be the "supreme body" of the Communist Party. It picks the Executive, lays down the line, exacts responsibilities. But even in Lenin's day, the Congress had been drained of its sovereign powers. Lenin's centralism had led him to appoint organizers to set up and run the local organizations, and these had returned in due course as delegates to a Congress to confirm the Center which had appointed them. After he took power, Lenin began to settle the urgent and bewildering variety of problems in the Politburo, or Orgburo, or in impromptu consultation with whatever leaders happened to be on hand. Essentially, he was so sure that he was right that he settled all matters himself. At the Tenth Congress in March, 1921, he dealt the final blow to the authority of a Congress by abolishing the free discussion period with its groups and platforms, which had hitherto been the prelude to every such gathering. From this time forward, the Congress became no more than a sounding board for predetermined policies of the Dictator.

Once the Congress was thus reduced to a "monolith," it became a matter of convenience whether it was summoned or not. Stalin delayed one congress until he had purged the Trotskyites, another until he had finished off Zinoviev and his group, a third until he had settled accounts with Bukharin. In 1934, the Seventeenth Congress celebrated the "victories" over Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, over advocates of

fair wages (more consumers' goods), and over the peasantry. Thereafter Stalin postponed the next Congress (the Eighteenth) while he purged the ranks of the Stalinites themselves. Originally annual affairs, this time five years elapsed between congresses. Then there was not another until 1952, a period of thirteen years! It occurred when Stalin's death was only five months away.

According to the new party statutes, the next one was not due until October 1956, but the heirs did not wait the now statutory four years. As soon as Khrushchev had settled with the Triumvirate, the date of the Twentieth Congress was set for three and one half years after the Nineteenth. It was held early because the new leadership needed a sounding board. And as a sounding board, it must be pronounced the most successful of Congresses.

The 1,436 hand-picked delegates was too large a body to enter into a serious discussion of, much less a determination of, the line or leadership. They neither could, nor dared, to do so. About 500 of them, or 37 per cent, were persons who had been advanced to leading positions since Stalin's death.* Many who attended the Nineteenth Congress had been demoted, or, as in the case of a Beria or a Poskrebyshev, executed. Virtually all the speakers were members of the top committees. Even these merely praised, amplified, pinpointed, or glossed Khrushchev's report. The participation of the rest was limited to the protocolized "applause," "laughter," "commotion in the hall," "animation," "indignation in the hall," and reporting back to their "constituents"—in short, the functions of a human sounding board to give resonance to whatever the First Secretary and his Associates wanted to amplify, and to withhold resonance from whatever it was desired to play down.

Though Khrushchev reported on everything, served as factotum, and received the only "ovation," the sounding board

* Calculation of Alexander Uralov in *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Vol. III, No. 5, May, 1956, p. 32.

reverberated with the slogan of “collective leadership.” Neither the death of Beria and his associates, nor the allusion to the downgrading and errors of Malenkov and Molotov by Khrushchev at the Congress, nor the absence of any division of reports among the “collective leaders” could prevail against the planned iteration and amplification of the slogan.

“Malenkov is still alive!” said the Commentators in genuine astonishment, forgetting how Stalin had championed “collective leadership” and opposed “bloodletting from 1923 to 1929, nor had dared to shed the blood of a comrade until he had been in power for a decade and a half. They forgot, too, how Poskrebyshev had disappeared in 24 hours and Beria in three months, while the blood-purge of Beriaites was still continuing and would continue after the Congress adjourned.

“The method of blood-letting is dangerous and contagious,” Stalin had warned the Fourteenth Congress. In the end he was to verify his prophecy on so vast, capricious and paranoiac a scale that it is hard to believe that his disciples will ever repeat the mass blood-purge. But they were schooled in it, and are its beneficiaries. They have inherited a party and a society so atomized and rendered so “monolithic” by it, that they can count on the will-lessness and eager obedience of all its parts. Still it must be recognized that they handled “the Beria gang” in a manner worthy of their Master, and will not soon forget the arts of silent and bloodless, and, where they deem it necessary, noisy and bloody, purging.

IX. STALINISM IN INDUSTRY.

Nine-tenths of the "debates" were discussions on how to maintain and carry out the line of "primacy of heavy industry" which Stalin had introduced in 1929. The discussion was largely a series of concrete proposals for further speedup. But none of this was new, and correspondents must look for something new to report, so nine-tenths of all the flood of talk went unreported, as does nine-tenths of each day's daily grist of exhortation and command in the Soviet press. Attention was concentrated on the "novelty" of the future seven-hour day or 40-hour week, to be introduced in the course of the next five years; the pledge of greater equalization of pay for the lowest paid, along with greater "incentive pay for unequal production;" and the promise to raise pensions so that the aged and infirm might really stop work without becoming too great a burden on their dependents.

Who was there to remember that the seven-hour day had first been promised in 1927, to celebrate the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution? Or that it had been written into the Constitution of 1936, and proclaimed once more to celebrate the Twentieth Anniversary? In 1957 it will be proclaimed yet again to celebrate the fortieth anniversary! As Boris Souvarine has remarked: "Bolshevism has always been very expert in conjugating the future tense."

But Khrushchev's real plans for the future of Russia's working class are summed up in his denunciation of those

who are "trying to prove that at a certain stage of socialism, the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task."

Pervukhin glossed Khrushchev's (actually Stalin's) basic line in these words:

Our party has fought decisively, and is fighting against the anti-Leninist view . . . that heavy industry may ever cease to be our main task at any of the stages of Socialist construction.

Translated into plain speech, this means that *never* will butter take precedence over bombs, *never* will production for use (socialism) take precedence over production for accumulation, for the power and wealth of the state (totalitarianism). The heirs may cut off two hours on Saturday afternoon, or even return in a year or two to Stalin's one-time seven-hour day (1937 to 1940). But Stalin himself never ventured to discount the future that heavily. Now the very existence of the future tense is being called into question. What then is left of Utopia?

X. STALINISM IN AGRICULTURE.

In agriculture, too, the Congress confirmed the Stalinist line and took steps to continue and extend it. Or rather, since the Congress itself legislated nothing, it hailed the steps that had been taken since Stalin's death, and foreshadowed steps to be taken.

Khrushchev had been Stalin's chief overseer in agriculture during the last years of his reign. It was he who discovered that, in the peasant, existence does not seem to determine consciousness in good Marxist fashion, since after twenty years of collective existence "the little worm of private ownership still sits in the mind of the *kolkhoznik*." Khrushchev's remedy had been Stalin's: more party control and regulation. To this end, he had championed the *agrorod*, which, stripped of its "music of the future," meant the uprooting of the existing kolkhoz villages with their private parcels and memories of individual farming, and the merger of the already gigantic kolkhozes into larger and larger units under more and more complete party and Machine Tractor Station control. The Congress was able to record that the number of kolkhozes had been reduced by merger from 254,000 in 1950 to 87,371. Whereas in 1950 most kolkhozes could not even boast of a single party member, the Congress noted with satisfaction that now all but 8.4 per cent of them had party cells. In 1955 alone, more than 30,000 city Communists had been sent to kolkhozes to be "elected" chairmen, and virtually every Col-

lective Farm now had its own Machine Tractor Station to act as the state's economic overseer.

Since Stalin's death, Khrushchev had gone with fresh energy about a characteristic Stalinist revolution from above: the ploughing up of the range and new lands, with city Communists as settlers and with Sovkhozoes (State Farms) rather than kolkhozoes (Collective Farms) as end product. If this giant gamble with nature should fail (after all the range was range because it has a short summer and more dry years than wet ones), it might still turn in a few good crops. And as a by-product, achieve population transfers to Soviet Asia and strengthen Asia's Russification. Moreover, it did not escape the Congress delegates, Stalin trained all of them, that "criticism and self-criticism" was not meant to apply to, but only be applied by the First Secretary. Andreyev had been demoted for criticizing Khrushchev's agricultural plans while Stalin was alive. Malenkov had already taken upon himself the blame for "shortcomings in agriculture" since Stalin's death. Beria had been charged with "sabotage of the kolkhoz," and two other critics of the *agrogorod* drive, Bagirov and Arutinov, had gone into the cellars of the Secret Police as part of the Beria Gang. Could the Congress be less than enthusiastic about corn, the ploughing up of the range, the multiplication of *Sovkhozoes* and the merger of *Kolkhozoes*?

However, the sharpest blow to the peasant was delivered quietly, with the sounding board muted. Not the First Secretary but a delegate from Cherkassy Province, F. I. Dubkovetsky, was given the floor to urge that

. . . it is necessary to reconsider the question of the participation of the collective farmers in the communal economy so that the collective farmer will work not a mere minimum of work days but throughout the entire year. . . . Life itself shows that the small parcels must be reduced to a common denominator, with one tenth of a hectare allotted per able-bodied person . . .

Here was the voice of the "rank and file" peasant crying

to be further driven and to have his small parcel curtailed further! As soon as the Congress had adjourned and the sounding board was dismantled, the *kolkhozniks* learned that their plea had been heard. On March 10, *Pravda* published a decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers which declared:

It is essential that the collective farmers' personal garden plots should be of subsidiary importance until the communal sector has been developed sufficiently to satisfy fully both . . . public needs and the personal needs of the *kolkhoznik*, and the main part of his income must stem from his participation in kolkhoz production, while his garden plot should be of truly subordinate importance . . . an embellishment of his way of life.

On June 29, *Pravda* published another decree (of lesser importance) attacking the private ownership of the single cow, once guaranteed by Stalin to every private parcel tiller. But this time it was the cow owned by dwellers in cities or city suburbs, and because these were more important than ordinary *kolkhozniks*, they were to be paid for the cow at something approximating the market price. The explanation given was that the urbanite and the suburbanite were often distracted from their regular work, and that the grain used in feeding the private cow should be going into bread for other citizens. Thus do the decrees continue to rain upon the stubborn soil where the little worm of private farming still sits and will not be flushed out completely.*

* For more on agriculture see pp. 229-237 and Appendix D.

XI. A NEW LOOK AT THE "NEW MEN."

Looked at closely, the "new men" turn out not to be so new either. The Presidium of 11 contains 7 of Stalin's old nine-man Politburo (all that are left now that Stalin and Beria are dead); plus two added by Stalin at the Nineteenth Congress, Pervukhin and Saburov; plus two from Khrushchev's Secretariat, Suslov and Kirichenko, added not by the Congress but six months before the "sovereign body" met. In short, the Presidium consists of Stalin's men plus Khrushchev's men. It called the Congress after taking that shape, purged the party of any who might not have fitted its pattern, then was confirmed in office by the Congress it had summoned.

The Candidate Members (Alternates), however, with the exception of Shvernik, are new, and therefore tell us something of the direction in which the party is moving.

Most important of these is Marshall Zhukov. His rise, like so many of the events amplified by the sounding board of the Congress, did not begin there but immediately on Stalin's death. The reshuffle around the corpse lifted him from rustication to a key post as First Deputy Minister of Defense. He is now Minister. His programmatic speeches on military policy and on the history of World War II, his place in *Pravda* pictures and state receptions, all told the observer that he had become part of the top political leadership even before the Congress violated the usual alphabetical order to make him "first" Candidate Member. It is the first time that a professional

of the armed forces has risen so high in the political machine, and it is probable that his specific gravity in the new "collective leadership" is higher than his political title indicates. His rise would appear to be due to the lack of any popular figure among Stalin's heirs; to the importance of the armed forces in this era of "peaceful coexistence;" to the dependence of Khrushchev and Company on the army when they executed Poskrebyshev and Beria. Marshall Zhukov has been a party member since 1920, but he is a professional as well in whose party loyalty there is undoubtedly some room for an army *esprit de corps*. He is regarded as a prime mover in the drive to rewrite the history of World War II to downgrade Stalin and give the field generals their due, and in the drive to rehabilitate the 5,000 officers who died in the Tukhachevsky purge. Indeed, the need to rehabilitate the army and clear it of this incredible stigma of spawning more traitors than all the other armies in history put together, would have compelled the heirs to other rehabilitations even if they lacked any other motive.

At the Congress, Zhukov was one of the few speakers who did not praise Khrushchev or his report. His speech made it clear that one of his functions is to cover with the mantle of his popularity the new demands upon the masses involved in the stepping up of the Stalinist line of the "primacy of heavy industry." Indeed, he came close to giving a working definition of that line when he declared; "The great achievements of heavy industry have made possible the rearming of our army, navy and air force with first class military equipment."

In a regime based on absolute force, the army becomes more important with the downgrading of the police. It is impossible to tell how many in the leading body are really chekists (like Bulganin, for instance, who made his career in the Cheka beginning in 1918, and is an army Marshall only by virtue of being Chief of the Party's Special Section for penetrating and controlling the army). But the open practi-

tioners of the profession have suffered diminution. Three who were in the Central Committee were shot with Beria; three failed of reelection, i.e. were purged; and only three are on the new committee. For the first time there is no police official on the Presidium (Politburo). The Central Committee police officials include Duderov, apparently new to the police, who is Khrushchev's appointee as Minister of the Interior; Lunev, Deputy Minister and one of Beria's "judges"; and Serov, Chairman of the new KBG, Committee on State Security (the latest incarnation of the Protean MGB). Serov's name should reassure those who may fear a "lack of vigilance." Though Khrushchev has now condemned the mass deportation of entire peoples, Serov, the expert organizer of such deportations, retains his place as Chief of the KGB. He acquired international renown when he took over the Baltic Republics and prepared a suspect list, not by deeds but, in true totalitarian fashion by categories. His 11 suspect categories included Esperantists and philatelists. He is nothing if not thorough.

Moreover, Khrushchev reassured the fearful on continued vigilance in his public Report, in which he also set down the limits on the apologies to corpses:

Our party is now more monolithic than ever . . . its unity has been built up in years and decades of struggle with Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Bourgeois Nationalists, and others of the worst enemies of the people,* champions of the restoration of capitalism . . .

Great attention has been given and is being given by the Central Committee to the strengthening of socialist legality. . . . It is necessary to say that in connection with the revision and cancellation of a number of verdicts, some comrades have begun to exhibit a certain lack of confidence in the workers of the organs of State Security. This is wrong and harmful. . . . Our Chekists in their overwhelming majority are honest workers . . . we have confidence in these cadres . . .

Capitalist encirclement has sent in among us not a few spies and wreckers. It would be naive to suppose that now the enemies will cease their efforts. . . . Therefore, we must strengthen in every way revolutionary vigilance and the organs of State Security.

* See page 106 for Khrushchev's explanation of the "usefulness" of the term, *enemy of the people*, in preventing the examination of an ideological position or the revision of a verdict.

There is some evidence of friction between the career generals and the political administration of the army, whose top figure is Bulganin. Brezhnev, added to the Presidium Candidates as a Khrushchev man (his last job was party secretary to oversee the ploughing up of the range in Kazakhstan) is also a political general, and thus a counterweight to Zhukov. But there has been a clean sweep of political army officials from the Central Committee.

If Zhukov is not a Khrushchev man, all the other new Presidium Candidates are: Brezhnev (already identified); Furtseva, from his Moscow machine; Mukhitdinov, who was his First Secretary in Uzbekistan for the drive to plough the new lands and increase the cotton yield; Shepilov, from the Central Committee *Agitprop*, a Secretary under Khrushchev since last July, and now Foreign Minister.

For the first time there is no Georgian on the leading bodies, Presidium or Secretariat. Historically, Georgia has furnished high leadership to both wings of Russian Socialism from the beginning: Jordania, Tseretelli and Chkheidze to Menshevism; Stalin, Yenukidze, Orjonikidze, Beria, to Bolshevism. The new boss of Georgia, Mzhavanadze, is a poor second-string Georgian who was serving as a Chekist under Khrushchev in the Ukraine. This downgrading of the proud Georgians was one of the reasons for the Tiflis disorders.* On the other hand many Ukrainians from Khrushchev's old machine in the Ukraine, have been advanced to higher posts in Secretariat, Presidium, Central Committee and Army.

One aspect of the "new" leadership that has been little noted is its age. Khrushchev is 62. His associates, except Malenkov, Pervukhin and Saburov, are in their sixties and seventies. In this sense the new men are not so new either.

The party, too, thanks to a restrictive policy on new ad-

* Other reasons were the death of Stalin, which aroused expectation of change here as elsewhere; the uneasiness caused by incessant purges first of Beriaites, then of anti-Beriaites, and now of Beriaites again; and a deep-seated national feeling.

missions, has been permitted to grow older at a faster rate than the general population, while the Congresses have been "aging" faster than the party itself. At the Eighteenth Congress, 1.8 per cent of the delegates were over 50 (the blood purges had seen to that "renewal" of youth). At the Nineteenth Congress, 15.3 per cent were over 50, and at the Twentieth, 24 per cent. Though Stalin and his associates had killed off almost the entire generation of Old Bolsheviks and Civil War veterans, so that these two categories together form only 6 per cent of the party, they have 7 out of 11 members of the Presidium. Even if we assume that Khrushchev has won a secure hold on the top post, the problem of the succession is bound to arise again before long, and with it the problem of the aging party, the aged leadership, the rising generation knocking at the door, and the affinity of totalitarianism for purges, bloody or bloodless, as the only method of wholesale promotion and renewal.

XII. "CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT."

The Soviet Empire was built by terror and is held together by terror. Nowhere has Communism ever won power in a free election.* The Communist-controlled coalition governments were set up by force and threat of force in the countries "liberated" by the Soviet armies. Then the coalition parties were purged and swallowed up and the one-party system introduced. Finally Stalin carried out a "preventive purge" of "Titoists" or "national Communists."

With the Tyrant's death, the symbol of unity and terror vanished. Not Khrushchev's secret speech on de-Stalinization,

* Unless we except San Marino (area 38 sq. miles; pop. 15,000). Here the Communists, backed by Communist infiltrated Socialists of the Nenni type, won an election by 743 votes in a country which had previously voted fascist by the same procedure of importing voters from neighbor Italy. But here the Communists have not ventured to take power in the sense of attempting to introduce "Communism in One Country"—of 38 sq. miles.

but the physical de-Stalinization by Death revived the hopes and vitality of the subjugated nations. The Empire was not so ready to take orders from an upstart. Nor the satellite parties either. And wherever the party weakened, the nation tended to revive. Uprisings in Tiflis, Poznan, Warsaw, Budapest are but the latest in a series that began right after Stalin's death with the strikes and rebellions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in June 1953, and the strikes in the concentration camps of Vorkuta.

It seems clear then that totalitarianism's difficulties in the matter of the succession and the power vacuum at the center are freedom's opportunities. If the outside world were really the consistent crusader for freedom that it sometimes imagines itself to be, or if it were anything like the Communist picture of it, it would have taken advantage of the uncertain power position of Stalin's heirs to press for advantage. Actually it has done the opposite.

The Communist picture of an "encircling" capitalist world, united in laying perpetual siege to the Soviet Union may be a useful picture for their own war on the world and for their maintenance of a perpetual state of siege over their own people. But it does not correspond to reality.

According to this Communist dogma, the Entente and the Central Powers should have united (as Lenin predicted) in the closing stages of World War I to crush "the center of world revolution"; then the capitalist powers should have taken advantage of the famine under Lenin instead of providing famine relief; above all, they should have united in support of Hitler, the "creature and spearhead of capitalist reaction," when he carried out "their plan" and attacked the Soviet Union. Actually, they forgave Stalin his pact with Hitler, excluded from their minds the thought that he might still be dreaming of conquering the world for Communism, and gave him the most loyal—and alas, the most unconditional—aid and support.

From the very beginning the non-Communist world has

been unable to believe seriously in the Communist dogma of an inevitable final conflict between the two "systems" for the possession of the earth. It has steadily nourished the illusion that sooner or later the rulers of the Soviet Union would give up their dream of conquering the world for their dogmas and would become more responsive to the national interests of their own people.

When Lenin was commemorating the fourth anniversary of "the tearing of *the first hundred million people* of the earth" out of the "capitalist-imperialist system" by the "*first Bolshevik Revolution*" (emphasis Lenin's) and was promising that further revolutions would win "the entire human race," he made this revealing observation:

Our difficulties are vast. We are accustomed to struggle with enormous difficulties. Not for nothing have our enemies dubbed us "rock-hard" and representatives of "bone-crushing policies." But we have also learned—at least to a certain degree we have learned—another art necessary to revolution, the art of flexibility, the ability to change our tactics sharply and rapidly, taking into account changing objective conditions, choosing another path to our goal if the previous path has shown itself inexpedient or impossible for the given period.*

This was the wisdom and the statesmanship that the leader of the "rock-hard" Bolsheviks had learned from four years of experience with the responsibilities of power over the "*first hundred million people*." This tactical wisdom was learned by heart by his disciples, learned by heart by Stalin, and by his heirs.

Yet every zigzag, above all every "right feint" in the perpetual reversals of field that accompany the relentless and continuous attempt to break through to one and the same goal, has been hailed in its day as the longed for and long awaited "inevitable change," the "sobering that comes from the responsibilities of power," the "reexamination of unworkable

* Vol. XXXIII, p. 35.

dogmas," the "response to the pressure of reality," "the mellowing process that sooner or later overtakes all militant movements," the "preordained downward curve in the parabola of revolution," the "diffusion of authority which could lead to a constitutional order," the "rise of a rationalist technocracy," or of a "limited and traditionalist despotism," an "adaptation of the regime to the technological necessities of modern industry," the "inevitable work of erosion upon the totalitarian edifice." (Each of these formulae is quoted from some highly respected authority on Russian affairs.)

As early as 1921, when Lenin introduced the NEP, it was adjudged a yielding to economic reality and a making of peace with the outside world and the Russian people. "Socialism in one-country" was hailed as a break with the Lenin-Trotsky aim of world revolution. The Constitution of 1936 was the beginning of democracy and a reign of law. The rights it "guaranteed" were a sign of peace with the Russian people. The Popular Front and Litvinov Collective Security and Disarmament line were an abandonment of the class war in favor of an alliance with progressive parties and countries. The Grand Alliance evoked fresh illusions inside as well as outside Russia. The death of Stalin was hailed as the end of Stalinism. The "Geneva Sprit" had scarcely been dispelled when illusion sprang up afresh from the Twentieth Congress and the "de-sanctification" of Stalin.

All these expectations of change have involved the same two fundamentals: peace with the Soviet people and peace with the world. Which brings us back to the essence of totalitarianism: its two-fold war—an unending war on its own people to remake them in the image of its blueprint for the spirit of man; and on the rest of the world to conquer it for the inevitable and infallible Communist system. Inded the two wars are inseparably interlinked: a regime which gives its own people no peace will give the world no peace either.

XIII. "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE."

At Stalin's death, the outside world once more opened a fresh credit for his heirs. Even the wise and wary Churchill hastened to speak with hope and expectation of "a new regime" and a "new attitude," and to nourish the dream that the last spectacular act of his spectacular career might be the calling of a new four-power conference of the "summits"—like those with Stalin and Roosevelt—but this time to settle all things which those conferences had left unsettled or settled wrongly and bring real peace at long last to the world. Alas, the fruit of this dream were the barren thistles of the Geneva Conference.

Stalin's heirs badly needed the opening of this large credit to their account, and that for two reasons: the first, because Stalin had already decided on a new tack in his perpetual zigzags which they had now to carry out; and the second, their unsettled power position. It must be owned that they made good use of the credit.

From 1945-50 Stalin had taken full advantage of the illusions of the Grand Alliance and the power vacuums left in Europe and Asia at the war's end. He had seized all he could conceivably seize without risking all-out war and thus jeopardizing his power center. He had felt out the limits of imperial expansion in Berlin, where he was checked by the airlift; and in Korea, where he was checked by military resistance; and

in Iran, Greece and Turkey, where he was checked by the United Nations and the Truman Doctrine.

The Dictator had grown old and rigid and inflexible, to be sure, but not too rigid to follow what had already become the ingrained habit of zigzagging to make a fresh end-run around an insurmountable obstacle. One of the functions of the Nineteenth Congress held in October 1952, in the last autumn of Stalin's life, was to prepare the new turn. Its direction, as outlined in the basic document of the Congress, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, was to be the playing down of the "priority of the contradictions between the socialist camp," and a fresh emphasis upon and enlargement of the "contradictions inside the camp of imperialism," around the general polarizing slogan of "emancipation from American domination."

The sudden death of the aging Dictator within six months of this pronouncement enabled a fresher and more flexible carrying out of this maneuver. Moreover, the readiness of the outside world to regard these lieutenants of Stalin as "new men" gave them an additional asset. If smiles could serve as "the continuation of the cold war by other means," they were willing to smile, though Khrushchev has shown that a man may smile and smile and make the rude propaganda attack still.

The one thing that Stalin could not conceivably have done, because his prestige had gotten too involved, was to undertake the difficult game of reconciliation with Tito. This game has not yet been played out, for it involves many incalculables for both sides. Both Tito and Stalin's heirs have made gains in the neutral camp because of it. Since Tito's regime has remained a one-party, totalitarian regime with a Communist ideology and he and they have elements in common in their foreign policy, the maneuver has been possible. But Stalin's heirs have

to consider the reverberations of "Titoism" in the satellites,* while Tito has his independence, his economic aid from America, and his reputation as a fighter for independence in his own country to consider. Both sides have learned from Lenin that in every alliance or agreement of disparate groups the ultimate political question is *Kto kogo?* (pronounced *kto kovó*—*who whom?* Since Russian is a highly inflected language no verb is needed, but Lenin's implied verb was: Who *beats* whom? or Who *uses* whom?).

Aside from the Tito maneuver, the greater flexibility and freshness of younger men, and a readiness to travel to sell their line which neither Lenin nor Stalin ever showed, there is little in the maneuvers of the "new" men in foreign policy that is not traditional and smallish. It has nothing like the sweep, for example of Lenin's turn from "war communism" to the "NEP" with its accompanying switch from immediate world revolution to a "breathing spell," pleas for recognition and trade, and offers of "capitalist concessions." Nor does it have the sweep of Stalin's swing from "social fascism" to the "people's front," nor anything of the large and lightning surprises of his triple zigzag from "collective security" to the Pact with Hitler, then to the Grand Alliance, then to the Cold War. Indeed, the *epigoni* demonstrate that they are *epigoni* by the smallness and imitativeness of what they do, by their borrowing of trivial and fragmentary features from previous maneuvers, furbished with mutilated passages from the very same texts and formulations which accompanied these earlier, larger maneuvers.

It is the world's unthinking and heartfelt expectation of change and its weariness of a tension (concern) which will have to be maintained as long as the causes of it have not disappeared—it is the pathetic eagerness of the outside world

* Tito obligingly undermined "Titoism" in the Poznan riots by denouncing them as the work of foreign agents. He, too, may be shaken if the one-party system breaks up in the Soviet Empire.

to be deceived that magnifies these trivial and hackneyed maneuvers into something big and portentous.

Let us examine the post-Stalin pronouncements and maneuvers to see their antecedents and their scope.

1. The new men have claimed credit for the withdrawal from Austria, the end of the war in Korea and in Indo-China. That Stalin always intended to withdraw from Austria after he had gotten what he could out of occupation and negotiation is proved by the fact that it is the only area occupied by the Soviet Army in which he never set up a puppet government or a "People's Democracy." He had already recognized the stalemate in Korea and negotiations were near completion when he died. The stepping up of a last military offensive during the negotiations at Panmunjom were worthy of his teaching. And so was the battering down of the defenses of Dienbienphu while the heirs were negotiating at Geneva for the partition of Indo-China.

2. The line of neutralization of those who cannot be directly won for your camp is as old as Lenin, though Khrushchev and Bulganin have shown new skills in exploiting this tactical principle with their "camp of peace" extended to include the neutrals. Lenin tried variants of this in his "camp of opponents of the Versailles Treaty," in his relations with Kemal Pasha, and in his "camp of opponents of imperialism." When Mikoyan on September 17, 1956, addressed the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he quite properly invoked Lenin's spirit by quoting from one of the latter's last articles of 1923:

The outcome of the struggle in the last analysis depends upon the fact that Russia, India, China and so on, constitute a gigantic majority of the population of the globe. And it is precisely this majority which is being drawn with extraordinary rapidity in recent years into a struggle for its own liberation, so that in this sense there cannot be the shadow of a doubt as to the final outcome of the world struggle.

In this sense the final victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured.

Mikoyan's speech glossing this quotation dealt not only with Communist China but with the whole of "anti-imperialist" and "peace-loving" Asia and Africa. It was the view that Lenin had developed at the Second Congress of the Comintern. It was expounded afresh by Stalin in his first lectures on Leninism in the year Lenin died. There one can find even a recipe which might apply to Nasser more than thirty years later:

The struggle of Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals for independence of Egypt, for the same reason, is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, without regard to the bourgeois origin and bourgeois profession of the leaders of the Egyptian national movement.*

Moreover, it was Stalin who in his last years invented the "camp of peace" and the "struggle for peace." And it was he who moved from the united front of the working class against capitalism, to the popular front of many classes against fascism, and then to the non-class front of all countries and all sorts of regimes, not excluding the most reactionary, against the "main enemy"—in place of class war, cold war. In Lenin's day, the "main enemy" was Britain, and in the day of Stalin and his heirs, the United States.

Yet, the two "traveling salesmen" did not neglect Britain either when, furnished unexpectedly with credentials from America that "their desire for peace was not less earnest than that of the West," they went from Geneva to India, Burma and Afghanistan. Stalin had angled for such an endorsement with the shining bait of "peaceful coexistence" for a quarter of a century and not been able to hook it. The "new" men got it with no merit beyond the illusion that they and

* Stalin: *Collected Works*, Vol. VI, p. 144.

their ways were "new." If they did little to deserve it, they made most effective use of their Geneva credential.

3. The main foreign policy proposals of Stalin's heirs were summed up by Marshal Bulganin on November 7, 1954, while Malenkov was still Premier and the leadership somewhat more "collective" than it has since become. His chief points were:

a) A collective security system in Europe, *with* the Soviet Union and satellites, and *without* the United States.

b) Unification of Germany by "peaceful means" through an agreement between the two German governments, free elections in West Germany and controlled elections in East Germany. Such elections have been proposed by the Communists for the two Koreas, the two Indo-Chinas, and they have been practiced successfully under Stalin in the "peaceful unification" of all the post-war satellite coalition governments.

c) Proportionate reduction of armaments and outlawing of "weapons of mass destruction" (meaning specifically atomic weapons), which would leave overwhelming superiority to the heavily armed and populous Soviet bloc, eliminate the one weapon in which the Free World has superiority, without any guarantees of a foolproof control and inspection.

These three points for a "program of peace" were all inherited from Stalin and have all been repeated both at the Twentieth Congress and before and since.

One of the main purposes of the Twentieth Congress was to serve as a sounding board to make this inherited general line seem novel and peaceful. It must be admitted that here the sounding board was particularly effective, and it is worth while examining how this was done.

Every speech at the Congress that touched on these matters had two purposes: to reassure and admonish the faithful that the orthodox Lenin-Stalin revolutionary line was being preserved, and, at the same time, to reassure the outside world on the "newness" and peaceful intention of the line of the Congress. Every speech was interlarded and reinforced with

quotations from Lenin. The faithful were told on what page and in what volume and in what context they might find the *full* quotation,*but only the bowdlerized fragment was broadcast to the world. Reporters and commentators looking to separate out the fragments of new from the uninteresting “old stuff” did the rest.

* Each speaker actually interrupted the flow of his speech after each quotation from Lenin to give volume and page. In every case, if the reader takes the trouble to follow the hint, he will find Lenin's words to have been more belligerent and more “revolutionary” than the fragment broadcast by the Congress!

XIV. "WAR IS NOT INEVITABLE."

The first sensational "novelty" of the Congress was the pronouncement that war is not inevitable. Like every tack in the perpetual zigzags, this was new as compared to the last line but one. Yet it was a commonplace of one of Stalin's earlier zigzags. When Stalin brought his country into the League of Nations (called until then "The League of Bandits") and advanced his line of popular front and collective security, it was explained that the "camp of peace" could make itself strong enough to "curb the aggressors" and prevent war. During that period, the *New Times* (English Edition, Moscow) reported these words:

The speaker denied that war is inevitable, or the maintenance of peace impossible. . . . Those who say, 'As long as capitalism exists, it is impossible to avoid war and hopeless and useless to fight to maintain peace,' are either out and out doctrinaires, or ordinary imposters.

The speaker was Georgi Dimitrov, the "helmsman of the Comintern." The date was May 1, 1936. The speech was delivered from Lenin's tomb. Standing behind the speaker and applauding ostentatiously was none other than Josef Stalin! All that was new in the Twentieth Congress version was the contention that the Communist Empire had now become so strong that it alone could tie the hands of the "imperialist warmongers."

XV. THE PEACEFUL ROAD TO SOCIALISM.

Closely tied to this "novelty" was another: the Congress pronouncements on an "alternative peaceful or parliamentary road to socialism." The enthusiasm which greeted these pronouncements when the first cable summaries arrived was chilled when people took the trouble to look up the bowdlerized quotations from Lenin offered by Mikoyan, Bulganin and Khrushchev, and when they examined the truly terrifying list of "examples" of the peaceful transition to socialism.

Both Kaganovich and Shepilov quoted Lenin as declaring that "a revolution cannot be engendered on order" and those who thought so were "either fools or provocateurs." But Lenin had said this to those who wanted to risk the loss of power by refusing to sign a peace treaty with Kaiser Germany in the hope that a German Revolution might be just around the corner. In the self same speech he promised his hearers that a revolution would surely come in Germany and that the Soviet Government was doing its best to engender such a revolution. "In fact," said Lenin,

the interests of the world revolution demand that the Soviet power, having overthrown the bourgeoisie in its own land, *should aid* that revolution. But the *form* of the aid should be chosen in accord with our own strength.

The German Revolution, he continued, "had not yet matured sufficiently" for the Bolsheviks to risk the power they

had conquered by trying to give it direct military aid. But if and when the German Revolution were mature enough, it would be "our direct *obligation* to risk possible defeat and the loss of the Soviet power" to aid it.*

It remained for Khrushchev to tell the Congress that Lenin had recognized the possibility of a peaceful revolution as one of the forms of the transition to Socialism. If we pursue his "quotation" to its source we find Lenin saying the following:

Dictatorship is the rule of a part of society over the whole of society, and moreover, rule basing itself directly on force. The dictatorship of the proletariat as the only class that is revolutionary to the end is necessary for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the defeat of its counter-revolutionary attempts. The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is so important that no one can be a member of the Social Democratic party (*This was written in 1916 before Lenin called his party Communist*), if he rejects it, or gives it recognition in words only. But we cannot reject the possibility that in certain cases by way of exception, for example in some small state after its great neighbor has already accomplished a social revolution, a peaceful surrender of power by the bourgeoisie is *possible*, if they have convinced themselves of the hopelessness of resistance and prefer to keep their heads fastened to their necks. But it is much more probable, of course, that even in such a little state without a civil war socialism will *not* be achieved, and therefore the *only* program of international social democracy must be the recognition of such a civil war, although in our ideal there is no place for the use of force against people.**

Of course, few leaders of the Free World, whether in the North Atlantic Alliance or in the "neutral camp" or "zone of

* This deliberately fraudulent "quotation" was first used by Kaganovich on November 6, 1955, speaking at the Celebration of the thirty-eighth anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power. He used the fragment out of context to "prove" that his government had no responsibility for the Cold War, "never interferes in the affairs of other states," and "never helps to call forth revolutions." (*Pravda*, November 7, 1955). The full speech of Lenin, proving just the opposite, is to be found in the latter's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 46-53. Shepilov performed a similar piece of juggling at the Twentieth Congress with page 441 of the same volume (XXVII) of Lenin's works.

** *Collected Works*, Vol. XXXIII, pp 57-58. For Khrushchev's use of this article of Lenin's to make him appear to say the opposite, see: N. S. Khrushchev: *Otchetnyi doklad XX Sezdy Partii*. Gospolitizdat (Moscow, 1956), p. 41.

peace,” can be expected to look up the quotations from Lenin which Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Shepilov are professing to quote. Still the next passage in Khrushchev’s public report to the Congress was enough to chill the enthusiasm of all who read it. The examples of “peaceful transition to socialism” turned out to be: Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavia, and . . . China!

Khrushchev explained—as if we didn’t know it—that Communists might be willing to take power by non-violent infiltration of “bourgeois” institutions, but he also made it clear that once having won power in that fashion they could not and would not maintain and exercise it without recourse to violence against doomed classes and institutions. They would have to “transform parliament from an organ of bourgeois democracy into an organ of the people’s will” led by a “vanguard party, the Communist Party,” and they would treat their allies of the infiltration period as they had treated them in the satellites while establishing a one-party dictatorship in the name of the proletariat.

In the first crucial post-war election in Italy, the non-Communist parties advanced the slogan: “Vote this time or you may never vote again!” For the nature of totalitarian parliamentarism is such that the totalitarian party may lose in a dozen elections and still contest the thirteenth. But if once it wins, by parliamentary or by extra-parliamentary means, it abolishes elections and you can never vote again.

Leninism teaches us that the ruling classes will not surrender their power voluntarily—Khrushchev told the Congress.—And the greater or lesser degree of intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or the non-use of violence in the transition to socialism, depends on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiting class itself resorts to violence, rather than on the proletariat. In the countries where capitalism is still strong . . . the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp, class, revolutionary struggle.

Thus the “new line,” as it was so well summarized by the

late Peter Meyer, says: *If you yield to us without resistance, we will not use force. If you resist, we will use force. But yield you must. So it is up to you to decide whether there is to be a rape, or a peaceful voluntary yielding.**

* *New Leader*, March 12, 1956.

XVI. THE GHOST AT THE CONGRESS.

The Twentieth Congress was prepared as Lenin and Stalin had taught. All the issues had been settled; all potential contenders for the role of spokesmen disposed of, the triumvirate deposed and its most dangerous man destroyed; the brief, frightened promise of a relative increase in consumers' goods, made immediately after Stalin's death, had been withdrawn; the Presidium had been enlarged; the Sixth Five-Year Plan adopted; the Central Committee replacements determined in advance; the spokesmen and discussers had been selected and their theses and roles allotted; the pre-Congress purge was systematic and thorough and had lasted for six months. The 1436 delegates* had been picked with care. They could be counted on to cheer when the men on the platform cheered, to show animation, laugh or cry at the proper places and only at the proper places, ask no questions, raise no issues, vote *yes* on everything. The men on the platform might declaim "Back to Leninist norms," but no one would misunderstand that to mean that there were to be any of the unruly discussions of Lenin's earlier congresses, or any of the heckling or controversy of Stalin's first six years of "collective leadership." The only licensed heckler was Khrushchev, and those whom he interrupted hastened to agree with him. "More monolithic than ever," said Khrushchev of the Congress, and though the

* There were 1,355 delegates with "vote" and 81 delegates with "voice" but no vote.

word monolithic might seem to admit of no degrees of comparison, the boast was justified. "The best congress since Lenin's day," said Mikoyan.

The great sounding board was a marvel of mechanical perfection, amplifying every "novelty" that was to be amplified, muting what was to be muted, silencing what was to remain unheard.

Even the matter of Josef Stalin and his place in history seemed to have been precisely prepared by three years of experimentation. The publicized sessions were to give obscure hints to the initiate, and to the world something to speculate on and guess wrongly about. It was the first congress without Stalin but the meed of praise was to be measured out in homeopathic doses and the condemnation to be expressed in cryptic algebraic formulae.

Between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Congresses—said Khrushchev in his opening words—we have lost the outstanding activists [not *Vozhd* now, or even *rukovoditel*, but plain *deyatel*]:* Josef Vissarionovich Stalin, Klement Gottwald, and Kyuichi Tokuda. I ask every one to rise in honor of their memory.

But yesterday the word of Caesar might have stood against the world. Now lies he there. . . .

And none so indisciplined or indiscreet as to sob, protest, cry out, as they rose in orderly silence to do demeaning honor to His memory.

As each "collective leader" read his predetermined speech with its predetermined slighting reference to the "cult of the personality," and as Mikoyan at last questioned by name the infallibility of the Infallible, there were no gasps, no interjections, no visible emotions, no "indignation in the hall." Yesterday these were 1,436 Stalinists: today not a Stalinist in the lot of them. Were ever any 1,436 outstanding human beings—vanguard of the vanguard of the party which is the

* *Vozhd* is the Russian equivalent of *Duce* and *Fuehrer*; *rukovoditel* is leader in the everyday, non-charismatic sense; *deyatel* is merely active participant.

vanguard of the class which is the vanguard of humanity—were ever any other 1,436 outstanding human beings so perfectly drilled, so uniform in thought and feeling, so inhumanly identical and predictable?

But on the eleventh day at midnight, something went wrong. It was at a secret session, so secret that in the columns of *Pravda* it never took place at all. It was a session for delegates only, with all the distinguished foreign guests from brother parties excluded. No notes were to be taken, and every one was enjoined to the strictest secrecy. For now the problem of Stalin's Spirit was to be settled once and for all. The delegates were to be told in the strictest confidence what had been Stalin's errors and achievements, what his place in history, and how much of this they should tell to the party, by what stages, in what measured doses.

It was at this point that the sounding board, hitherto so mechanically perfect, began to act up: it turned on when it should have been completely off, displayed monstrous powers of amplification, startling with its blast the speaker, delegates, party, country, satellites, and the world. In the sepulchral acoustics of the secret meeting, every accusation hurled at the Dead Leader seemed to reverberate, and rebound upon the speaker and his associates. After three years of cautious and experimental reduction, the Ghost filled the horizon once more, no longer as the apotheosis of good but as the apotheosis of evil. "*His fault,*" said Khrushchev again and again, and again and again from all over the hall echoes seemed to return to the rostrum repeating, "*his fault, his fault, his fault. . .*"

Clearly, laying a ghost is not so simple when the exorcists are the Ghost's disciples, close comrades-in-arms, his creators and creatures, his helpers and accomplices, his flatterers and favorites, his beneficiaries and heirs—and some say, his murderers.*

* On pp. 3-4, 221, 223 I have given some of the reasons which have led serious experts to conjecture that Stalin was actually murdered in a preventive conspiracy

They had had three years to plan this operation on Stalin's Ghost. The theory by which these men live promised them complete success. Given a complete enough monopoly of all the levers of force and persuasion and information, they have always believed that there is nothing which they could not plan and control.

Yet there is evidence that in the three years they had not even managed to settle with the Ghost in their own spirits, or, if not that, then in their calculations. For two years after his death, gradually, with some vacillation, they had worked at the partial reduction in size of the life and works of the *Vozhd*. But all through 1955, Khrushchev had striven to enlarge again the authority of the dead Leader. At the January 1955 Plenum, where Malenkov had confessed his faults, Khrushchev and Bulganin had proclaimed the rightness of Stalin's dogma of the perpetual primacy of heavy industry. And thenceforth several occasions of homage had been taken advantage of to pay exalted tribute to Stalin's doctrines, services, and name.

With Khrushchev's Secret Speech before us bold in its claims that the heirs had been correcting the "cult of Stalin's

of his disciples who were among his next intended victims. Certainly the history of tyranny and the history of Russia itself give precedents for such an hypothesis. No less certainly, the death was timely from the standpoint of his heirs. Still, tyrants, too, must die. And one who has so long lived by the maxim, *if you want your enemies to fear you, kill your friends*, no matter when he dies, is likely to die at a good time for some of those closest to him.

To complicate matters, Stalin was one to make the natural death of Old Bolsheviks seem most unnatural. Not only did he set a violent term to the lives of so many of them, but even Zhdanov, Scherbakov, Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky and Gorky, whose physicians certified that they had died of natural causes, were later declared by Stalin retroactively to have died by poison. Yet Old Bolsheviks, too, have been known to die a natural death and stay that way.

From disinterested observers we have testimony that during World War II Stalin suffered from hardening of the arteries and had either a mild stroke, or a mild heart attack. In default of more conclusive evidence than that now available, I am inclined to believe that the aging dictator died of natural causes.

Neither the disappearance of Poskrebyshev nor of the commanders of the Moscow and Kremlin guard rules this out. The disappearance of the Minister of Health who watched over his last treatment is harder to explain. On the other hand, the Kremlin doctors who treated Stalin in his last illness and signed the communiqués are still alive.

person” and its evils for full three years, it is hard indeed to believe that as late as Dec. 21, 1955 (Stalin’s seventy-sixth birthday) the *Vozhd* could have been proclaimed in *Izvestia* in these terms:

Great revolutionary and profound thinker . . . The name of Stalin is close and dear to millions of toilers in all corners of the earth. Stalin—great fighter for the peace and security of the peoples. In millions of hearts burns the inextinguishable flame of his word.

Only in mid January, amidst a deepening silence, did the Presidium seem to have made up its mind to Khrushchev’s midnight Address.

What caused this last minute switch to a more drastic course? Here are some of the possible reasons:

1) The downgrading of the Secret Police had made the heirs so dependent on the Army that they had to concede to it a restoration of its tarnished honor through the rehabilitation of its 5,000 traitor officers. But a rehabilitation of purge victims on such a scale in one field of Soviet life could not stand alone.

2) As the “closest comrades-in-arms” and chief defender of and builder upon Stalin’s place in the apostolic succession, Khrushchev was beginning to fear that he might himself be struck at if he permitted another to capitalize on the feeling against Stalin and to lead an attack.

3) Khrushchev had gone so far in his assumption of personal power that his rise had alarmed his associates, as earlier they had feared Beria and Malenkov. They demanded that his ascent toward single leadership be hedged in by a solemn promise that “these bloody deeds should not occur again.” But he had already risen so far that he could arrogate to himself this report as he had the other roles at the Congress, thus converting himself overnight from the chief “Stalinist” to the chief “anti-Stalinist.”

4) The heirs had actually murdered Stalin in a preventive

conspiracy and were troubled, not by their guilt, but by the fear that their secret might not be safe forever, so they decided that they had best make a good case for the murder.

5) More and more people inside the party and outside it had begun to credit the rumor that they had murdered Stalin, so that even though they were innocent of the charge, it were best to make a good preventive case for his at least having deserved to be murdered.

6) The pressure of an incoherent anti-Stalinism in all walks of life had grown so great that they could only control and direct it by appropriating it as their own and putting themselves at its head. Thus the Stalinists assumed the leadership of Anti-Stalinism to conserve as much of Stalinism as possible and to fortify their leadership of the party and the country.

7) The latest zigzag or change of line begun shortly before Stalin's death (at the Nineteenth Congress) had developed further after his passing. They had found the general expectation of change, and the widespread belief that they were "new men," so profitable, that they were able to get great successes out of the most trivial maneuvers. They had tried, in the fashion he had taught them, to lay the blame for all the "excesses" of the preceding line on Beria's corpse, but the corpse had not been big enough. Now (but why just now beyond the fact that a Congress is a magnificent sounding board?), they had decided to use Stalin's corpse in the same fashion to unload upon it the shared misdeeds, the outlived features of the last line but one, and the aging rigidities and paranoid elements of the Dictator's last years. Thus they could have greater freedom of maneuver, greater credit out of smaller gestures, and develop a renovated and invigorated Stalinism without its prestige-bound and paranoid elements.

The last of these seven hypotheses is the weakest because, beyond the fact that a Congress was approaching, there is no explanation of the *suddenness* and *drastic character* of the switch which took place in a few days shortly after the middle

of January. In any case, the one hypothesis we cannot seriously entertain is the widely held view that Mikoyan forced Khrushchev's hand at the Congress itself by "unexpectedly" mentioning Stalin's name and writings in a derogatory context, whereupon Khrushchev hastily decided on the special Secret Session and improvised his report to take the anti-Stalin gambit away from his rivals. The structure of his speech, shrewd and planful in its apparent planlessness; the research and preparation involved in digging some thirty long buried documents from the archives so long concealed from the party, and deciding upon these thirty and how much of them to quote; the time and thought required to select, edit, and print eighteen classified documents for distribution to the delegates at the Congress—all testify to the fact that the decision was taken at the Presidium meeting shortly after mid-January and followed up by a feverish work of preparation and implementation to be in time for one of the closing sessions of the Congress.

Moreover, there is documentary evidence that some of the more serious magazines like *Voprosy Istorii* (Problems of History) were briefed in late January and instructed to implement certain aspects of the report and new line on Stalin and his victims in their next number.*

*The February issue of *Voprosy Istorii* contains the required statement on when its forms closed—"given to the printer on February 15," which means that it was written and approved and prepared for the press prior to the opening of the Congress. Nevertheless, it ventures to rehabilitate a number of corpses that were to be rehabilitated by name, and others that were to be rehabilitated by implication, in Khrushchev's secret speech.

Men long in oblivion, some physically purged, some in exile, some simply consigned to the "memory hole" as "unpersons," are quietly readmitted to the pages of history. Among these are: Manuilsky, who at best died without an obituary or a state funeral; Pokrovsky, the historian who had been posthumously purged; Chubar, purged; Kosareva, purged; Marshal Gamarnik, purged or "suicided"; Makharadze, against whom Beria had thundered in his book on Stalin's early activities; Lunacharsky, who died a natural death then a second death of planned oblivion.

Thus the February *Voprosy Istorii* reflected Khrushchev's Secret Speech before it was delivered, thereby becoming one of the earliest volumes in a new *WHO WAS WHO*. Each subsequent issue has contained another such group of names, and even whole constellations of events, constituting a new, but also fraudulent, *WHAT REALLY HAPPENED*.

With histories, encyclopedias, and biographical dictionaries succeeding each

Finally, however far advanced Khrushchev may be on the road to personal leadership, he would surely have taken care to cover himself with a collective decision on so important and perilous a move as this.

other as if they were being consumed by an enormous chain smoker who lights the first volume of each new work with the last of the old, one would think that it was high time to adopt a loose leaf system, as the stone statues of Roman Emperors were so constructed that only the head had to be removed and replaced by a new one. The ever changing annals of the past as recorded in the pages of the journal *Voprosy Istorii* are the nearest thing so far devised to a loose-leaf *WHO'S WHO* and a loose-leaf *WHAT WAS WHAT*.

XVII. TRACT FOR OUR TIME.

The speech itself is perhaps the most important document ever to have come from the Communist movement. It must be studied for what it tells us of the history of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, for the light it throws upon the psychological make-up of the post-Stalinist leaders, for the insight it gives into the nature of totalitarianism and of Communism. It is the most revealing indictment of Communism ever to have been made by a Communist, the most damning indictment of the Soviet system ever to have been made by a Soviet leader.

There is about it a nightmare quality, felt alike by those who believe in Communism and those who do not. To see one of the chief creators of the atmosphere of terror and of the monstrous cult of the living god calmly reporting to a Congress of those who were all terrorized agents of the terror and votaries of the cult; to hear the confidences as to what went on behind the scenes, torture, false confessions, judicial murder, perfidious destruction of the bodies and souls and very names of devoted comrades and intimates; to see that the Reporter expects absolution and forgiveness and even continuance in absolute power because at long last he has revealed some of the guilty secrets in which he shared; to note the broad, self-satisfied smile which deprives the fearful avowals of any of the value of repentance; to catch in all the flood of words only a *sua culpa* and not one syllable of a *mea culpa*

or a *nuestra culpa*; to sense how much greater crimes have been committed against a helpless people by this little band whose deeds against each other are being in part recited; to think that men who are capable of doing such things to each other and tolerating, sanctioning and applauding such actions, have managed to vest themselves with absolute power over belief and action, over manners and morals, over life and death and the good name of the dead, over industry and agriculture and politics and communication and expression and culture; and then to hear that the system which spawned these monstrous things is still the best in the world, and that the surviving members of this band are still in their collective wisdom infallible and in their collective power unlimited—who can read this recital without a sense of horror and revulsion?

Those who have worked conscientiously in that field of “archaeological research” which seeks to uncover buried truths about a living and contemporary society knew many of the things that Khrushchev now “reveals.” What he said coincides to an astonishing degree, both in general and in detail, with what historians of the Soviet system, analysts of its structure, and biographers of Stalin had managed to unearth, despite the fact that all the machinery of a great and totalist state had been employed to distort and conceal. Thus Boris Souvarine’s classic *Staline: Aperçu Historique du Bolchevisme*, published in 1935 before the purges got under way (and regrettably permitted to drop out of print) is confirmed in generalizations, in details, and in prognostications. Yet, though specialists found little that was really new in Khrushchev’s revelations, none of them could read it without fresh tension and a sense of horror.

Active Communist leaders of many years standing in the Western world must have known these things also. They cheered these crimes when they were ordered to cheer them, and are shocked only now when they are ordered to be

shocked, without even the excuse that they were under the duress of terror. Yet there is a deeper sense in which many of them were shocked beyond the limits of the emotion prescribed or permitted.

Thus Palmiro Togliatti, who had managed to swallow first his admiration for Trotsky, then his admiration for Bukharin and spew forth his prior admiration as abuse, was moved by the “surprise, sorrow, bewilderment and doubts which the unexpected criticism leveled at Stalin evoked in the masses,” to speak with unprecedented frankness and to ask some embarrassing questions:

One is forced to admit that the errors that Stalin committed were either unknown . . . to the ruling cadres of the country . . . which does not seem likely; or that they were not considered errors . . . I exclude the explanation that a change was impossible solely by the presence of military, police and terroristic apparatus. . . .

We can only think among ourselves that since Stalin was such (a man) . . . they could at least have been more prudent in their public and solemn exaltation of his qualities. . . .

Previously, all the good was due to the superhuman positive qualities of one man; now all the evil is attributed to his equally exceptional and shocking defects . . . The real problems are skipped over—how and why Soviet society . . . could and did depart from the self-chosen path of democracy and legality to the point of degeneration. (*L'Unità*, June 17, 1956.)

And Howard Fast, Communist novelist and Stalin Prize winner, with less complicity and less calculation than Togliatti, spoke from the anguish of his enforced recognition of what in his heart he had always known:

There is little that one can say to take the edge off the secret Khrushchev speech . . . It is a strange and awful document perhaps without a parallel in history . . . it itemizes a record of barbarism and paranoiac blood-lust that will be a lasting and a shameful memory to civilized man.

A few weeks later he had found much to say “to take the edge off” just as Togliatti was able to accept reproof from

Khrushchev and consorts for having questioned whether there had not been some degeneration in their system, and to express himself as satisfied and grateful for an "explanation" that ignored his questions. There is something amazing in this disciplined indiscipline. But the first cries of those who have at last been instructed to be indignant at these indignities reveal the startling power of Khrushchev's address.

What runs through this report is a series of expressions and synonyms for cruelty unmatched in the bloody chronicles of history:

Stalin's despotism . . . the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov . . . mass repressions and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality . . . shot in order to cover the traces of Kirov's killing . . . mass acts of abuse . . . terror against honest workers . . . mass terror against ordinary Soviet citizens . . . brutal arbitrariness . . . confessions secured by force . . . vile provocation . . . odious falsification . . . criminal violation of revolutionary legality . . . forced under torture to sign a blank confession . . . lists of the condemned and their sentences prepared in advance and signed by Yezhov and Stalin . . . Rudzutak who spent ten years at hard labor in Tsarist prisons was broken in three months . . . monstrous falsification of cases . . . executions and arrests increased tenfold in a year . . . even worse in the provinces . . . prolonged tortures . . . the most brutal torture and oppression . . . tormented from the time of my arrest until I began to write nonsense . . . physical measures of pressuring him, tortures bringing him to a state of unconscious deprivation of judgment . . . kept Professor Vinogradov in chains . . . beat, beat and beat again . . . men came to fear their own shadows . . . insecurity, fear and despair . . . thousands executed without trial . . . everything has its limits, my torture has reached its extreme . . . utilized the knowledge that my broken ribs have not properly mended . . . let my cry of horror reach your ears . . .

These images of torture are somehow made more stark by

the speaker's attempt to comprehend all the monstrous things under the comparatively trifling charge of "the cult of the individual."

Khrushchev and his associates seem to have been genuinely astonished at the effect of his words, when they reached the outside world. He had been so careful to prescribe the limits of the "desanctification" and to balance his role as prosecutor with his role of defender of Stalin's "achievements," deeds and name. At the beginning, in the body of the Address, and in the summation, he reverts to Stalin's "merits" and "services" and sums up his whole indictment as a picture of Stalin's tragedy not his crimes.

But the merits and services are expressed in tired, worn propaganda clichés, and the crimes in startling images of cruelty, suffering, and terror. The self-serving political clichés concerning Stalin's "services," on which his heirs intend to continue to base their power and rule, pass unnoticed. But the case histories of his crimes and the sufferings of his victims stir the imagination and wring the heart.

They seem not less terrible, as Khrushchev imagines, but more terrible, because they have been committed in the name of some of man's age-old dreams, and inflicted on a people which has produced some of man's noblest dreamers.

Even if one knew most of these things before, one cannot fail to be stirred when twenty years of such a regime are distilled into a single report by one of Stalin's closest comrades-in-arms, the very heir to his post of First Secretary.

It is terrifying to consider that for over twenty years these crimes have been denied, apologized for, justified, explained, or explained away. And that this has been done not merely by accomplices and the terrorized, but by well-intentioned and sensitive men and women, writing and speaking in freedom, free to sympathize with and take up the defense of the helpless victims, free to gain access to the facts if they but took the trouble. Can it be that Khrushchev is right in his assumption

that all a tyrant needs to do is cover his crimes with noble formulae to have these crimes excused? Can it be that all one has to do with one's victims is blacken their names and then men of good will need not concern themselves with their fate? During twenty years the perpetrator of these crimes has been praised and exalted by men under no compulsion to exalt him; his very crimes applauded as great achievements and a great "experiment."

In passing, Khrushchev's speech answers many questions which long have troubled us, and confirms many things which have been in dispute.

What are some of the things which Khrushchev confirms? The camps. The tortures. The arrest of innocent persons. The circumstances of Kirov's death for which so many thousands died. The helplessness of the atomized individual before the power of a single monopoly party, and the party before its boss or bosses, when the party owns the state and the state owns the press, the courts, the political and economic levers, the instruments of force, persuasion and communication, the meeting halls, the street corners, public opinion, "criticism and self-criticism."

Recently there has been much talk of "brain washing." Has any one ever given a more authoritative, precise and compact definition than that given by Khrushchev in this single question and answer?

And how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed?

Only in one way: because of the applying of physical pressure, torture, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away his human dignity.

Other things that Khrushchev confirms are: the fact of genocide. The persecution of the nationalities. The frequently capricious and fantastic exploitation of the peasantry. The stagnation in agriculture. The ubiquitous police. The omnipotence of the Dictator when he is the head of the party

and the state and the master of infallible doctrine and prescriber even of feelings and thought. The universal terror among high and low reaching even into the circles of the ruling party, even to the men around the throne. The enforced servility of artists, writers, historians in a single-party dictatorship. The enforced servility of the party itself. How the most monstrous of tyrannies, if it has a dictatorial monopoly of power, can contrive to get itself celebrated with ceaseless din as the wisest, freest, most humane, most democratic, most advanced, most enlightened and most just system in the world.

Other questions are adumbrated in the Speech but to get at the answers requires further study of it, and of the context in which it was delivered. Of such nature is the question of the scope of the reforms of the new rulers, the durability of their promises and of their present line.

Always in Russia the death of a tyrant has brought a general expectation of change. Always there has been certain largess by the new ruler. But never has the change been sweeping unless the regime was suffering from defeat and crisis, or the changes welled up from below and were forced upon the ruler. Like every new Tsar succeeding an unpopular Sire, the new Dictator, whether a single man or a Committee of Dictators, seeks popularity and the stabilization of power by largess.

Since Stalin died there have been these changes: several amnesties; the reduction of the concentration camp population and improvement in the concentration camp regime; apologies to some of the late ruler's corpses, rehabilitation of some who are too dead to appreciate it and of others who still happen to be alive; the promise of a return to the seven-hour day within five years and an immediate beginning towards a shortening of the working week; enlargement of the nugatory pensions for the aged and of wages for the lowest paid; downgrading of the punishments for lateness and absence with a return to the pre-1940 limited freedom to change jobs; the downgrading of the Secret Police and an increase of the control by the prose-

cutor over arrests, pre-trial investigations and trials; more travel by the rulers, and, within carefully defined limits, more travel by the ruled and more admission of travellers.

But Khrushchev was careful both in his public and Secret Speech to make clear that they were leaving untouched, nay reconsecrating as untouchable, the entire system of dictatorship, monopoly of power and wisdom at the summit, rightlessness and total lack of controls and of countervailing power below. The swiftness with which the promise of a marked increase in consumer's goods was taken back again, shows how precarious all these promises are.

The reforms themselves are trivial compared with the big changes introduced by Lenin when he went from war communism to the NEP. Stalin, too, granted his amnesties during his zigzags, in 1939 rehabilitated victims of his purges, including the living as well as corpses. He too had his seven-hour day, until 1940, milder penalties for lateness and absence, greater freedom to change jobs. With his private parcel and private cow he made more sweeping concessions to the peasant than the new men, fighting once more to cut down both, are prepared to make to the largest single class of the population. To make the prosecutor the controller of arrests and trials in a country where prosecutors and courts alike are controlled by the dictator party, is like making the fox an inspector in the chicken yard.

Still, many of the reforms are genuine if smallish, and for the moment the life of the Soviet citizen is a little easier. And his expectations—themselves a potential force—are somewhat greater. In the conquered lands, the expectations are building into a force each day harder to control.

Just as Stalin and his heirs have been willing to make all sorts of pledges concerning the reduction of arms, the prohibition of atomic weapons, the renunciation of aggressive war, but will not grant the slightest inspection and control of the fulfillment, so the rulers of the Soviet land grant largess to

their people, but will not grant the slightest concession to the people's need to have organizations of their own to check upon the government's performance of its promises.

As for our country—*Pravda* commented after Khrushchev's Secret Address became known and had aroused so much hope and discussion—the Communist Party has been and will be the only master of the minds and thoughts, the spokesman, leader and organizer of the people.*

This leaves the people as rightless, as voiceless, as helpless, as they were before. The one right they have, as they had before is the right of silent pressure, which can never be altogether taken away by even the most totalitarian and efficient of dictatorships. And in many ways that pressure has grown by virtue of the very illusions spread by Khrushchev's speech and Stalin's death.

There is a fundamental difficulty in the leader principle which, as Karl Popper has written,

makes the very idea of selecting future leaders self-contradictory . . . The authoritarian will select those who obey, who believe, who respond to his influence. But in doing so, he is bound to select mediocrities . . . Never can an authoritarian admit that the intellectually courageous, i.e., those who defy authority, may be the most valuable. . . .

Even Lenin declared after one of his purges:

If you expel all the insufficiently obedient but intelligent people and are left with none but the obedient dumbbells, will you not surely destroy the party?

Josef Stalin, less sure of his merits and more reckless of the lives of all who doubted, surrounded himself with yet more mediocre men. Why, one asks as one studies them, are these men at the head of a great people? They are the characteristic *epigoni* of a personal dictatorship which has already had one bloody struggle for succession and two powerful dictators over

* Editorial of July 6, 1956.

a period of fifty years. They reached their high place because Stalin killed off their betters and because they served and flattered him.

Still, given a great country with 150-200,000,000 inhabitants and the world's largest empire to experiment with, they have learned other trades besides those of faction lieutenant, emissary and courtier—just as the subalterns of the Soviet Army after it had been purged of 5,000 officers, were able, while losing an empire thirteen times the size of France and an army of over 5,000,000, to learn the trade of general.

But Stalin's heirs remained *epigoni* and smallish men. They demonstrate it by the imitativeness of what they do, by borrowing trivial and fragmentary bits from Lenin's and Stalin's earlier larger maneuvers, and utilizing mutilated passages from the very texts and formulations which accompanied these maneuvers. It is the pathetic eagerness of the world to be deceived that magnifies these played out and trivial concessions and maneuvers into something big, portending fundamental change.

Where genuine novelty does lie, however, as we have seen, is in the operation to diminish Stalin's ghost. It is an operation which from the first was dangerous to their power and likely to escape their planned control. Because they cannot really draw a line between their responsibilities and his; because they cannot truly distinguish between his crimes and his "great achievements;" because they cannot apologize to selected specimens of his—and their own—injustice without having a whole army of skeletons force their way into the strange dance of death; because their regime of absolute force, having downgraded the police, finds that it must upgrade the army; because an aging party headed by an even older leadership is holding down a country where new classes are in formation and new generations demand a place; because they lack Stalin's terrible patience and demonic force; because these exorcists are the disciples, accomplices and heirs of the huge and monstrous

spirit they are trying to exorcise; and because their plea that they were but the intimidated minions of a madman, so reminiscent of Hitler's fallen entourage, raises a huge question about the system itself—for these reasons the future seems fraught with surprises.

Thus the Secret Speech has proved the starting point of something far larger than was intended and planned. One has only to look at the satellite states to see the forces that the speech has released. The moment Stalin died, unrest grew. Now that Stalin has been reduced in size, the unrest is greater and more general. In every satellite, Communist leaders were framed as "Titoists" (apologies to the corpse!), as agents of foreign powers (apologies to some but not to others). There is the case of Slansky and his comrades. Some have been rehabilitated, Slansky himself has been subdivided into three parts, one third pardoned as Titoist, and as co-defendant of those who are being rehabilitated; one-third condemned as Beriaite and cultist of his own personality and Stalin's; and one-third defamed as Jewish agent of Zionism and foreign intelligence. How long can any ghost remain so divided?

In Poland, the problem of exorcism is even more unmanageable, for there Stalin outlawed the entire Communist Party in the thirties and killed all its leaders; killed Ehrlich and Alter and other Jewish socialists as "agents of Hitler"; murdered 11,000 officers and buried them in the Katyn forest; betrayed the Warsaw uprising to Hitler's army; betrayed and outlawed the patriot Home Army; had a million and a quarter Poles deported to Siberia and the Arctic. The apologies, rehabilitations, and amnesties in Poland already run into the tens of thousands, but where can a line be drawn short of setting this unhappy people free to nurse their undeserved wounds? Here, more than elsewhere is it true that as the Communist Party diminishes the nation revives, and even inside the party national feeling is stirring into life.

Finally, the Secret Address requires study because in it are

contained answers to deeper and more general questions—to such fundamental questions as these:

How much of all that is narrated here is to be attributed to Josef Stalin personally, and how much to the existence of a dictatorial and totalist regime?

Can mankind really get ahead faster by abolishing all controls upon its rulers, all restraints and limitations on power which have been erected in centuries of uncertain and arduous struggle? Can men really get more well-being by giving up their hard-won and ever precarious individual freedoms? Can whole generations be usefully sacrificed to the promises of a constantly postponed “future,” or has each generation the right to live a life of its own?

In a system under which a few self-elected men proclaim themselves the masters of an infallible doctrine masquerading as science, and pronounce themselves its sole authorized interpreters, what checks remain upon the upward flow of power to a handful of dictators, then to the most authoritative, or simply the toughest? Where disagreement is no longer arguable difference but “deviation,” or “treason,” how can errors be corrected?

Where the press is owned by the rulers, the party by the rulers, and all other parties are in prison or dead, *quid custodiet custodies?* Who will liberate us from our liberators? How can the Infallible, whether one or a Board of Directors of Infallibility, be corrected when they are wrong but sure that they are right? And if they are wrong about the whole “future” how can alternative futures be presented for consideration?

Is Khrushchev’s address a picture of what single-party rule and dictatorship must bring men and nations to, poisoning even the life of the party in power?

Khrushchev’s Address has opened a veritable Pandora’s box of such questions in the minds of party members, in the minds of Communists abroad, and non-Communists as well. Larger

perhaps than all the others, a question mark that seems to fill the entire horizon is addressed to totalitarianism as a system:

If a Hitler, clothed with absolute power and infallibility and touched with madness, can rule over a great people; if a Stalin, touched with madness, can rule over and terrorize a great people—and nothing can be done about it until violence or death befall . . . is there not something paranoid about totalitarian dictatorship itself? Is there not something about the claim to the possession of an infallible doctrine and an infallible wisdom, something about the concentration of the power of life and death, the power over all means of production, distribution, persuasion, communication and force in the hands of a single irresponsible ruler or an irresponsible handful, is there not something about total dictatorship that leads to abuse and madness? Is there not something about the arduous profession of absolute Dictator that unhinges the mind? Will not totalitarian dictatorship, lacking checks and restraints from below, lacking the organized opposition that is as essential to the body politic as air to the lungs, tend ever afresh to engender the absolute dictator and corrupt him by the concentration of absolute power in his hands? Is not this the realization in life of what Lord Acton obscurely sensed when he wrote: *Power tends to corrupt, but absolute power corrupts absolutely?*

More than First Secretary Khrushchev intended, and more than he realizes, the answers to these large questions are to be found in his Secret Midnight Address. It is this that makes it more than a terrifying, one-sided exposition of twenty years of Communist dictatorship and party history. It is a tract for our times, to be read, pondered, studied, and its true significance mastered by every thoughtful contemporary.

XVIII. TEXTUAL MATTERS.

To be sure, Khrushchev did not intend to produce a tract for our times, open to the study of all his contemporaries.

We cannot let this matter get out of the party—he said.—Especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed session of the Congress. We should know the limits; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes. I think that the delegates to the Congress will understand and assess properly all these proposals.

Yet, when 1,436 delegates know a secret, it is a secret no longer. Some aspects of it, as was planned, were officially reported on at party gatherings throughout the land. Each time such a meeting was held, a courier brought a copy of the report directly from the Secretariat to the meeting. The document was handed to the reporter, and immediately after the report, taken away again and returned by the courier to the Secretariat. The participants were warned not to make notes, and not to talk about what they had heard. But there are few better ways to spread a secret, even enlarge its dimensions, than to communicate it to so many people in strictest confidence. And few better ways to enlarge one's person in a land where everything tends towards its diminution, than for the man who knows a secret to communicate it in strictest confidence to intimates who look to him for inside information.

Soon the whole party and the whole country were humming with rumors of the nature of the speech and the sweeping changes that it was supposed to initiate. In place of revealing

more and more of it piecemeal in the press as they had planned, leaders found it more and more necessary to limit and curb discussion, conjecture, and anticipation of sweeping change.

Soon Reuters carried what turned out to be a remarkably accurate story of the whole affair, though with description of scenes of emotion that are not confirmed in the present version. Then *Borba*, the Yugoslav Communist paper, carried a fairly accurate summary of a version specially edited to be sent to Communist leaders abroad. Finally, on June 4, 1956, almost four months after the Address was delivered, the United States Department of State made public a version which had been sent, after some reworking, to the leaders of a foreign Communist Party. The State Department, for its own reasons, does not state which Party it got it from, but there is some textual evidence tending to suggest that the present version has been translated into another Slavic tongue, and from the second language into English.

How much was cut out or softened before the Secretary of the Soviet Party sent the edited text abroad we have no way of knowing. Two newspapers have since claimed to have secured the suppressed portions. The one "supplementary portion," published in *France Soir* on June 11, need not be taken seriously. It tells of a "still more secret speech," datelined Vienna, "but almost certainly from another source . . . the authenticity of which cannot be questioned." It deals with Stalin's alleged erotomania, in which Lavrentii Beria picked for him young girls of "always more and more tender years," and other such sensational matters. It is a characteristic product of a boulevard scandal forgery mill in Paris, the products of which the writer has analyzed elsewhere.*

The other supplementary portion, published by *Il Quotidiano*, Catholic Action daily, contains thirty-two additional sentences or phrases. It gives as its source l'Agencia Contin-

* See: "The Case of the Litvinov Diaries," in *Commentary*, August 1956, pp. 164-171.

entale, which in ways not given, came into possession of a slightly less mutilated text. The additional sentences deal principally with foreign matters. On the whole they add little to the State Department's version but are entirely plausible and consistent with it. The chief additions are:

1. In the discussion of the Stalin prizes, the words: "many of these prizes were conferred on his sycophants in Russia and abroad."

2. In the discussion of the use of extreme measures of mass repression, the italicized words are added:

"He employed extreme methods and carried on mass repression, *not only for the necessary repression of the kulaks*, but also for the elimination of communist opponents."

3. In the part dealing with Stalin's policies in Asia, there is an additional sentence reading:

"His unrealistic appreciation of the position of the Western nations in the face of the developments in Asia, contributed to the risky situation for the entire socialist cause, as it developed in the Korean War."

4. In speaking of British warnings to Stalin against Hitler, "for British imperialist purposes," there is an added sentence to the effect that "the present British leaders in a more subtle way are still trying to do the same thing" (i.e., presumably, to use Russia for their imperialist purposes).

5. Re India: "He did not know how to act in the case of India for years during which it was clear that the winning of independence and the establishment of a progressive government could have played an important part and one in which the possibility of hastening the passage into the socialist camp would have been significantly improved."

6. Re China: "In our relations with China, it has been the lack of faith on Stalin's part in our Chinese comrades which led to an unnecessary retarding in their positive program relating to the establishment of a government of Popular Democracy and the elimination of the disastrous regime of

Chiang Kai-shek and his bourgeois imperialist collaborators.”

7. Re “peaceful coexistence.” “We must work with Leninist persistence and patience to increase socialist consciousness in order to eliminate bourgeois nationalism in other countries.”

And further in the same context:

“We have no intention of abandoning the road of our party and the brother parties for the attainment of the final and universal victory of socialism.”

8. In his discussion of the evil influence of Beria on Stalin, Khrushchev remarked that besides Beria, “only Zhdanov and Malenkov had regular access to Stalin.”

9. After his remark on Voroshilov’s duty of revising the false history of Tsaritsyn in the Civil War, an additional sentence:

“It may be difficult for Voroshilov to take the initiative to reestablish the truth after having been forced for so many years to be silent and to accept Stalinist falsifications.”

10. On the nationalities question:

“It is a source of pride for our party and for our people, given the rudeness and lack of comprehension of Stalin, that there did not develop a greater nationalist separatism. That such a tendency existed for many years is proved by the collection of secret documents distributed at this Congress, among which we have included the note of Lenin to Trotsky where the rudeness of Stalin and of Dzherzhinsky are condemned in their policy running back to the beginning of the year 1920.”

The text as printed here is the text given by the State Department, as prepared by its translators from the document “For the Use of Foreign Communists.” The only changes I have ventured to make are such as will improve the quality of the English, where from the text itself it is obvious what the Russian original may have been. Where I could not be sure of the original Russian, I have preferred to keep the dubious English and follow the text as released by the State

Department. The major corrections are the following:

1. Use of more idiomatic English, e.g. "resolutions were adopted" instead of "resolutions were made." "This is Radio Kossior" instead of "This is Radio in the name of Kossior." "Confessions were secured" in place of "acquired." "Despair" instead of "desperation." "Approval" for "sanction" where it is obvious that what was meant was approval by the Politburo. "Morbidly suspicious" in place of "sickly suspicious." "Views alien to Marxism" in place of "foreign-to-Marxism views." "Condemned" instead of "stigmatized." "Slander of" in place of "slander toward." "Candidate Member" in place of "Candidate" where Candidate Member of the Politburo is intended.

2. Changes of the various past tenses in keeping with English practice. In Russian the simple past often corresponds to our progressive past or imperfect, at other times to our simple past or preterite, at yet others to our present perfect, or even our past perfect. Where the original meaning was clear from the context, I have changed the tenses to accord more closely with English usage. Where there was the slightest doubt of the original, I have kept the awkward tense construction rather than speculate.

3. Introduction of the definite and indefinite articles, *a* and *the*, or their elimination, to improve the English. Since Russian has no article, good English usage can be followed without falsifying the original.

4. Changes of word order where this improved the quality of the English without altering the sense.

5. The only change in substance is one in which it seems clear to me that the translator misunderstood the original Russian word. The State Department translation reads:

"Stalin thought that now he could decide all things alone and all he needed were *statisticians*."

The original Russian probably read not *statistiki* but *statisti*, which is a word from the language of the stage referring to "extras," "supernumeraries," people with mere walk on parts,

who fill the stage but do not speak. I have therefore altered the passage to read: "Stalin thought that all he needed were people to fill the stage."

For the rest, the State Department text as released on June 4 has been faithfully followed. That it is an accurate transcript of Khrushchev's speech as edited and softened "for the use of foreign communists" is proved by its immediate acceptance by all the leaders of parties and by all the leading Communist papers of the world, as an accurate version. Although the Russian people are still denied access to Khrushchev's speech, *Pravda*, too, has recognized the State Department version as a true one by publishing an article by Eugene Dennis, American Communist leader, concerning it. Until the Russian Communist Party and its First Secretary see fit to release to their people and the world a more complete and accurate version, this will do. Togliatti, Dennis, Duclos, Nenni, Pollitt, and the other Communist leaders, have all found it worthy of study. The rest of us will also.

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Part II

THE CRIMES OF THE STALIN ERA

Text of Khrushchev's Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress
on the Night of February 24-25, 1956, with Accompanying
Commentary

*The text of KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET REPORT
is on the left-hand (even numbered) pages and the
Commentary is on the right-hand (odd numbered) pages*

KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET REPORT.

Comrades! In the report of the Central Committee of the party at the Twentieth Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary CC/CPSU [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences.

After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the party began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior.

Such a belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years.

The objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's merits an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had already been written in his lifetime. The role of Stalin in the preparation and execution of the Socialist Revolution, in the Civil War, and in the fight for the construction of Socialism in our country is universally known. Everyone knows this well. At present we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the party now and for the future—(we are concerned) with

I. THE CULT OF STALIN'S PERSON.

There is a strange discrepancy between the crimes recited in Khrushchev's staggering bill of particulars, and the title of his indictment. Can such huge crimes really be subsumed under so smallish a charge as that of having "fostered the cult of one's own person?" History and private life are full of men who craved flattery, but in all history's pages who has equalled these crimes?

It may be that Khrushchev has chosen the term "cult of the person" because he wishes to give a "Marxist" sound to his indictment. But could all these monstrous crimes flow from the substitution of the "individual person" for masses or classes as the makers of history? Moreover, can the cult of Stalin's person be so fraught with evil, and the cult of Lenin's person, which Khrushchev celebrates, be free of it?

It may be that it is indeed "foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism" to encourage the glorification of one's own person. But is this the same as "mass repression by the government apparatus . . . torture of those who opposed the party line . . . killing of close comrades . . . execution of loyal communists without trial . . . moral and physical annihilation of entirely innocent persons . . . arrest and shooting of 70% of the Central Committee and 80% of the delegates to a party congress," the very Central Committee and delegates who elected Stalin as their secretary and whose servant he was supposed to be?

Moreover, though the crimes that are cited are great, greater crimes than they are omitted . . . or praised in passing as "achievements."

how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legality.

Because of the fact that not all as yet realize fully the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual, the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of collective leadership of the party and because of the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person—the Central Committee of the party considers it absolutely necessary to make the material pertaining to this matter available to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual. In a letter to the German political worker, Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute. Lasalle subsequently did quite the opposite."

Some time later Engels wrote: "Both Marx and I have always been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals, with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose; and we most strongly opposed such manifestations which during our lifetime concerned us personally."

The great modesty of the genius of the Revolution,

Thus the crime of Cain is here; the killing of one's brothers or comrades. But of the endless catalogue of crimes against non-Communists, not one word.

Not one word is wasted on the crimes against the peasants, nor against the rest of Stalin's subjects, nor against neighbor peoples from the Baltic to Korea. Khrushchev charges his former master with "ignorant mistakes in agriculture." But these mistakes do not include the liquidation of more than a million independent peasant families (first branded as "kulaks" to facilitate their liquidation).^{*} Nor the four million or more peasant families deliberately starved to death to break the resistance to forced collectivization. When the collectivization of agriculture is mentioned it is as "one of the many gains won during Stalin's lifetime."

So the killing of Polish Communists is obscurely touched on, but not the partition of Poland with Hitler, nor the deportation of more than a million and a quarter Poles to Siberian and Arctic concentration camps, nor the murder of 11,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest, nor the betrayal to Hitler of the Warsaw uprising. Poland which was the first country to resist Hitler, is once more under a foreign totalitarian yoke, but that is one of "the magnificent victories" of Stalin's "liberating" armies during the last stages of "the Great Patriotic War."

There is about the whole indictment a kind of touchy reticence, for Khrushchev is keenly aware that every point he makes leads deeper than he wishes to go.

The questioning of the infallibility of Stalin may lead to the questioning of the infallibility of Lenin. And of the infallibility of the party and its leading committee. And the infallibility of Marx and the "science" of Marxism. Indeed, it may lead to the questioning of the infallibility of any man-made creed or doctrine and of any man or group who may claim individually or

^{*} Stalin placed the total of "Kulaks" disposed of as "10,000,000." See his remarks to Churchill, p. 164.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing and organizational role of the party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the Central Committee.

Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the working class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement.

While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly condemned every manifestation of the cult of the individual, inexorably combated the views, alien to Marxism, about the "hero" and the "crowd" and countered all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the masses and to the people.

Lenin taught that the party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the party follow the people—workers, peasants and intelligentsia. "Only he will win and retain the power," said Lenin, "who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness of the people."

Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolshevik Communist Party as the leader and teacher of the people; he called for the presentation of all the most important questions before the opinion of the conscious workers, before the opinion of their party. He said (of the party), "We believe in it, we see in it the wisdom, the honor, and the conscience of our epoch."

Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at belittling or weakening the directing role of the party in the structure of the Soviet state. He worked out Bolshevik principles of party leadership and norms of party life, stressing that the guiding principle of party leadership is its collegiality [leadership by a group]. Already during the prerevolutionary years Lenin called the Central Committee of the

collectively to be its sole repositories and interpreters.

The questioning of Stalin's terror, in turn, may lead to the questioning of terror in general. But Bolshevism believes in the use of terror. Lenin held that no one was worthy of the name of communist who did not believe in terror.* Lest Khrushchev be misunderstood as proposing the unbolshevik rejection of terror in principle, he is careful to state that "Vladimir Ilyich demanded the most uncompromising treatment of the enemies of the Revolution and the working class, and, when necessary, resorted ruthlessly and without hesitation . . . to the most extreme methods."

It is true, as Khrushchev charges, that Stalin fostered the cult of his person. He and his lieutenants, Khrushchev not the least among them, made that cult their banner as a means of waging their faction war and raising their political line—"the Stalinist line"—above all questioning.

If, in the end, the cult irked and dwarfed even them and made them, too, fear for their lives like all other Russians, that is only one item in a long list of Stalin's crimes, and not the most monstrous.

The subsuming of all his crimes under this single head is but a shift to avoid calling Stalin's rule by its right name: *personal dictatorship*. The cult of his person was one of the spiritual weapons of that dictatorship as terror was another. But the same motives which make Khrushchev prudently avoid the word *terror*, make him avoid the word *dictatorship*. For Stalin's personal dictatorship rested on the party dictatorship. To use the word *dictatorship* in the indictment would lead to calling in question dictatorship in general as a method of ruling a great country. It would call in question "the dictatorship of the proletariat," which in practice means the dictatorship of a single party, the dictatorship over that party of its leaders, and ultimately the dictatorship of a single leader, based on the

* See Appendix C.

party a collective of leaders and the guardian and interpreter of party principles. "During the period between congresses," pointed out Lenin, "the Central Committee guards and interprets the principles of the party."

Underlining the role of the Central Committee of the party and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: "Our Central Committee constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly authoritative group . . ."

During Lenin's life the Central Committee of the party was a real expression of collective leadership of the party and of the nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force his views on his coworkers. He tried to convince; he patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently observed that the norms of party life were realized, that the party statute was enforced, that the party congresses and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee took place at the proper intervals.

In addition to the great accomplishments of V. I. Lenin for the victory of the working class and of the working peasants, for the victory of our party and for the application of the ideas of scientific Communism to life, his acute mind expressed itself also in this—that he detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of the Secretary General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that he is capricious and abuses his power.

In December, 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress, Vladimir Ilyich wrote: "After taking over the position of

leader's being the authoritative expounder of doctrine and the man in control of the party machine. It is these power levers that Lenin held, and Stalin after him. And they are the power levers on which First Secretary Khrushchev has now put his hand.

II. LENINIST NORMS OF PARTY LIFE.

A. *Dictator without Vanity.*

No town was named Leningrad during Lenin's life. The cult of his person, founded by Stalin and continued by Khrushchev, would have been distasteful to him. In this sense it is right to speak of "the great modesty of the genius of the revolution."

His immodesty did not lie in a thirst for flattery but in a selfless egoism which made him identify his views on everything with "the truth." As the admiring Lunacharsky wrote:

Lenin does his work imperiously, not because power is sweet to him, but because he is sure that he is right. . . . His love of power grows out of his tremendous sureness and the correctness of his principles . . . out of the inability to see from the point of view of his opponent.*

Though Lenin might himself make startling reversals in his position with the explanation that "History has shown" or the "situation has changed," whoever did not accept every turn of his zigzags he excoriated as bourgeois, opportunist, traitor, spokesman of an enemy class. His intolerance of difference left behind it an angry wake of denunciations, expulsions, purges and splits.

He was sure that he knew what was good for the working class, but unlike a Marx or a Rosa Luxemburg, he did not trust the working class to learn its own "true interests."** Not

* Lunacharsky: *Revolutionary Portraits*. (Moscow, 1923.) Cited in introduction to American edition of Leon Trotsky: *The History of the Russian Revolution*. Vol. I, p. XV.

** Whether Marx really trusted the working class ever to learn its own "true interests" and "historic mission" is debatable. But his theory asserted this whereas Lenin specifically asserted the opposite.

Secretary General, Comrade Stalin accumulated in his hands immeasurable power and I am not certain whether he will be always able to use this power with the required care."

This letter—a political document of tremendous importance, known in the party history as Lenin's "Testament"—was distributed among the delegates to the Twentieth Party Congress. You have read it and will undoubtedly read it again more than once. You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the party, the people, the state, and the future direction of party policy.

Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man who, above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and a more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc."

This document of Lenin's was made known to the delegates at the Thirteenth Party Congress, who discussed the question of transferring Stalin from the position of Secretary General. The delegates declared themselves in favor of retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of Vladimir Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects which caused Lenin serious anxiety.

Comrades! The Party Congress should become acquainted with two new documents, which confirm Stalin's character as already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his "testament." These documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya to Kamenev, who was at that time

only the peasants, who were to him “bourgeois” by nature, but the very working class, “left to its own devices,” would develop only a “bourgeois, trade-unionist ideology,” not a “socialist consciousness.” For a party of the workers, he substituted a party of the classless elite, a self-proclaimed “vanguard of the working class,” who would establish a guardianship over it and speak in its name, use it as cannon fodder or battering ram to smash their own way to power, then force the workers to execute their program, ruling dictatorially over the workers as well as over all other classes.

Since everything done by the party was done in the name of the workers, and therefore, according to his theory, done by the workers themselves, it became all important to Lenin that no other party be allowed to call itself a “party of the proletariat.” Every other socialist and labor party, and every faction in his own party that opposed him, had to be branded “bourgeois,” “petit-bourgeois,” the “expression of alien views of an enemy class.” This goes far to explain the merciless fury with which Lenin denounced and persecuted all other socialist parties. And the special rage with which he attacked the Workers’ Opposition in his own party.

Every committee that Lenin could not control, he split. Every opponent that he could not “correct,” he expelled. He handpicked his followers and set up his leading committees according to their agreement with his views. When he expelled his comrades or broke with them, he sought their public discredit and moral annihilation. The periodic purge was not invented by Stalin but by Lenin. Stalin’s contribution was to make it infinitely more bloody and capricious.

The vicissitudes of his struggle with opponents forced Lenin to add the word “democratic” to “centralism,” but from the outset his centralism swallowed up his “democracy.” His real views he expressed in these forthright, though awkward, words:

It is important to note the undoubted tendency to *defend the autonomy* [of the lower party units] *against centralism* as the basic

head of the Political Bureau, and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.

I will now read these documents:

LEV BORISOVICH!

Because of a short letter which I had written in words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by permission of the doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday an unusually rude outburst directed at me. This is not my first day in the party. During all these 30 years I have never heard from any comrade one word of rudeness. The business of the party and of Ilyich are not less dear to me than to Stalin. I need at present the maximum of self-control. What one can and what one cannot discuss with Ilyich—I know better than any doctor, because I know what makes him nervous and what does not, in any case I know better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigory [Zinoviev], as much closer comrades of V. I., and I beg you to protect me from rude interference with my private life and from vile invectives and threats. I have no doubt as to what will be the unanimous decision of the control commission, with which Stalin sees fit to threaten me; however, I have neither the strength nor the time to waste on this foolish quarrel. And I am a living person and my nerves are strained to the utmost.

N. KRUPSKAYA

Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on 23 December 1922. After two and a half months, in March, 1923, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin sent Stalin the following letter:

TO COMRADE STALIN:

COPIES FOR: KAMENEV AND ZINOVIEV.

Dear Comrade Stalin!

You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her. Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what was said,

feature appropriate to opportunism in organizational matters. . . . Bureaucratism versus democratism, that is the same as centralism versus autonomism, that is also the difference between the organizational principle of revolutionary social democracy and the organizational principle of the opportunists of social democracy. The latter principle strives to go from the bottom upward and therefore defends wherever possible and as far as possible, autonomism, "democratism", . . . The former principle [bureaucratic centralism] strives to go from the top downward; insisting upon the widening of the rights and the plenary powers of the center in relation to the parts.*

In expounding the wonders of the Leninist party and the Leninist norms of party life, *Pravda* of July 6, 1956 rightly declared that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were always "centralist by conviction." They sum up those Leninist norms as they have developed into the totalitarianism of the one-party state in these words:

As for our country, the Communist Party has been and will be the only master of the minds, the thoughts, the spokesmen, leader and organizer of the people.

When in 1903 Lenin first split from the other five orthodox Marxist editors of the *Iskra* Editorial Board, and at a Congress that was supposed to "unify" the party, formed a party of his own, centralized, controlled from above, subject to his "iron military discipline," the young Leon Trotsky, then only 23, foretold where such centralism would lead:

The organization of the party will take the place of the party itself; the Central Committee will take the place of the Organization; and finally, the Dictator will take the place of the Central Committee.

And so it came to pass. . . . Now, the Communist party is, as *Pravda* says, "the only master of the minds and thoughts," the only spokesman for and the only organizer of the activities of the people over whom it rules. The Central Committee is the master of the party. The Presidium is the master of the Central Committee. The Party Machine (the Secretariat and its

* *Collected Works*, Vol. VII, pp. 365-6. The references throughout are to the Fourth Russian Edition. All emphasis is as in the original, unless otherwise noted.

KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET REPORT

nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it from her. I have no intention to forget so easily that which is being done against me, and I need not stress here that I consider as directed against me that which is being done against my wife. I ask you, therefore, that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your words and apologizing or whether you prefer the severance of relations between us.

SINCERELY: LENIN

5 MARCH 1923

(Commotion in the hall.)

Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner during Lenin's life, could behave thus toward Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya—whom the party knows well and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as an active fighter for the cause of the party since its creation—we can easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years acquired an absolutely insufferable character.

As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justified: In the first period after Lenin's death Stalin still paid attention to his (i.e., Lenin's) advice, but later he began to disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.

When we analyze the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the party and of the country, when we pause to consider everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin's fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin's time, were only incipient, transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party.

We have to consider seriously and analyze correctly this

Apparatus) is the master of the Presidium. And two personal dictators, first Lenin, then Stalin, have been the masters of the machine for the fifty years from 1903 when Lenin split from his comrades to form a Leninist party of his own to 1953 when Stalin breathed his last.

The Soviets lost their political powers and life when all other parties were outlawed and they ceased to be a "workers parliament." The Communist Party was drained of all internal political life when at the Tenth Congress (1921) Lenin forbade the formation of factions and the proposal of rival platforms and views within the party. Soviet Congresses are but sounding boards or rubber stamps. Party Congresses, too, are but sounding boards or rubber stamps. Like the Soviets, the unions, and the other mass organizations, even the party itself, has in Stalin's words become one more "transmission belt" by which the will of the Center is transmitted to the masses. The whole dynamics of dictatorship cries out for a dictator, autocracy for an autocrat, centralism for an authoritative center, infallible doctrine for an authoritarian expounder, a totalitarian state for a *Duce, Fuehrer, Vozhd.*

Such in outline are "the Leninist norms" of Party organization.*

B. *Lenin's Testament Enjoins Collegiality on His Heirs.*

The Angel of Death gave three solemn warnings, in the form of partial strokes, before he finally called for Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. After the second, the hitherto self-confident dictator bethought himself of the methods of work to which he had accustomed his party, and the need of instructing his soon to be orphaned disciples.

Though death did not come until January 1924, he made his first confession of failure to lead the party and the state

* For more on these norms, see Appendix C: *On Leninist Norms of Party Organization.*

KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET REPORT

matter in order that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form whatever of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate collegiality in leadership and in work, and who practiced brutal violence, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which seemed, to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts.

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient co-operation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint and the correctness of his position was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was especially true during the period following the Seventeenth Party Congress, when many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of Communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism.

We must affirm that the party fought a serious fight against the Trotskyites, the Rightists, and Bourgeois Nationalists, and that it disarmed ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological fight was carried on successfully, as a result of which the party became strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role.

The party led a great political-ideological struggle against those in its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who represented a political line hostile to the party and to the cause of socialism. This was a stubborn and a difficult fight but a necessary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites led actually toward the restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie. Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 1928-1929 the political line of right deviation had prevailed among us, or orienta-

“collectively” as early as March 1922. On March 27, 1922, already a sick man, he told the Eleventh Congress that the Council of People’s Commissars (the Government) was being drained of life by the fact that everything was being decided in the Politburo. And he himself, as the chairman of both bodies, had been settling too many things personally. In part this unhealthy state of affairs was difficult to overcome, “because with us a single government party rules.”

But in this my own grave guilt is also involved, since the connections between the Council of People’s Commissars and the Politburo have been personally in my hands. And now, that I have to leave the scene, it seems that the two wheels have not begun to move together immediately . . . *

After the second stroke, on Christmas Day 1922, Lenin dictated with a halting tongue a letter to be read to the first party congress which should be held after his death. That letter has come to known as his Testament. He dictated a postscript on January 4, 1923, then a series of letters and articles until March 5, on the night of which a third stroke left him with no further power to speak. Helpless further to influence events, he lingered on until the fourth and final stroke on the night of January 20-21, 1924.

His faithful disciples did not permit his Testament nor his other messages to be read at a session of the Congress held after his death (the Thirteenth) nor at any congress since. At the Thirteenth Congress—the first after Lenin’s death—the delegates were broken up into little local groups, and the Testament was read to each group separately. They were forbidden to take notes, or report on it to the party or the general public. At the Twentieth Congress, many delegates saw the Testament and the other last words of Lenin for the first time. Once more they were enjoined to secrecy. Though Lenin’s supposedly complete works have gone through four successive editions, still the messages and deathbed articles remained un-

* Vol. XXXIII, pp. 274-5.

tion toward "cotton-dress industrialization," or toward the kulak, etc. We would not now have a powerful heavy industry, we would not have the *kolkhozes*, we would find ourselves disarmed and weak in a capitalist encirclement.

It was for this reason that the party led an inexorable ideological fight and explained to all party members and to the non-party masses the harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist proposals of the Trotskyite opposition and the rightist opportunists. And this great work of explaining the party line bore fruit; both the Trotskyites and the rightist opportunists were politically isolated; the overwhelming party majority supported the Leninist line and the party was able to awaken and organize the working masses to apply the Leninist party line and to build socialism.

Worth noting is the fact that, even during the progress of the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites, the Bukharinites and others, extreme repressive measures were not used against them. The fight was on ideological grounds. But some years later, when socialism in our country was fundamentally constructed, when the exploiting classes were generally liquidated, when the Soviet social structure had radically changed, when the social basis for political movements and groups hostile to the party had violently contracted, when the ideological opponents of the party had long since been defeated politically—then the repression directed against them began.

It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression through the Government apparatus was born, first against the enemies of Leninism—Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long since politically defeated by the party—and subsequently also against many honest Communists, against those party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the Civil War and the first and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, who

published until June 30, 1956, when, supplied with a misleading introduction, some of them appeared in *Kommunist* and as a separate pamphlet.*

From Khrushchev's Report it would appear that the Testament was merely "a characterization of Stalin." That is the part which Khrushchev felt he could use. But actually the Testament contained a characterization of a number of Lenin's close associates, and its primary purpose was to urge them to restore within the limits of the Politburo the "collegiality" which Lenin's methods of personal rule had reduced to a mere simulacrum.

The testament specifically names Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Piatakov. Its purpose is to give each some praise, so that there should be no thought of eliminating any of them. And each some blame so that none should think himself big enough to succeed to Lenin's shoes and try to rule alone. Lenin is especially afraid that Stalin and Trotsky may quarrel with each other and split the "collegium" that he is enjoining them to maintain.

He speaks of Trotsky's "exceptional abilities . . . personally the most able man in the present Central Committee," but he warns of Trotsky's excessive self-confidence and too ready recourse to administrative measures, i.e. his dictatorial tendencies. The other "most able leader" is Stalin. Of him Lenin warns much more strongly that, as General Secretary, Stalin has "concentrated enormous power in his hands" which he is apt to use recklessly against the other comrades. A postscript devoted to Stalin alone, urges the disciples to take the dictatorial power from Stalin's hands.

Lenin reproves the "Old Bolsheviks," Zinoviev and Kamenev, for their errors, and praises two of the younger men, Bukharin and Piatakov, with the idea of holding the generations together. Thus the burden of the Testament is a call for a collective leadership in the politburo and the avoidance of

* For the full text of these documents, see pp. 257-79.

actively fought against the Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist party line.

Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proved; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations. This concept "enemy of the people" actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the "confession" of the accused himself; and, as subsequent investigation proved, "confessions" were secured through physical pressures against the accused. This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the party line, became victims.

We must assert that, in regard to those persons who in their time had opposed the party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula "enemy of the people" was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals.

It is a sad fact that many persons who were later annihilated as enemies of the party and people had worked with Lenin during his life. Some of these persons had made errors during Lenin's life, but despite this, Lenin benefited by their work; he corrected them and he did everything possible to retain them in the ranks of the party; he induced them to follow him.

quarrels that might lead to the expulsion of one part of the Politburo by the other, which in turn might bring a split in the Party.

By denouncing Trotsky and Bukharin as “anti-Leninists,” Khrushchev is using the very terms which Stalin first used to destroy them. Thus he expressly approves of the destruction of the Leninist Politburo, which Lenin’s Testament was intended to prevent. For Khrushchev, Stalin’s crimes do not begin until he turns on the *Stalinist* Central Committee of 1934, the first to which Khrushchev was elected. He approves of the manner in which Stalinists violated the Testament by keeping the “rude” Stalin in the post which “concentrated enormous power in his hands.”

Only because Stalin destroyed all of Lenin’s close associates were men like Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev able to move to the highest posts. Hence the crushing of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin is actually recorded as one of Stalin’s “serious achievements” and a “great service to the party.”

Lenin’s deathbed messages also reveal grave doubts on the ruthless centralism practiced by him and his party in the nationalities question. With his usual mixture of cynicism and sincerity he had promised all the minority nationalities under Great-Russian rule “the right of self-determination even up to the point of separation or secession.” This promise of complete freedom to determine their own fate had had a twofold purpose: 1) to undermine the old regime by encouraging centrifugal rebellion; and 2) to make the oppressed minority nationalities trust the new Soviet Government and “voluntarily” join a “free union of peoples.”

But with the Communist Party itself centralized and dominated by its Great-Russian Muscovite core, and with all other parties outlawed, this right of self-determination had become a mockery of the hopes stirred by his promises. Dying he contemplated the new Soviet Empire he had set up and he did

In this connection the delegates to the Party Congress should familiarize themselves with an unpublished note by V. I. Lenin directed to the Central Committee's Political Bureau in October 1920. Outlining the duties of the Control Commission, Lenin wrote that the commission should be transformed into a real "organ of party and proletarian conscience."

"As a special duty of the Control Commission there is recommended a deep individualized relationship with, and sometimes even a type of therapy for, the representatives of the so-called opposition—those who have experienced a psychological crisis because of failure in their Soviet or party career. An effort should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in a way used among comrades, to find for them (avoiding the method of issuing orders) a task for which they are psychologically fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to be formulated by the Central Committee's Organizational Bureau, etc."

Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from the correct party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as is evident from the given document, in his practice in leading the party demanded the most intimate party contact with people who had shown indecision or temporary non-conformity with the party line, but whom it was possible to return to the party path. Lenin advised that such people should be patiently educated without the application of extreme methods.

Lenin's wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his work with cadres.

An entirely different relationship with people characterized Stalin. Lenin's traits—patient work with people, stubborn and painstaking education of them, the ability to induce people to follow him without using compulsion, but

not find it good. He wrote three death-bed articles on the National Question. In them he confessed:

I have committed a great offense against the workers of Russia because I have not pressed with sufficient energy and sharpness the question of autonomy. . . . We have taken over the Tsarist apparatus and only thinly annointed it with Soviet oil. . . . The point about the 'freedom to withdraw from the union' with which we justify ourselves will prove to be but a scrap of paper . . .*

Startled by the brutality and autocratic tendencies of the new Soviet imperialists ("Great-Russian Chauvinists" Lenin calls them), and above all by those newly baked non-Russian converts to Great-Russian imperialism, the Georgians, Stalin and Orjonikidze, and the Pole, Dzerzhinski, Lenin prepared to give battle on behalf of those Communists in Georgia and the Ukraine who had taken seriously at least some fragment of the large Leninist promises of "national autonomy." But all three articles, with their warnings and cry of alarm have been suppressed by Stalin and the Stalinists from that day to this. The Georgian and Ukrainian Communists who questioned his excesses, Stalin branded as "bourgeois nationalists," then expelled, then murdered them. Khrushchev declares:

We must affirm that the party fought a serious fight against the Trotskyists, Rightists, and *Bourgeois Nationalists*. (emphasis added).

However poverty-stricken in remedies for the evils that flowed from his own regime Lenin's deathbed reflections may be, they show that he knew well the disciples he had gathered around him, and that he sensed how dangerous and evil his machine, methods and "norms" might be in the hands of a lesser and more brutal man with less of his intellectual power and his restraining humaneness.**

* For the text of these three suppressed articles—confused and absurdly inadequate, but deeply moving as a confession of error and warning of the dangers of Soviet or Great-Russian imperialism—see Appendix A, pp. 271-6.

** Lenin was ruthless in dealing out prison and death to non-Communist critics and "doomed classes," but tender of the blood of Communists even when he expelled them. When first he thought he might be dying, he called Rykov to him and said: "Let no blood flow among you."

rather through the ideological influence on them of the whole collective—were entirely foreign to Stalin. He discarded the Leninist method of convincing and educating, he abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time often violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws.

Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even despair.

This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the party ranks and of all strata of working people, but, on the contrary, brought about annihilation and the expulsion from the party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin.

Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the construction of socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the party's devotion to principles been skillfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but rather drawn to our side, we certainly would not have had such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen victim to the method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then have been resorted to only against those people who had in fact committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.

Let us recall some historical facts.

In the days before the October Revolution, two members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party—Kamenev and Zinoviev—declared themselves against Lenin's plan for

Those whom he sought to preserve from the abuses of the excessive concentration of power in the hands of any single man save himself—namely Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Piatakov and the Communist leaders in Georgia and the Ukraine—were all, according to Khrushchev, “anti-Leninist, hostile to the party and the cause of socialism,” and in favor of a line of conduct which would “lead to the restoration of capitalism and surrender to the world bourgeoisie.” In branding these men “anti-Leninist” and anti-socialist or counter-revolutionary, and in destroying them and the “collegial body,” which Lenin, dying, had sought to create or preserve, Stalin, according to Khrushchev, “played a positive role.”

III. HOW STALIN BECAME LENIN'S HEIR.

A. *Lenin Prepares the Machine.*

Lenin feared that the struggle for the succession would break out as soon as he was dead. Actually it did not wait for his death. As soon as his dominion over words was gone, his ability to influence his lieutenants went with it. Power over the mighty, centralized machine slipped from his hands.

The whole history of his party, especially after it had taken control of the country, was one of steady reduction in the number of men taking part in decision-making, even as the number who carried out the decisions was being enormously increased. By a series of self-confident acts based on his unassailable belief in himself, he had reduced his party to its machine, and the machine to a single power lever that might be manipulated by a single hand—the hand of the man in the driver's seat.

The main lines of this development are crystal clear. First the Congresses proved too large and too infrequent to decide the enormous problems that pressed upon a party seeking to control the destinies of over a hundred and fifty million people.

an armed uprising. In addition, on October 18 they published in the Menshevik newspaper, *Novaya Zhizn*, a statement declaring that the Bolsheviks were making preparations for an uprising and that they considered it adventurist. Kamenev and Zinoviev thus disclosed to the enemy the decision of the Central Committee to stage the uprising, and that the uprising had been organized to take place within the very near future.

This was treason against the party and against the Revolution. In this connection, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Kamenev and Zinoviev revealed the decision of the Central Committee of their party on the armed uprising to Rodzyanko and Kerensky . . ." He put before the Central Committee the question of Zinoviev's and Kamenev's expulsion from the party.

However, after the Great Socialist October Revolution, as is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev were given leading positions. Lenin put them in positions in which they carried out most responsible party tasks and participated actively in the work of the leading party and Soviet organs. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev committed a number of other serious errors during Lenin's life. In his "Testament" Lenin warned that "Zinoviev's and Kamenev's October episode was of course not an accident." But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and certainly not their shooting.

Or, let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At present, after a sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyze this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who, in their time, joined the Trotskyites; how-

The first Congress held after the Bolsheviks seized power (the Seventh Congress, March 1918), was the last Congress ever to decide a basic policy question by a majority vote. The issue was the ratification of the Brest Treaty.

Sensing the ebb of its own influence, the Seventh Congress sought to safeguard at least the power of the Central Committee over decision-making by limiting the committee to nineteen members and instructing it to meet not less than once in two weeks.

But even as it did so, it simultaneously adopted three fateful proposals of Lenin which served to rob the Central Committee of all real power: 1) it created a Politburo of five, to handle current political matters; 2) an Orgburo of five, to handle current organization matters; 3) a permanent Secretariat of three Secretaries, with an indefinitely expandible staff, giving it power over the movement and activities of all members, and the duty to set up a card index of their "characteristics." It was the Secretariat that became the germ of the future all-powerful *Apparat*.

The first responsible Secretary was the gentle Krestinsky,* but to maintain liaison, one of the members of the Orgburo and Politburo was also made a member of the Secretariat. The name of the liaison man was Josef Stalin.

Having taken power over a great nation, the party soon discovered that its utopian blueprints were not applicable to the refractory human material, to the inherited traditions, behavior, inclinations and desires of the members of a real society-in-being. The gap between human life and its *a priori* programs brought the party into a continuous crisis and fever of discussion.

Lenin was as disconcerted as any. He made the most startling reversals—from the withering away of the state to its omnipotence; from complete communism to the NEP; from the proclamation that gold would soon lose its value and be used

* Shot after the "Trial" of March 2-3, 1938.

ever, these same individuals took an active part in the workers' movement before the Revolution, during the Socialist October Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced that, had Lenin lived, such an extreme method would not have been used against any of them.

Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the Revolution when this was actually necessary? No; no one can say this. Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the Revolution and of the working class and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods. You will recall only V. I. Lenin's fight with the Socialist Revolutionary organizers of the anti-Soviet uprising, with the counterrevolutionary kulaks in 1918 and with others, when Lenin without hesitation used the most extreme methods against the enemies. Lenin used such methods, however, only against actual class enemies and not against those who blunder, who err, and whom it was possible to lead through ideological influence and even retain in the leadership. Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were vigorously opposing the Revolution, when the struggle for survival was decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.

Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the Revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated and socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had

only "to build public toilets,"* to the establishment of a gold-backed currency. But he was just as sure and dogmatic with each of his commands at the one extreme as at the other. "Who does not understand this," he would say at each juncture, "does not understand anything."

Until the Angel of Death was hovering over him, there had never been in Lenin's temperament any cleft for a seedcorn of doubt to take root in. The more startling his reverses of direction, the more impatient he became of question, challenge and discussion. That his party's questioning of itself should get in the way of decisive and ruthless action, and that the challenge should come in the name of his own programs and ideals and categorical pronouncements of yesterday, drove him to a fury of intolerance.

The man who had characteristically written: *Give me an organization and I will turn Russia upsidedown*, now sought to solve each conflict between dogmas and realities by fresh commands, just as positive as the previous ones, and each of them implemented by a fresh organizational device. Did bureaucracy prove intractable and self-expanding, even swell to totality, as the State took over everything? His answer was to set up new bureaucratic devices to curb and check on the old ones. Was the party in a "fever of discussion" of its unworkable dogmas and broken promises? His answer was to set up organization devices to silence the discussants and thus put an end to the "fever."

At the Ninth Congress (March, 1920) he turned over to the Secretariat power over transfers, removals, assignments, as a means of dispersing nests of question and opposition—in short, power over all those devices which Khrushchev unctuously calls "Lenin's methods of ideological struggle."

At the Tenth Congress (March, 1921), he dismissed the three Secretaries, Krestinsky, Preobrazhensky and Serebryakov, because they had shrunk from using the organizational

* *Collected Works*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 89.

strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically.

It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet Government. Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so alarmed V. I. Lenin.

Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beria gang, the Central Committee looked into a series of matters fabricated by this gang. This revealed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the incorrect behavior of Stalin. As facts prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed himself many abuses, acting in the name of the Central Committee, not asking for the opinion of the Committee members nor even of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau; often he did not inform them about his personal decisions concerning very important party and government matters.

Considering the question of the cult of an individual, we must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the party's role and significance in the direction of the socialist government of workers and peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition for a successful building of socialism in our country. Pointing to the great responsibility of the Bolshevik party, as the ruling party of the Soviet state, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of all norms of party life; he called for the realization of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the party and the state.

Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of

weapons he had put in their hands for the purpose of stilling "the fever of discussion." In their place he put three tougher men: Molotov, Yaroslavsky, and Mikhailov.*

But these could not put an end to the "fever of discussion" either, for it sprang from a profound moral crisis: the gap between promise and performance, and between dogma and reality.

So at the Eleventh Congress (March-April, 1922), Lenin took the toughest man in his entourage and put him in direct charge of the machine. Josef Stalin, whom he had already utilized in 1906-7 for the organization of the famous bank robberies in the Caucasus** was just the man to use the powers of transfer, deportation and expulsion in order to put an end to the "fever." To signify the elevation of his powers he was given a bigger title: *General Secretary*.

Two other Secretaries were named to his liking: Molotov and Kuibyshev. At the same time Stalin was already the boss of the Orgburo and of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and was given appropriate liaison in the Central Control Commission*** and the Secret Police.

Ominously Lenin told the Congress of the need of "sternest military discipline" in a time of retreat (the retreat from their original unworkable programs). "Armies in retreat," he reminded his hearers, were accustomed to "turn machine guns on the few voices of panic." Under the inspiration of this awesome image, the Congress exhorted the new *Apparat* "not to

* Perhaps I should say "two tougher men," for Mikhailov, who was sent away to a diplomatic post in 1922, and died in 1928, does not seem to have lived up to what was expected of him. Krestinsky, Serebryakov and Preobrazhensky died in the purges. Yaroslavsky (though his pro-Stalin Party History was banned, and his wife, Kirsanova, Director of the Lenin School, died in prison under accusation of shielding spies among the Lenin School students) died a natural death.

** For the story of the bank robberies, see the chapter, "Arms and the Man," in the author's *Three Who Made a Revolution*.

*** The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was one of the bureaucratic devices Lenin had set up to check the bureaucratic degeneration of the Government. The Central Control Commission was a similar device to check the degeneration of the Party. In practice both served only to increase the power of the machine and the General Secretary.

our party, a party built on the principles of democratic centralism. "This means," said Lenin, "that all party matters are accomplished by all party members—directly or through representatives—who, without any exceptions, are subject to the same rules; in addition, all administrative members, all directing collegia, all holders of party positions are elective, they must account for their activities and are recallable."

It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most careful observance of these principles. There was no matter so important that Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau. In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin considered it necessary regularly to convoke congresses, party conferences and plenary sessions of the Central Committee at which all the most important questions were discussed and where resolutions, carefully worked out by the collective of leaders, were approved.

We can recall, for an example, the year 1918 when the country was threatened by the attack of the imperialistic interventionists. In this situation the Seventh Party Congress was convened in order to discuss a vitally important matter which could not be postponed—the matter of peace. In 1919, while the civil war was raging, the Eighth Party Congress convened, which adopted a new party program, decided such important matters as the relationship with the peasant masses, the organization of the Red Army, the leading role of the party in the work of the soviets, the correction of the social composition of the party, and other matters. In 1920 the Ninth Party Congress was convened, which laid down guiding principles pertaining to the party's work in the sphere of economic construction. In 1921 the

flinch from expulsions from the party in the struggle against such phenomena." The new Secretary was hardly one to need such exhortation.

On April 4, 1922, Stalin was made General Secretary.

On May 25—less than two months later—Lenin suffered his first stroke.

From his sickbed, and from that bench in the sun where Stalin managed to get himself photographed sitting together with Lenin, the erstwhile master of the party watched with mounting alarm the functioning of the machine he had just perfected.

When he sensed that he would never recover, doubt and fear took possession of him. His Testament, his deathbed articles and letters—what were they but a vain attempt to reverse gears on the fearful steamroller he had set in motion? But its momentum was already such that it rolled right over his Testament and deathbed letters.

As he lay voiceless, he saw his own voice reduced to a series of lifeless quotations, torn out of the context in which they had been uttered, and used by his disciples as magical weapons against each other. Thus, while Lenin was still living, was born the "posthumous" cult of the personality of V. I. Lenin.

B. How Trotskyism Was Discovered.

The first use of such Lenin texts out of context was a declaration of war on "Trotskyism" in the autumn of 1923. It was still a few months to Lenin's death. Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin had formed a "collective leadership," a triumvirate to take over the Dictator's powers. What united them was their common realization that the most likely heir to Lenin's place was Leon Trotsky.

Their Leader's last articulate words on Trotsky had been "personally the most able man in the present Central Committee" and "I ask you urgently to undertake the defense of the

Tenth Party Congress accepted Lenin's New Economic Policy and the historical resolution called "About Party Unity."

During Lenin's life, party congresses were convened regularly; always when a radical turn in the development of the party and the country took place, Lenin considered it absolutely necessary that the party discuss at length all the basic matters pertaining to internal and foreign policy and to questions bearing on the development of party and government.

It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed to the Party Congress as the highest party organ his last articles, letters and remarks. During the period between congresses, the Central Committee of the party, acting as the most authoritative leading collective, meticulously observed the principles of the party and carried out its policy.

So it was during Lenin's life. Were our party's holy Leninist principles observed after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?

Whereas, during the first few years after Lenin's death, party congresses and Central Committee plenums took place more or less regularly, later, when Stalin began increasingly to abuse his power, these principles were brutally violated. This was especially evident during the last 15 years of his life. Was it a normal situation when over 13 years elapsed between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Party Congresses, years during which our party and our country had experienced so many important events? These events demanded categorically that the party should have passed resolutions pertaining to the country's defense during the Patriotic War [World War II] and to peacetime construction after the war. Even after the end of the war a Congress was not convened for over seven years. Central Committee plenums were hardly ever called. It should be sufficient to mention that during all the years of the Patriotic War not a single

Georgian matter . . .” * But the triumvirate, aided by the “theoretician” Bukharin, ranged through the writings of Lenin of an earlier day to build up an eternal antagonism between their synthetic Leninism and their no less synthetic Trotskyism. The still living Lenin lay voiceless, unable to intervene.

Presuming on his total control of what it is that may be remembered and publicly recalled, Khrushchev tells us that the “anti-Leninist proposals of Trotskyism . . . led toward the restoration of capitalism and surrender to the world bourgeoisie.” But what Trotsky actually proposed in his counterattack against the triumvirate was nothing more nor less than the party’s need to reassert control over the machine that had passed into the triumvirate’s and more specifically into the General Secretary’s hands. As he watched the mounting attack upon him in Lenin’s name, Trotsky wrote an unwitting gloss** on that part of Lenin’s Testament which concerned the concentration of power in Stalin’s hands and his abuse of that power:

The party must subordinate to itself its machine . . . criticize without fear or favor . . . remove from party posts those who at the first voice of criticism, objection or protests, are inclined to demand one’s party card for the purposes of repression. . . . In the machine all from top to bottom must feel that nobody dares to terrorize the party . . .***

* See pp 262, 266-7.

** Trotsky did not yet know of Lenin’s Testament.

*** While Trotsky felt himself, at Lenin’s side, one of the masters of the party machine, he approved its use against the Trade Union Opposition, the Democratic Centralists, the Workers’ Opposition. His demand for greater freedom in the ranks came only after the machine began to roll over him and his supporters.

Bukharin, too, though he was no machine man at all, raised no objection when Stalin used the apparatus to reinforce Bukharin’s own ideological arguments. Even the Oppositions cited above undermined their own moral positions by limiting their demands for democracy to the ranks of the Communist Party, while approving the crushing of Socialists, Social Revolutionaries, Anarchists. The Trade Union Opposition, for example, demanded the “democratic right” of the Communist fractions engaged in trade union work to elect trade union officials, in place of their being appointed by the party machine from above. But never for an instant did they demand that the non-party trade unionists—the overwhelming majority—should have the democratic right to elect the union officers and determine union policy.

Thus the one-party system with its insistence of a monopoly of power by a

Central Committee plenum took place. It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in October 1941, when Central Committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and talk to the Central Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and how haughtily and disdainfully he treated the Central Committee members.

In practice, Stalin ignored the norms of party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective party leadership.

Stalin's willfulness *vis-à-vis* the party and its Central Committee became fully evident after the Seventeenth Party Congress which took place in 1934.

Having at its disposal numerous data showing brutal arbitrariness toward party cadres, the Central Committee has created a party commission under the control of the Central Committee Presidium; it was charged with investigating what made possible the mass repressions against the majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The commission has become acquainted with a large quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and with other documents and has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against Communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses of socialist legality, which resulted in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that many party, Soviet and economic activists, who were branded in 1937-1938 as "enemies," were actually never munists; they were only so stigmatized and, often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the investigative judges—falsifiers) with

Zinoviev, always inclined to be a little hysterical, answered with a proposal that the Cheka arrest the Commissar of War! But Stalin, more cautious, more patient and calculating, more skilled in infighting, opposed this dangerous move against the most popular man in the leadership. Instead, he speeded up his "ideological" measures: removals, transfers, deportations, "promotions" to posts abroad, expulsions.

Christian Rakovsky, long the leading Communist in the Ukraine, was sent to London as Ambassador, and one of Stalin's toughest lieutenants and cronies, Lazar Kaganovich, was sent to "clean up" the Ukraine. It was as Kaganovich's lieutenant, alternately in the Ukraine and in Moscow, that another tough young Stalinist, Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev, first made his mark and first attracted to himself the favorable notice of Josef Stalin.

At the same time that Rakovsky was sent to London, Krestinsky was sent to Germany, Yoffe to China. Lesser figures were sent to the Urals, to Siberia, or expelled from the party.

Before Lenin had been dead a year, Trotsky's adherents had been scattered and he himself had been forced out of the Commissariat of War, and demoted to obscure economic posts. It was only then that Trotsky developed his special program on industrialization. Far from "leading to the restoration of capitalism and surrender to the world bourgeoisie" that program would have led to an ever greater totalitarianism, as

minority over the popular majority, paved the way for the state of siege in the party itself. Those who approved of the dictatorship of their party found out, too late, that what they were really approving of was the dictatorship of the central party apparatus. Lenin was able to claim that every opposition expressed the desires or hopes of some part of the voiceless population. From this it was but a step to calling it "anti-party, anti-class," or, after Lenin's death, "anti-Leninist." The tragedy of every Communist who accepted the party dictatorship over the country was that he undermined the moral case for his own freedom by approving the destruction of the freedom of others.

Only a Medvediev, whom Lenin expelled for it, or a Rosa Luxemburg, had the breadth of vision to see what she wrote of the Lenin regime from her prison in Germany:

"Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party . . . is no Freedom. Freedom is always only freedom for those who think differently."

all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes.

The commission has presented to the Central Committee Presidium lengthy and documented materials pertaining to mass repressions against the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress and against members of the Central Committee elected at that Congress. These materials have been studied by the Presidium of the Central Committee.

It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates of the party's Central Committee who were elected at the Seventeenth Congress, 98 persons, *i.e.*, 70 per cent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938). (*Indignation in the hall.*) What was the composition of the delegates to the Seventeenth Congress? It is known that 80 per cent of enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest Communist voting participants of the Seventeenth Congress joined the party during the years of conspiracy before the Revolution and during the civil war; this means before 1921. By social origin the basic mass of the delegates to the Congress were workers (60 per cent of the voting members).

For this reason, it was inconceivable that a congress so composed would have elected a Central Committee a majority of whom would prove to be enemies of the party. The only reason why 70 per cent of Central Committee members and candidates elected at the Seventeenth Congress were branded as enemies of the party and of the people was because honest Communists were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and revolutionary legality was gravely undermined.

The same fate met not only the Central Committee members but also the majority of the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress. Of 1,966 delegates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 persons were arrested on charges of revolutionary crimes, *i.e.*, decidedly more than a majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild and

indeed it did when Stalin plagiarized and applied it in his own rough fashion a few years later. Khrushchev's interest in obscuring this is obvious, for the line which Stalin, under the ideological influence of Bukharin, first stigmatized as "super-industrialization," and then, when he had broken with Bukharin, lifted bodily from Trotsky's arsenal, is the general line which Khrushchev lists as one of Stalin's "well-known merits," and the line which Khrushchev follows today.

Moreover, Trotsky's proposal for the development of heavy industry at the expense of the peasant and the well-being of the worker was the basic line of Zinoviev and Kamenev as well as of Stalin. Only Bukharin, who did not aspire to the driver's seat, but merely to play out his role as "the party's leading theoretician" and to urge the building of the economy on the basis of some of the gentler and more benign aspects of Lenin's zigzagging policies, eventually developed a special economic line of his own. The differences between Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were differences in originality—Trotsky thought up what others merely appropriated as their own—together with differences which were invented by the complicated casuistry of the factional struggle for power. But all of them, save Bukharin, and his associates Rykov and Tomsky (the "Rightists"), actually supported the same "general line" which has come by right of possession and fearful execution to be known as the Stalinist General Line. Thus, for better or worse, Bukharin alone has a legitimate right to have his name elevated—or degraded—into an *ism*, which will have to be considered separately.

C. The "Good Period" or How Stalin Defended

Collective Leadership.

It is curious to watch Khrushchev's game of hide-and-seek with the date when Lenin's "wise characterization of Stalin" finally became "correct."

contrary to common sense were the charges of counter-revolutionary crimes made out, as we now see, against a majority of participants at the Seventeenth Party Congress.

(Indignation in the hall.)

We should recall that the Seventeenth Party Congress is historically known as the Congress of Victors. Delegates to the Congress were active participants in the building of our socialist state; many of them suffered and fought for party interests during the pre-Revolutionary years in the conspiracy and at the civil-war fronts; they fought their enemies valiantly and often nervelessly looked into the face of death.

How, then, can we believe that such people could prove to be "two-faced" and had joined the camps of the enemies of socialism during the era after the political liquidation of Zinovievites, Trotskyites and Rightists and after the great accomplishments of socialist construction? This was the result of the abuse of power by Stalin, who began to use mass terror against the party cadres.

What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the Seventeenth Party Congress? It was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above the party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the party.

While he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective before the Seventeenth Congress, after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites, when as a result of that fight and socialist victories the party achieved unity, Stalin ceased to an ever greater degree to consider the members of the party's Central Committee and even the members of the Political Bureau. Stalin thought that now he could decide all things

On the one hand, Khrushchev shocked his listeners by telling the pitiful story of Stalin's insulting of Krupskaya the moment he thought that her husband was helpless. On the other, Khrushchev insists that Stalin was quite properly kept in the post of General Secretary after Lenin's death because, "in that first period Stalin still paid attention to Lenin's advice."

But what advice did Lenin give Stalin in his Testament except to rebuke him for his rudeness and lack of loyalty, and warn him against expelling Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin or Piatakov? And what was the essence of Lenin's "plain words" concerning Stalin if not to urge his removal from the dangerous power post of General Secretary?

Yet there is a sense in which Stalin's conduct immediately after Lenin's death gave some color to the claim that he had mended his ways and taken Lenin's non-existent advice to his heart. He knew that he was surrounded by his peers, and more than peers, and would have to tread softly. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, each was more popular than he. But his hand was on Lenin's machine, and in its name he spoke not of his leadership but of a "collective leadership."

Even as he suppressed Lenin's last words and will, he swore in liturgical fashion to keep Lenin's every word as "the holy of holies."* As he struck down each of Lenin's lieutenants, it was with the pious invocation of Lenin texts, and a warning in the name of the nameless party functionaries that "no one was bigger than the party." He did not claim to be bigger than the party: he was but its humble servant and secretary. He was not another Lenin but merely a faithful disciple. In the name of the party, he struck down one by one those large figures that seemed to emerge above its anonymous machine.

The tactic was disarming. It deceived Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin, together and each in turn.

Stalin's first problem was to hold on to his post in despite of Lenin's Will. It was Zinoviev, sure that he could use the

* Cf. Khrushchev: "our party's holy Leninist principles."

alone and all he needed were people to fill the stage; he treated all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him.

After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, mass repressions and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality began. On the evening of 1 December 1934 on Stalin's initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau—which approved it two days later, casually) the secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, Yenukidze, signed the following directive:

“I. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.

“II. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death sentences pertaining to crimes of this category in order to consider the possibility of pardon, because the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee U.S.S.R. does not consider as possible the receiving of petitions of this sort.

“III. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are directed to execute the death sentences against criminals of the above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of sentences.”

This directive became the basis for mass acts of abuse against socialist legality. During many of the fabricated court cases the accused were charged with “the preparation” of terroristic acts; this deprived them of any possibility that their cases might be re-examined, even when they stated before the court that their “confessions” were secured by force, and when, in a convincing manner, they disproved the accusations against them.

It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful

lowly wheelhorse of the party machine for his own rise to power, who saved Stalin's skin. Four months after Lenin's death, the Testament was read for the first time to a meeting of the Central Committee.

Comrades—Zinoviev said unctuously—every word of Ilyich is law to us. . . . We have sworn to carry out every behest which the dying Ilyich enjoined upon us. You know perfectly well that we shall keep that vow. . . . But we are happy to say that in one point Lenin's fears have proved groundless. I have in mind the point about the General Secretary. You have all witnessed our harmonious cooperation in the last few months. . . . And with me you will be happy to say that Lenin's fears have proved without foundation . . .*

After a similar speech by Kamenev, and futile protest by Krupskaya, the Central Committee decided that Lenin's Testament should not be published or even read to a plenary session of the coming Congress. Stalin remained with his hand on the lever of the power machine.

At the Congress, Stalin "loyally" defended Zinoviev against attack by Lenin's old critic, the "Democratic Centralist," Ossinsky:

I cannot, comrades, overlook such attacks as that of Comrade Ossinsky. . . . He praised Comrade Stalin, praised Comrade Kamenev, and attacked Comrade Zinoviev, believing that for the moment it is enough to get rid of one, and then it will come the turn of the others. He directed his course towards the dissolution of that nucleus which has been created within the Central Committee by years of work, hoping thus, gradually, step by step, to dissolve everything. . . . I must warn him that he is running his head against a stone wall, on which I fear he will only break his head.**

Three things are interesting about this speech: 1) it is the first of a series of such "defenses" of comrades whom he would soon destroy; 2) these defenses make him seem the most mod-

* Isaac Deutscher: *Stalin*. (New York, 1949), p. 272.

** When Stalin reprinted this "defense" of Zinoviev against Ossinsky in his *Collected Works* (Vol. V, p. 227), he omitted the word "comrade" before both the names of the attacker, Ossinsky, and the defended Zinoviev. Of the four names in the passage only Stalin's still has the word "Comrade" before it. The other three had died as traitors.

examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of Kirov.

A month and a half before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious behavior but he was released and not even searched. It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist [member of the secret police] assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation, on 2 December 1934, he was killed in a car "accident" in which no other occupants of the car were harmed.

After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing.

Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov, dated from Sochi on 25 September 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the Political Bureau. The content of the telegram was as follows:

"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU [secret police] is four years behind in this matter. This is noted by all party workers and by the majority of the representatives of the NKVD."

Strictly speaking, we should stress that Stalin did not meet with and, therefore, could not know the opinion of party workers.

This Stalinist formulation that the "NKVD (term used

erate man in the faction of which he forms a part, the most reluctant to eliminate anybody or disturb the collective leadership and the unity of the party; and 3) in each case he attributes to the man he is answering motives, conceptions and tactics which he himself was to employ. Here, for example, he projects on Ossinsky the "belief that for the moment it is enough to get rid of one, and then will come the turn of the others."

The one which Stalin felt he must get rid of first was Trotsky. Before Lenin was even dead a year, Stalin and Zinoviev were able to force Trotsky to resign as Commissar of War. But with that their motive for holding together was ended.

Stalin turned his agents loose in Leningrad, where Zinoviev was in command, and in Moscow where Kamenev was at the helm. To undermine Zinoviev and picture him as party splitter while he, Stalin, remained but the humble wheelhorse of party unity and collective leadership, Stalin undertook the "defense" of Trotsky against the attacks of Zinoviev, and then of Bukharin against Trotsky and Zinoviev.

As the apostle of collective leadership, so careful of each precious leader, he told the Fourteenth Congress (1925):

We have toned down some of the formulations in our resolution in the interest of peace in the party. We are against head-chopping. We are against the entire policy of head-chopping.

That does not mean that leaders will be permitted to give themselves airs with impunity. . . . No, excuse us! There will be no kowtowing before leaders.

We stand for unity. We are against head-chopping. The policy of head-chopping is abhorrent to us. The party wants unity and it will achieve it—*with* Zinoviev and Kamenev if they are willing, *without them* if they are not willing. . . .

To lead the party in any other way than collectively is impossible. Now that Ilyich is no longer with us, it is silly to dream of such a thing, silly to talk about it. Collective work, collective leadership . . . that is what we need.*

* We must leave it to the reader to decide how much Khrushchey's talk of "collective leadership" owes to this lesson which his whilom master gave him in the art of advancing one's personal fortunes by espousing the "holy Leninist

interchangeably with 'OGPU') is four years behind" in applying mass repression and that there is need of "catching up" with the neglected work, directly pushed the NKVD workers on the path of mass arrests and executions.

We should state that this formulation was also forced on the February-March plenary session of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1937. The plenary resolution approved it on the basis of Yezhov's report, "Lessons Flowing from the Harmful Activity, Diversion and Espionage of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite agents," stating:

"The plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that all facts revealed during the investigation into the matter of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite center and of its followers in the provinces show that the People's Commissariat of International Affairs has fallen behind at least four years in the attempt to unmask these most inexorable enemies of the people."

The mass repressions at this time were made under the slogan of a fight against the Trotskyites. Did the Trotskyites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our party and to the Soviet state? We should recall that in 1927, on the eve of the Fifteenth Party Congress, only some 4,000 votes were cast for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition while there were 724,000 for the party line. During the 10 years which passed between the Fifteenth Party Congress and the February-March Central Committee plenum, Trotskyism was completely disarmed; many former Trotskyites had changed their former views and worked in the various sectors building socialism. It is clear that in the situation of socialist victory there was no basis for mass terror in the country.

Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee

Stalin also told the Fourteenth Congress how the ambitious Zinoviev, while Lenin lay dying, had proposed to enlarge the powers of the Secretariat, and make of it a ruling *troika* of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Stalin. Stalin told how he, as faithful defender of the powers of the Politburo and the Central Committee against the Secretariat, and as faithful champion of "collegiality," had indignantly rejected Zinoviev's proposal.

"What did this proposal mean?" he asked. And he answered:

It meant that the party was to be led without Rykov, without Kalinin, without Tomsky, without Molotov, without Bukharin. . . . The party can not be led without these comrades.*

Here is the good collective leader's own account of how he broke with Zinoviev and Kamenev to protect Trotsky from having his "head chopped off."

How did our disagreement begin? It began with the question: *What is to be done with Trotsky?* That was at the end of 1924. The group of Leningrad comrades proposed that Trotsky be expelled from the party. . . . We disagreed with this and limited ourselves to removing Trotsky from the post of People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs.

We disagreed with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that the policy of head-chopping was fraught with great dangers for the party, that the method of head-chopping, the method of blood-letting—and they demanded blood—was dangerous, contagious. Today you cut off one head, tomorrow another, the day after a third. What will you have left of the party.

The reader will notice that the word *comrade* has been eliminated from the names of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky,

principle of collective leadership." The observation, "Now that Ilyich is no longer with us, it is silly to dream of such a thing," shows that it was recognized by every one that Lenin had led the party personally and not "collectively."

* The rewriting of history to make the zealous but insignificant Molotov, and the mediocre Kalinin, indispensable leaders in 1923 would seem to be an absurdity, but it had its factional purpose. After Stalin had executed Rykov, Bukharin and Zinoviev, driven Tomsky to suicide, and first exiled, then arranged the murder of Trotsky, he amended the Congress Stenogram so that in his *Collected Works* (Vol. VII, p. 387) it reads:

"What does this mean? It means that the party is to be led without Kalinin, without Molotov. Without these comrades it was impossible at the given moment to lead the party!"

plenum in 1937, "Deficiencies of Party Work and Methods for the Liquidation of the Trotskyites and of Other Two-facers," contained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that as we march forward toward Socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this.

Actually Lenin taught that the application of revolutionary violence is necessitated by the resistance of the exploiting classes, and this referred to the era when the exploiting classes existed and were powerful. As soon as the nation's political situation had improved, when in January, 1920, the Red Army took Rostov and thus won a most important victory over Denikin, Lenin instructed Dzherzhinsky to stop mass terror and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin justified this important political move of the Soviet state in the following manner in his report at the session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee on 2 February 1920:

"We were forced to use terror because of the terror practiced by the Entente, when strong world powers threw their hordes against us, not avoiding any type of conduct. We would not have lasted two days had we not answered these attempts of officers and White Guardists in a merciless fashion; this meant the use of terror, but this was forced upon us by the terrorist methods of the Entente.

"But as soon as we attained a decisive victory, even before the end of the war, immediately after taking Rostov, we gave up the use of the death penalty and thus proved that we intend to execute our own program in the manner that we promised. We say that the application of violence flows out of the decision to crush the capitalists; as soon as this was accomplished we gave up the use of all extraordinary methods. We have proved this in practice."

for by the time this opponent of head-chopping published the address in Volume VII of his *Collected Works* (p. 389), he had employed the “contagious method of blood-letting” on all three.

It only remains to ask Khrushchev during which of these maneuvers Stalin was “still following Lenin’s advice” and therefore not dangerous in the post of General Secretary?

D. *Bukharin: The Ghost at the Banquet.*

As long as Stalin was concerned with his war on Trotsky and Zinoviev, he leaned on Bukharin for his theoretical arguments and ideological stock-in-trade.

While Stalin garnered the votes, rigged the conventions, and sent men like Kaganovich and Kirov to disperse the forces and destroy the fortresses of his opponents, it was Bukharin who provided the reasoning, the economic and social line, the irony, and no little of the demagogy (but none of the hatred or venom), for the joint battle against Trotsky and Zinoviev.

The key documents of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses (December 1925 and December 1927) bear the imprint of Bukharin’s line. Even as late as October, 1928, he believed that he was speaking in the name of Stalin as well as his own when he published his *Notes of an Economist*. These summed up the achievements and the errors of the past three years when Russia’s ruined economy was being rebuilt, and they laid down the principles on which the first of the Five-Year Plans was to be based.

But as soon as Stalin had finished with his competitors and critics from what he and Bukharin called the “ultra-Left,” he shamelessly plagiarized Trotsky’s “super-industrialization” line, and made it his own. It became the Stalinist “General Line” which Khrushchev and the other orphaned Stalinists still follow. Along with it, Stalin appropriated Trotsky’s and Zinoviev’s attacks against the line which he and Bukharin had

KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET REPORT

Stalin deviated from these clear and plain precepts of Lenin. Stalin put the party and the NKVD up to the use of mass terror when the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our country and when there were no serious reasons for the use of extraordinary mass terror.

This terror was actually directed not at the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes but against the honest workers of the party and of the Soviet state; against them were made lying, slanderous and absurd accusations concerning "two-facedness," "espionage," "sabotage," preparation of fictitious "plots," etc.

At the February-March Central Committee plenum in 1937 many members actually questioned the rightness of the established course regarding mass repressions under the pretext of combating "two-facedness."

Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts. He said:

"I have philosophized that the severe years of fighting have passed. Party members who have lost their backbones have broken down or have joined the camp of the enemy; healthy elements have fought for the party. These were the years of industrialization and collectivization. I never thought it possible that after this severe era had passed Karpov and people like him would find themselves in the camp of the enemy. (Karpov was a worker in the Ukrainian Central Committee whom Postyshev knew well.) And now, according to the testimony, it appears that Karpov was recruited in 1934 by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in 1934 an honest party member who had trod the long road of unrelenting fight against enemies for the party and for Socialism, would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not believe it. . . . I cannot imagine how it would be possible to travel with the party during the difficult

yesterday defended. Thus did Bukharin, and his supporters, Rykov and Tomsy, become "the Right Danger."*

In this Stalin was merely following a classical procedure of Lenin's: Lenin had always contrived to classify his critics into ultra-right and ultra-left thus giving his own line the position of running straight down the center of absolute truth. And, as at a later stage of each of Lenin's battles, he had always contrived to demonstrate that the "two extremes of deviation actually met" and could be lumped together as anti-Marxist and anti-Party, so Stalin in the purge trials converted Bukharin into a "Trotskyite" taking secret orders from foreign intelligence and espionage centers of which Trotsky was the master spy.

Bukharin and his associates were ousted from the leadership in 1929. Tomsy, leader and protector of the trade unions, was driven to suicide after the indispensable Kaganovich had moved into the trade union apparatus with his Stalinist agents. Bukharin and Rykov were executed in 1938.

Thus over a quarter of a century has passed since Bukharin was destroyed politically and it is two decades since he was exterminated physically. Yet until the day of his death, Stalin was never able to speak of his general line in industry and agriculture without reviving, to excoriate it, Bukharin's name.

In Stalin's last work before his death he denounced an economist named Yaroshenko, and other unnamed persons, for falling into the heresies of Bukharin. Since Stalin's death, Khrushchev, faithful in this as in so many things, has invoked Bukharin's name every time he has spoken on the general line

* Before the seizure of power in Russia, socialists frequently applied the term "Left" to those who were most exigent in their demands for the distribution of more wealth to the masses, and the term "Right" to those who insisted that more had to be produced and industry had to prosper if the masses were to get more of the product. Today in the Soviet Union, those who put the main emphasis on the well-being of the masses and distribution to them of more of the total product are called "the Right Danger," while those who insist that production and industry take priority are called the "Left" or "Leninists." Thus do the emotional cliché terms, Right and Left, get inverted where modern totalitarianism determines their "meaning."

years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites. It is an odd thing. . . .”

(Movement in the hall.)

Using Stalin's formulation, namely, that the closer we are to Socialism the more enemies we will have, and using the resolution of the February-March Central Committee plenum passed on the basis of Yezhov's report—the *provocateurs* who had infiltrated the organs of state security, together with conscienceless careerists began to cover with the party name the mass terror against party cadres, cadres of the Soviet state and ordinary Soviet citizens. It should suffice to say that the number of arrests based on charges of counterrevolutionary crimes grew 10 times between 1936 and 1937.

It is known that brutal willfulness was practiced against leading party workers. The Party Statutes, approved at the Seventeenth Party Congress, were based on Leninist principles expressed at the Tenth Party Congress. They stated that, in order to apply an extreme method such as exclusion from the party against a Central Committee member, against a Central Committee candidate and against a member of the Party Control Commission, “it is necessary to call a Central Committee plenum and to invite to the plenum all Central Committee candidate members and all members of the Party Control Commission”; only if two thirds of the members of such a general assembly of responsible party leaders find it necessary, only then can a Central Committee member or candidate be expelled.

The majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the Seventeenth Congress and arrested in 1937-1938 were expelled from the party illegally through the brutal abuse of the Party Statutes, because the question

in industry. He did so at the January Plenum of 1955, and in his open and secret reports at the Twentieth Congress. More than three years after Stalin's death and a full month and more after Khrushchev's report on Stalin's errors and crimes, *Pravda* revived the name of "L. Yaroshenko . . . and other rotten elements" (*rotten* applied to human beings is a purge word), to denounce them for "regurgitating" Bukharinite deviations, making "provocative anti-party statements" and "propagating views alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism."

Why is it that this heresy, so often condemned, so often refuted, so often punished, is so often resurrected? Why does this ghost not keep to his grave though the stake is driven into his corpse again and again?

If we look for the answer to this haunting mystery in Khrushchev's Secret Address we find that both the Trotskyite-Zinovievites and the Bukharinites "proposed political lines leading toward the restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie." But against Bukharin and his group a special and more specific indictment is added:

Let us consider for a moment—says Khrushchev—what would have happened if in 1928-29, the political line of the Right Deviation had prevailed among us, or (in other words) the orientation toward 'cotton-dress industrialization' and towards the kulak, etc. We would not now have a powerful heavy industry, we would not have the *kolkhozes*, we would find ourselves disarmed and weak in the midst of a capitalist encirclement.

A clearer light is thrown on the Bukharinite heresy by Khrushchev's remarks at the important January 1955 Plenum, when he ousted Malenkov from the Premiership and dealt a death blow to the modest efforts to step up somewhat the relative tempo of light industry as compared with the—in any case overwhelmingly predominant—heavy industry. Khrushchev was supposed to be reporting *On the Increase in the Production of Animal Products*, but the key passage in his report begins with a warning: "in the face of the fact that the

of their expulsion was never studied at the Central Committee plenum.

Now, when the cases of some of these so-called "spies" and "saboteurs" were examined, it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures.

At the same time, Stalin, as we have been informed by members of the Political Bureau of that time, did not show them the statements of many accused political activists when they retracted their confessions before the military tribunal and asked for an objective examination of their cases. There were many such declarations, and Stalin without doubt knew of them.

The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases" against the members of the party's Central Committee elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress.

An example of vile provocation, of odious falsification and of criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate member of the Central Committee Political Bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the party and of the Soviet Government, Comrade Eikhe, who was a party member since 1905.

(Commotion in the hall.)

Comrade Eikhe was arrested on 29 April 1938 on the basis of slanderous materials, without the sanction of the Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., which was finally received 15 months after the arrest.

Investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which most brutally violated Soviet legality and was accompanied by wilfulness and falsification.

Eikhe was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a

imperialist states are developing a furious preparation for war," any slowing up, even relatively, in the tempo of the development of heavy industry would be "suicide" and an impermissible "Right Deviation." This magical two-word incantation, as always, served to summon the ghost of Bukharin from his grave. Khrushchev continued:

In connection with the measures taken recently for the increase in the production of consumers' goods, some comrades have introduced confusion into the question of the respective tempos of the development of heavy and light industry in our country.

Basing themselves on the fundamental economic law of socialism, which they have misunderstood and vulgarized, these 'theoreticians'—if you will allow me to call them such—are trying to prove that at a certain stage of the construction of socialism, the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task and that light industry then can and should outstrip all other branches of industry.

These are totally wrong views, contradicting the law of Marxism-Leninism. They are nothing but a slandering of the party. They are a relapse into the right deviations, a relapse into the views hostile to Leninism, which in their time were preached by Rykov, Bukharin and their ilk. (*Pravda*, February 3, 1955).

The "some comrades" whose "confused" and "anti-Leninist" views are thus linked up with the slandered and murdered Bukharin must have quaked as they listened. But what must puzzle the ordinary reader is the idea that merely to propose a little more emphasis on consumers' goods is "a slandering of the party." Let us see if we can solve this mystery also.

The key to Bukharin's views on planning are to be found in their most systematic form in his *Notes of an Economist*.*

1) Planning is an extremely complicated operation calling for experimental tentativeness in its projected figures and a

* For the text, slightly condensed by the elimination of statistical tables and polemics that have lost their actuality, see Appendix D, pp. 295-315. The *Notes of an Economist* were first published in *Pravda* in October 1928 on the eve of the adoption of the first Five-Year Plan, and as a pamphlet (Moscow-Leningrad, 1928). A mediocre and occasionally incorrect translation is to be found in *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, pp. 1327-9; 1377-80; 1434-7. I have made a fresh translation.

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protocol of his confession prepared by the investigative judges, in which he and several other eminent party workers were accused of anti-Soviet activity.

On 1 October 1939 Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin in which he categorically denied his guilt and asked for an examination of his case. In his declaration he wrote:

“There is no more bitter misery than to sit in the jail of a government for which I have always fought.”

A second declaration of Eikhe has been preserved which he sent to Stalin on 27 October 1939; in it he cited facts very convincingly and countered the slanderous accusations made against him, arguing that this provocatory accusation was on the one hand the work of real Trotskyites whose arrests he had sanctioned as First Secretary of the West Siberian Krai [Territory] Party Committee and who conspired in order to take revenge on him, and, on the other hand, the result of the base falsification of materials by the investigative judges.

Eikhe wrote in his declaration:

“. . . On 25 October of this year I was informed that the investigation in my case has been concluded and I was given access to the materials of this investigation. Had I been guilty of only one hundredth of the crimes with which I am charged, I would not have dared to send you this pre-execution declaration; however, I have not been guilty of even one of the things with which I am charged and my heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness. I have never in my life told you a word of falsehood and now, finding my two feet in the grave, I am also not lying. My whole case is a typical example of provocation, slander and violation of the elementary basis of revolutionary legality. . . .

readiness to modify them wherever they produce an imbalance among the various sectors of the economy, or hardship for any stratum of the producing population.

2) The plan should aim at a proper proportionality between industry and agriculture, between producers' goods and consumers' goods, and among the various sectors of industry. Though the most rapid possible industrialization of the backward Russian land is the fundamental aim, if heavy industry is pushed one-sidedly at the expense of agriculture or worker well-being, it will upset the necessary proportionality, make a mockery of the socialist aim of mass-well being, and cause all manner of crises. One-sided expansion of one sector will be followed by a reaction until other sectors are brought abreast of it, or "will lead to an upsetting of the political equilibrium of the country." Therefore the plan should aim rather at the most rapid possible, balanced, and continuous expansion of the economy.

3) The plan must take realistic account of the supplies of raw materials and construction materials in being or producible within the given period. "If there are not enough bricks and if . . . no more than a certain quantity can be produced during the given period, then we must not draw up a factory building program which exceeds this limit . . . for no matter how much you may force building activities you cannot build factories out of thin air. . ."

4) In a land with so many small peasant enterprises, incalculable economic elements enter into play (Bukharin called them "spontaneous" or "elemental"), and the overall plan is by no means omnipotent. Such "spontaneous" elements as the size of the crop, amount of it which will come to market, resultant price, etc. require that we make tentative forecasts, then watch actual results and correct our directives accordingly.

5) Errors in calculation may cause, and indeed have caused crises. On the one hand we have permitted a goods famine and on the other pursued such a price policy as has caused stagna-

“. . . The Confessions which were made part of my file are not only absurd but contain some slander of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars because correct resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and of the Council of People's Commissars which were made not on my initiative and without my participation are presented as hostile acts of counterrevolutionary organizations made at my suggestion. . . .

“I am now alluding to the most disgraceful part of my life and to my really grave guilt against the party and against you. This is my confession of counterrevolutionary activity. . . . The case is as follows: Not being able to suffer the tortures to which I was submitted by Ushakov and Nikolayev—and especially by the first one—who utilized the knowledge that my broken ribs have not properly mended and have caused me great pain, I have been forced to accuse myself and others.

“The majority of my confession has been suggested or dictated by Ushakov, and the remainder is my reconstruction of NKVD materials from Western Siberia for which I assumed all responsibility. If some part of the story which Ushakov fabricated and which I signed did not properly hang together, I was forced to sign another variation. The same thing was done to Rukhimovich, who was at first designated as a member of the reserve net and whose name later was removed without telling me anything about it; the same was also done with the leader of the reserve net, supposedly created by Bukharin in 1935. At first I wrote my name in, and then I was intructed to insert Mezhlauk. There were other similar incidents.

“. . . I am asking and begging you that you again examine

tion and retrogression in grain supply. Such crises upset the expanding equilibrium, make for dangerous changes in class relations and tend to endanger the stability of our system.

6) A central problem of industrialization is the age-old one of the relation of industry and agriculture. Capitalist industrialization could take place at the expense of the stagnation and impoverishment of the village. But our socialist principles forbid us to build industry by the exploitation of agriculture. We must reject the use of force to collect grain or collectivize agriculture, and refrain from "pumping over" from the village into industry such large resources as will impoverish the village and hinder its flourishing. In the long run industry can grow great only on the basis of a strong internal market for its products.

7) A rapid and healthful growth of industry assumes a rapid growth of well-being and productivity in agriculture, and a new and truly comradely relation between city and village. Our price policy must stimulate grain production. We must offer the village the industrial consumers' goods it needs, and the equipment for industrializing and modernizing agriculture and inducing the small peasant freely to enter into cooperation.

8) An increase in consumers' goods and bread is also the key to the satisfaction of the working class in whose name we are industrializing, and the key to the stimulating of their productivity.

9) In a socialist country, the growth of mass consumption is the direct driving force for industry's own further expansion. With us production is no longer carried on for the sake of the self-expansion of wealth, but becomes a *means* to the expansion of consumption. It is determined by "relations truly *new* in principle between the needs of the masses and production." It must strive constantly to overtake the expanding consumer demand which marches ahead of it as the main stimulus to its development. "The acuteness of the goods famine must be genuinely alleviated, and not in some remote future, but within the next few years. A start must be made immediately . . . lest

my case, and this not for the purpose of sparing me but in order to unmask the vile provocation which, like a snake, wound itself around many persons in a great degree due to my meanness and criminal slander. I have never betrayed you or the party. I know that I perish because of vile and mean work of the enemies of the party and of the people, who fabricated the provocation against me."

It would appear that such an important declaration was worth an examination by the Central Committee. This, however, was not done, and the declaration was transmitted to Beria while the terrible maltreatment of the Political Bureau candidate, Comrade Eikhe, continued.

On 2 February 1940 Eikhe was brought before the court. Here he did not confess any guilt but said the following:

"In all the so-called confessions of mine there is not one letter written by me with the exception of my signatures under the protocols which were forced from me. I have made my confession under pressure from the investigative judge who from the time of my arrest tormented me. After that I began to write all this nonsense. . . . The most important thing for me is to tell the court, the party and Stalin that I am not guilty. I have never been guilty of any conspiracy. I will die believing in the truth of party policy as I have believed in it during my whole life."

On 4 February Eikhe was shot.

(Indignation in the hall.)

It has been definitely established now that Eikhe's case was fabricated; he has been posthumously rehabilitated.

Comrade Rudzutak, candidate-member of the Political Bureau, member of the party since 1905, who spent 10

the queue and the waiting list begin to look like our 'way of life'."

Within a few months after Bukharin published his *Notes of an Economist*, all such talk of tentativeness and experimentalism, of balance and equilibrium in planning, was to be outlawed. Stalin adopted the line of "super-industrialization," making the "primacy of heavy industry" the very law of the construction of socialism and communism. In place of the various tentative ("variant") figures for the plan, Stalin declared that only the "maximum variant" was to be tolerated. Its figures might be questioned in only one direction, i.e. any sector or industry might violate the balance of the plan figures by "overfulfilling" its own planned figures. Indeed, they were driven to compete with each other in helter-skelter violation of the plan. The goods famine deepened. Agriculture went into permanent depression from which it has never recovered. The queue became (and at the Twentieth Congress Mikoyan admitted that it still is) a "way of life." All talk of balance, expanding equilibrium, adapting the plan to the real possibilities, all tentative, experimental, scientific approach to planning, was to be exterminated by excommunication, anathema, slander, torture, confession, recantation, death.

But Bukharin in his *Notes of an Economist* committed graver crimes. He warned against the use of force and exploitation in the village, against the reintroduction of impoverishment and "semi-feudal relations" into agriculture, "as in Old Russia." And he warned against exploiting the working class by giving it a mere minimal return in real wages (consumers' goods).

Worst of all, Bukharin's line serves to remind his comrades that socialism has always presented itself as "production for use" and denounced capitalism as "production for profit." Socialism has always claimed that the mighty expansion of production and distribution under what it called capitalism was

years in a tsarist hard-labor camp, completely retracted in court the confession which was forced from him. The protocol of the session of the Collegium of the Supreme Military Court contains the following statement by Rudzutak:

“. . . The only plea which he places before the court is that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) be informed that there is in the NKVD an as yet not liquidated center which is craftily manufacturing cases, which forces innocent persons to confess; there is no opportunity to prove one's nonparticipation in crimes to which the confessions of various persons testify. The investigative methods are such that they force people to lie and to slander entirely innocent persons in addition to those who already stand accused. He asks the Court that he be allowed to inform the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) about all this in writing. He assures the Court that he personally never had any evil designs in regard to the policy of our party because he had always agreed with the party policy pertaining to all spheres of economic and cultural activity.”

This declaration of Rudzutak was ignored, despite the fact that Rudzutak was in his time the chief of the Central Control Commission which was called into being in accordance with Lenin's concept for the purpose of fighting for party unity. . . . In this manner fell the chief of this highly authoritative party organ, a victim of brutal willfulness; he was not even called before the Central Committee's Political Bureau because Stalin did not want to talk to him. Sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes and he was shot.

(Indignation in the hall.)

After careful examination of the case in 1955, it was

“fetishistic,” i.e. that it was production for production’s sake, production for the self-expansion of wealth and power over men. Socialism promised that it would abolish this state of affairs. It would at once “defetishize” production and “humanize” it—transforming it into production for consumption’s sake, for the satisfaction of infinitely expansible human needs.

That is the real secret of Khrushchev’s touchiness. That is why the mere idea of increased attention to consumers’ goods seems to him, as it did to Stalin, “a slander of the party.” For it reminds him that when Communism made all the means of production into the monopoly of a sole monopoly capitalist, it left the working class without defenses against the single, omnipotent owner of all industries and jobs.

To mention the “fetishistic self-expansion of wealth” as against the expansion of human needs and human satisfactions, is to remind the Lords of the State that their line of eternal priority for heavy industry is the line of the eternal self-expansion of the power and wealth of that State. It reminds them, too, that this self-expansion takes place at the expense of the impoverishment and refeudalization of the village, and the ruthless exploitation of the very working class in whose name they took power. Once more, as under the Tsars, “the state swells up, the people shrink.” *

The Lords of that State not only possess an absolute and complete monopoly of all the means of production and distribution. They possess a monopoly of all decisions on what shall be produced and in what proportions, and what shall be distributed and to what classes. They possess, too, a complete monopoly of all force. And a complete monopoly of all political power. This is not made better, but worse, when they tell the proletariat that whatever they have decided has been decided in his name, that he has really decided it himself, that when the masters of everything speak it is the worker that is speaking. This but serves to underscore the fact that the

* The phrase is taken from the pre-revolutionary historian Klyuchevsky.

established that the accusation against Rudzutak was false and that it was based on slanderous materials. Rudzutak has been rehabilitated posthumously.

The way in which the former NKVD workers manufactured various fictitious "anti-Soviet centers" and "bloccs" with the help of provocatory methods is seen from the confession of Comrade Rozenblum, party member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937 by the Leningrad NKVD.

During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case Rozenblum revealed the following fact: When Rozenblum was arrested in 1937, he was subjected to terrible torture during which he was ordered to confess false information concerning himself and other persons. He was then brought to the office of Zakovsky, who offered him freedom on condition that he make before the court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the NKVD concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion in a terroristic center in Leningrad."

(Movement in the hall.)

With unbelievable cynicism, Zakovsky told about the vile "mechanism" for the crafty creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet plots."

"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rozenblum, "Zakovsky gave me several possible variants of the organization of this center and its branches. After he detailed the organization to me, Zakovsky told me that the NKVD would prepare the case of this center, remarking that the trial would be public. Before the court were to be brought 4 or 5 members of this center: Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposhnikova (Chudov's wife) and others together with 2 or 3 members from the branches of this center. . . .

". . . The case of the Leningrad center has to be built solidly, and for this reason witnesses are needed. Social

owner-state possesses yet another monopoly, the monopoly of wisdom which inheres in the "vanguard of the proletariat," who always know what is best.

It requires only the candor of a child—or a Bukharin—to cry out: *But the Emperor has no clothes!*

Khrushchev may make bold to assert that not Stalin but the masses make the mighty machines. But any suggestion that the machines which the masses have built with so much sacrifice and toil should produce in greater abundance and variety for them, any demand for a greater reward for their labor in real wages and consumers' goods, is a "slander of the party."

That is why the ghost of Bukharin is called up from his grave every time they discuss the general line. And why his spirit haunts every feast at which the Lords of the "Proletarian State" celebrate the growth of its power and might and the blessings it confers upon its subjects.

IV. THE ORIGINS OF STALIN'S "TRAGEDY."

A. *When Did the Cult of His Person Begin?*

At the end of his address, Khrushchev assures us that Stalin always intended everything for the best. He was undone, his head was turned, by the cult of his person, so that willing absolute good he committed much evil. "In this lies the whole tragedy."

It becomes important, then, to know when Stalin ceased to "defend collective leadership" and when the corrupting cult of his person began. Few events in the history of the human spirit can be dated as precisely.

On Oct. 19, 1928, Stalin attacked the leadership of Moscow as bearers of a "Right Deviation." He removed Uglanov as Secretary and leader of the Moscow District, and sent in Kaganovich.

In the self-same speech, however, this "genius in the administration of poison in calculated doses" (as Bukharin called

origin (of course, in the past) and the party standing of the witness will play more than a small role.

“You, yourself,” said Zakovsky, ‘will not need to invent anything. The NKVD will prepare for you a ready outline for every branch of the center; you will have to study it carefully and to remember well all questions and answers which the Court might ask. This case will be ready in four-five months, or perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be preparing yourself so that you will not compromise the investigation and yourself. Your future will depend on how the trial goes and on its results. If you begin to lie and testify falsely, blame yourself. If you manage to endure it, you will save your head and we will feed and clothe you at the Government’s cost until your death.’”

These are the kind of vile things which were then practiced.

(Movement in the hall.)

Even more widely was the falsification of cases practiced in the provinces. The NKVD headquarters of the Sverdlov Oblast “discovered” the so-called “Ural Uprising Staff”—an organ of the bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, church leaders—whose chief supposedly was the Secretary of the Sverdlov Oblast Party Committee and member of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kabakov, who had been a party member since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show that in almost all *krais*, *oblasts* [provinces] and republics there supposedly existed “rightist Trotskyite, espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and centers” and that the heads of such organizations as a rule—for no known reasons—were first secretaries of *oblast* or republic Communist Party committees or central committees.

him) defended Bukharin and his fellow Politburo members against the charge that they were either a Right Danger or “conciliatory” towards (i.e. tolerant of) the Right Danger.

On Nov. 19, 1928, Stalin defended Bukharin’s *Notes of an Economist*. His defense was on the ambiguous ground that as an abstract and theoretical analysis it was “permissible and lawful.”

On Jan. 18, 1929, he disposed of the head of the “Left Opposition” by pushing a motion through the Politburo over Bukharin’s protest for the deportation of Leon Trotsky from the Soviet Union.

On the last day of January, 1929, Stalin attacked the *Notes of an Economist* as the quintessence of the Right Danger and as “anti-party.” In the same attack, he reminded Mikhail Tomsky that Lenin had once sent him to Turkestan for being too tenacious in defending trade union democracy against party dictates. He jocosely suggested that he was “softer” than Lenin since he wanted “no one ousted from the Politburo or deported to Turkestan.” Finally, On April 22, 1929, he opened a full dress attack on Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky and all who thought like them. (“We love Bukharin, that’s the truth, but we love the party and the Comintern still more.”) *

With the political destruction of Bukharin, Stalin completed a half decade of chess moves aimed at Lenin’s Politburo, which the Testament had sought to conserve as the one “collegial body” in the post-Lenin party.** Having ousted in turn Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov in the name of party unity and Leninism, it was on that last day of April, 1929, that Stalin became “the Leninist Politburo,” the Lenin of Our Day, Old Bolshevism, Leninism, and party unity, in his

* *Collected Works*, Vol. XI, pp. 236, 290, 320, 323; Vol. XII, p. 23.

** That Bukharin was aware of the fate prepared for him is shown by his confiding to the already ousted Kamenev: “If I fight back, Stalin will force a split in the party; if I do not, he will kill me with chess moves. . . . What does he want of me? He wants me to call him a genius. He is a genius . . . a genius of dosing.”

(Movement in the hall.)

Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists have died as a result of this monstrous falsification of such "cases," as a result of the fact that all kinds of slanderous "confessions" were accepted, and as a result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and others. In the same manner were fabricated the "cases" against eminent party and state workers—Kossior, Chubar, Postyshev, Kosaryev and others.

In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in heavy cadre losses to the party.

The vicious practice was condoned of having the NKVD prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the Military Collegium and whose sentences were prepared in advance. Yezhov would send these lists to Stalin personally for his approval of the proposed punishment. In 1937-1938, 383 such lists containing the names of many thousands of party, Soviet, Komsomol, Army and economic workers were sent to Stalin. He approved these lists.

A large part of these cases are being reviewed now and a great part of them are being voided because they were baseless and falsified. Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom were rehabilitated posthumously.

Mass arrests of party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of socialist advancement.

Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-political condition of the party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy sus-

single person. At that moment, the cult of his person became a "rational" necessity, if only by virtue of the fact that dictatorship has its systemic or monolithic logic, madness its method, and paranoia its closed rationale.*

Within a month, at an appointed signal, every periodical in the Soviet Union, from *Pravda* and *Izvestia* to the women's and children's magazines and *Krokodil*, broke out with a picture of the hitherto little known Stalin, praising his deeds and his name. From Mayday to December 21, 1929, when his Fiftieth Birthday was celebrated, the chorus of glorification continued to swell to a frightening intensity.

The timid, the pliant, the servile, the climbers and courtiers, the worshippers of manifest power, contributed to the din.

But most noisy and joyous were the zealous members of his own faction, who had laughed uproariously at his coarse jests, watched his chess moves with knowing admiration, reiterated his commonplaces as gems of wisdom, shouted down his victims when they tried to speak. (The stenograms of Plenums and Congresses for some time now had read more like recordings from Bedlam than like sessions of deliberative bodies).

The rewriting of Stalin's biography kept pace with the growth of the cult. Now Stalin's older cronies, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich, could aspire to promotion into the void created around Lenin's person, becoming "Lenin's closest comrades-in-arms." Younger Stalinists could hope to attract his attention by their zeal and get closer to the presence that exuded infallibility and power, for henceforth Stalin alone could decide who were Leninists and who anti-Leninists, what party and what anti-party doctrine.

As always, the man whom Lenin had made master of the machine prepared each battle and followed up each "ideo-

* The writer has shown elsewhere that the craving for flattery, and the will to exact it where he had the power, was inherent in Stalin's nature and had been manifested as early as December 1920 in *Zhizn Natsionalnoy (Six Keys to the Soviet System, pp. 51-2)*. But then it was still a personal trait without a fundamental political function and "rationale."

picion, and sowed distrust among Communists. All sorts of slanderers and careerists were active.

Resolutions of the January plenum of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1938 brought some measure of improvement to the party organizations. However, widespread repression also existed in 1938.

Only because our party has at its disposal such great moral-political strength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in 1937-1938 and to educate new cadres. There is, however, no doubt that our march forward toward Socialism and toward the preparation for the country's defense would have been much more successful were it not for the tremendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the baseless and false mass repressions in 1937-1938.

We are justly accusing Yezhov for the degenerate practices of 1937. But we have to answer these questions:

Could Yezhov have arrested Kossior, for instance, without the knowledge of Stalin? Was there an exchange of opinions or a Political Bureau decision concerning this?

No, there was not, as there was none regarding other cases of this type.

Could Yezhov have decided such important matters as the fate of such eminent party figures?

No, it would be a display of naïveté to consider this the work of Yezhov alone. It is clear that these matters were decided by Stalin, and that without his orders and his sanction Yezhov could not have done this.

We have examined the cases and have rehabilitated Kossior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosaryev and others. For what causes were they arrested and sentenced? The review of evidence shows that there was no reason for this. They, like many others, were arrested without the prosecutor's knowledge.

logical" victory with appropriate organizational moves. As Kirov had been moved into Leningrad to oust Zinoviev, and Kaganovich into the Ukraine to oust Rakovsky, and Frunze into the Commissariat of War which Trotsky had filled with such distinction, so Kaganovich was moved in 1929 into Moscow to oust Uglanov and the Bukharinites, and a little later into the trade unions to oust Tomsy. Molotov was dispatched into the Communist International to oust Bukharin from its chairmanship, as Bukharin had earlier been dispatched to oust Zinoviev.

Stalin himself, like some ritual cannibal absorbing the virtues of the warrior he consumes, now ingested Trotsky's deeds as organizer of the seizure of power and builder of the Red Army, Zinoviev's partnership with Lenin in elaborating the doctrine of "revolutionary defeatism" in the First World War, Bukharin's mastery of Marxist economic and political theory, Trotsky's forced industrialization line, and the role of Lenin's adviser, partner, associate, in every critical move of the latter's life.

By the year's end, when his Fiftieth Birthday was celebrated as the birthday of no living man had ever been celebrated before, his name and likeness were everywhere. In a land suffering from a famine of consumers' goods, a famine which was now to grow rapidly worse, his pictures, busts and statues went into mass production. His modesty and devotion, his granite strength, iron will, and steel character, his unique humanism and implacability in the destruction of all deviators, his role as organizer of the party, champion of unity, architect of the Soviet Union, victorious leader of the civil war, defender and enricher of Leninism when Lenin was no more, and leader and guide of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the world—all these superlative qualities were set down in innumerable telegrams of greeting, articles, speeches, eulogies in his presence.*

* It is at this time that the word *Vozhd* began to be used of him in place of

In such a situation, there is no need for any approval, for what sort of an approval could there be when Stalin decided everything? He was the chief prosecutor in these cases. Stalin not only agreed to but on his own initiative issued arrest orders. We must say this so that the delegates to the Congress can clearly undertake and themselves assess this and draw the proper conclusions.

Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin's orders without reckoning with any norms of party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very distrustful man, morbidly suspicious; we knew this from our work with him. He could look at a man and say: "Why are your eyes so shifty today?" or "Why are you turning so much today and why do you avoid looking directly into my eyes?"

The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even toward eminent party workers whom he had known for years. Everywhere and in everything he saw "enemies," "two-facers" and "spies."

Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great willfulness and choked a person morally and physically. A situation was created where one could not express one's own will.

When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an "enemy of the people." Meanwhile, Beria's gang, which ran the organs of state security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials which it falsified. And what proofs were offered? The confessions of the arrested. And the investigative judges accepted these "confessions."

And how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed? Only in one way—because of application of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, depriva-

Men vied with each other to uncover his modestly concealed and hitherto unknown deeds and qualities of genius. Four tributes were given the honor of translation into the major tongues of the world. They were those of his closest cronies, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Orjonikidze and Yenukidze. Even two of these failed to survive the fury of his purges! **

Thus the cult of Stalin's person did not, as Khrushchev implies, begin after 1934, but burst into flower five years before, in 1929. Khrushchev has every reason to know this. In 1929, he had already been working for over three years as a zealous Stalinist in the Ukraine, serving his apprenticeship under that toughest of "original Stalinists," Lazar Kaganovich. And in the crucial year 1929, when Stalin moved Kaganovich to Moscow to oust the Bukharinites, he took Khrushchev with him.

If the cult of Stalin's person is really the matrix which engendered his errors and crimes, we should expect to find their origins in the year of his canonization. And we do indeed find that his cruellest crimes, those that claimed the greatest number of nameless, defenseless and innocent victims, were precisely the crimes committed by him *and his faction* between 1929 and 1933. They are not, to be sure, his most perfidious crimes, those which caused the death of "*thousands* of innocent Communists," concerning which Khrushchev—a little late—protests. They are crimes which caused the death of *millions*, his crimes—of which Khrushchev approves—against the Russian people: the crimes of the General Line itself.

B. *The Years of the Locust.*

In the totalist state's perpetual two-front war (on its own people to atomize and remake them, on other peoples to conquer them for its system), there are periods of relaxation and

the less charismatic word, *Rukovoditel*. Both mean *leader* but *Vozhd* has the same overtones as *Fuehrer* in German and *Duce* in Italian.

* *The Life of Stalin: A Symposium* (New York and London, 1930).

tion of his judgment, taking away of his human dignity. In this manner were "confessions" secured.

When the wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939, and the leaders of territorial party organizations began to accuse the NKVD workers of using methods of physical pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded telegram on 20 January 1939 to the committee secretaries of *oblasts* and *krais*, to the Central Committees of republic Communist parties, to the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of NKVD organizations. The telegram stated :

"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) explains that the application of methods of physical pressure in NKVD practice is permissible from 1937 on in accordance with permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) . . . It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use methods of physical influence against representatives of the socialist proletariat and that they use them in their most scandalous forms.

"The question arises as to why the socialist intelligence service should be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly enemies of the working class and of the kolkhoz workers. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both justifiable and appropriate."

Thus, Stalin sanctioned in the name of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the most brutal violation of socialist legality, torture and op-

intensification, now on one front, now on the other. The Stalinist General Line ("socialism in one country", all-out industrialization, all-out collectivization of agriculture) meant the opening of a war without quarter on the home front, against the workers and peasants of Russia.

In any case industrialization is a stern process that uproots from the village, crowds into the city and factory, upsets the ancient ways of life. In the older countries these rigors were mitigated by time, by the primacy of consumers' goods, by the state which was fortunately not the owner and exploiter of the process, and above all by the concomitant growth of economic democracy (the right to organize, to strike, to change jobs, social mobility, the power of consumers' choice over the market) and political democracy (rival parties bidding for the workers' vote, labor legislation, state inspection and regulation of the industrialists' domain and power therein, etc.). But where these are lacking—where the state is the only accumulator and investor of capital, the sole owner of all economic and all political and social organizations, the sole maker of all economic decisions—the laborer is indeed defenseless. A shortcut to industrialization is bound to be a shortcut to totalitarianism.

The workers, in whose name the all-out war for industrialization and collectivization was waged, suffered almost as severely as the peasants. The highest sales tax in human history, forced loans, inflated printing-press rubles, export of needed foodstuffs to buy machines and technicians; change of diet from meat, milk, fats, to bread, and even that scarce and rationed; rising paper wages flaunted in propaganda while the cost of living was shooting up many times faster; suppression of statistics on real wages; introduction of workbooks, internal passports, universal piecework and speedup; decreeing of imprisonment and the death penalty for stealing state property, for "wrecking" and other industrial crimes; the mushrooming of forced labor camps as a whip over "free" labor; severe

pression, which led as we have seen to the slandering and self-accusation of innocent people.

Not long ago—only several days before the present Congress—we called to the Central Committee Presidium session and interrogated the investigative judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosaryev. He is a vile person, with the brain of a bird, and morally completely degenerate. And it was this man who was deciding the fate of prominent party workers; he was making judgments also concerning the politics in these matters, because, having established their “crime,” he provided therewith materials from which important political implications could be drawn.

The question arises whether a man with such an intellect could alone make the investigation in a manner to prove the guilt of people such as Kossior and others. No, he could not have done it without proper directives. At the Central Committee Presidium session he told us: “I was told that Kossior and Chubar were people’s enemies and for this reason, I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess that they are enemies.”

(Indignation in the hall.)

He could do this only through long tortures, which he did, receiving detailed instructions from Beria. We must say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared: “I thought that I was executing the orders of the party.”

In this manner, Stalin’s orders concerning the use of methods of physical pressure against the arrested were in practice executed.

These and many other facts show that all norms of correct party solution of problems were invalidated and everything was dependent upon the willfulness of one man.

penalties for lateness, absence, change of job without permission—such were the fruits of the General Line for the “rulers” of Russia, the “sovereign” working class.

But it was the peasantry that felt the full fury of the General Line.

Stalin’s contributions to “rural socialism” were:

1) a return to the early Leninist use of force to collect grain and promote socialism in the village;

2) worship of the giant farm and mechanization, which were Leninist too;

3) a dogma, inherited from Lenin, that foreign loans meant automatic diminution of sovereignty, from which Stalin deduced that it was better to exact the investment capital from the impoverished peasants and from enforced workers’ abstinence;

4) a belief, also Leninist, that the peasant could be better controlled by the state, and agriculture could be “planned” completely, if the peasant were driven off his land and into State and Collective Farms—a new feudalism with one single overlord;

5) a state monopoly not only of land, its workers and its products, but also of tractors and machinery.

Saddened and made wiser by his experiences in the use of force to collect the “surplus” grain, to abolish private trade between town and village, and to drive the peasant towards “socialism,” Lenin had introduced the NEP and had suggested in his last years that the peasant “could not be remade by force” but would have to be persuaded by economic inducements such as plentiful industrial consumers’ goods and tractors, and the physical demonstration of the supposed superiority of the “factory farm.” Stalin now returned to the primitive Leninism which had brought revolts from Kronstadt to Tambov. “There is no fortress,” said Stalin, “that Bolshevik determination cannot conquer.”

The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious consequences during the Great Patriotic War.

When we look at many of our novels, films and historical "scientific studies," the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin has foreseen everything. The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called "active defense," i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly, thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned the offensive and subdued the enemy. The epic victory gained through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and "scientific study" as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.

We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance not only from the historical, but especially from the political, educational and practical point of view.

What are the facts of this matter?

Before the war, our press and all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone: When an enemy violates the holy Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we will answer three blows, and we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts, which would actually guarantee the immunity of our borders.

During the war and after the war, Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of the "unexpected" attack of the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to

One week after the celebration of his Fiftieth Birthday, Stalin told a "Conference of Agrarian Marxists":

Now we have the material basis for *replacing kulak* production by *kolkhoz* and *sovkhoz* production. . . . It is necessary to take the offensive against the kulaks. . . . That is why we have gone over from the policy of *limiting* the exploitative tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of *liquidating the kulaks, as a class*.*

"Liquidation" was the word which spelled the doom, as Stalin later told Churchill, of 10,000,000 peasant households. It was the beginning of a war which had seemed much worse to Stalin than the war with the Germans.**

The land which Lenin had "nationalized" but nevertheless conceded "in perpetuity" to those who worked it, was taken from them. Not only the land given them by the Revolution, but also the land they had gotten by the Emancipation of 1861, and paid off by the sweat and toil of redemption payments, and that which they had acquired by subsequent purchase from the landowners as well. For a brief sixty years, the peasants of Russia had in increasing measure known the joy of working their own soil for themselves. Now their land was "enclosed" in Collective and State Farms with acts of brutality and fury that made the British Enclosure acts preceding England's Industrial Revolution look like a rural idyll. That "Restoration" of "bondage to the State," of which Plekhanov had warned Lenin in 1906, had come to pass.***

The peasantry fought for its life with fowling pieces and pitchforks. Uprisings embraced whole regions. Villages were surrounded and laid waste, set to the torch, attacked by tanks and artillery and bombs dropped from the air. For several

* *Ibid.*, Vol. XII, p. 169.

** See Churchill: *Memoirs*, Vol. IV, p. 498-9. Stalin told Churchill that "some of them were given land of their own to cultivate" in Siberia and the Arctic circle (the concentration camp lands!) "but the great bulk were very unpopular and were wiped out by the laborers" (i.e. armed bands of young Stalinists and the GPU).

*** See Wolfe: *Three Who Made A Revolution*, pp. 366, 468.

power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating Communism. The fascists were saying this openly; they did not hide their plans.

In order to attain this aggressive end, all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Many facts from the prewar period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state, and that he had concentrated large armed forces, including armored units, near the Soviet borders.

Documents which have now been published show that by 3 April 1941 Churchill, through his Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union.

It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation. He had in this his own imperialistic goals—to bring Germany and the U.S.S.R. into a bloody war and thereby to strengthen the position of the British Empire.

Just the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to “warn Stalin and call his attention to the danger which threatened him.” Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of 18 April and in the following days.

However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings. What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to information of this sort, in order not to provoke the initiation of military operations.

We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.

Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on 6

years the war was waged without pity or quarter. Districts were stripped of their stocks of grain and seed, then cordoned off to die of famine and plague. Lands, tools, animals were confiscated; the peasant families driven into the "collectives" or uprooted and sent on foot or in overcrowded freight cars to Siberian and Arctic wastes. The entire independent peasantry, the most numerous class in Russia, was destroyed or enserfed under the monstrous slogan of "the liquidation of the kulak as a class." In January 1933, in the final stage of the offensive "18,000 firm and tested Party workers" were transferred to a new "political department" which was "given jurisdiction over all questions concerning the development of the Soviet countryside. . . . The Central Committee placed Comrade L. M. Kaganovich, the closest comrade-in-arms of Comrade Stalin, in charge of this department."* Later the ubiquitous Kaganovich was to be succeeded by the ubiquitous understudy, Khrushchev, in this field, too.

Even Walter Duranty, who has so often acted as apologist for Stalin's deeds, and did not lack for words to justify these crimes also, admitted years later that:

Every village in Russia had been the scene of bitter internal strife . . . animals slaughtered or allowed to die . . . grain, barns and houses burned. . . . There were large areas, as I saw with my own eyes in 1933, where miles of weeds and desolation replaced the former grainfields. That summer I drove nearly two hundred miles across country from Rostov and Krasnodar through land that was lost to weeds and through villages that were empty. . .**

Khrushchev would like to keep all instances of cruelty, injustice, and death within the party. His show of indignation is reserved for those "honest Communists who never committed any crimes against the party . . . who bore the heavy load of the first and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, who actively fought against the Trotsky-

* *Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Short History*. Ed. W. Knorin. (Moscow, 1935), pp. 487-8.

** *Stalin & Co.*, (New York, 1949), p.77.

KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET REPORT

May 1941 by the Soviet military attaché, Captain Vorontsov, stated: "Soviet citizen . . . Bozer communicated to the deputy naval attaché that according to a statement of a certain German officer from Hitler's headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the U.S.S.R. on 14 May through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia. At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and paratroopers landed in border cities. . . ."

In his report of 22 May 1941, the deputy military attaché in Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that ". . . the attack of the German Army is reportedly scheduled for 15 June, but it is possible that it may begin in the first days of June . . ."

A cable from our London Embassy dated 18 June 1941 stated:

"As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of armed conflict between Germany and the U.S.S.R. which will begin not later than the middle of June. According to Cripps, the Germans have presently concentrated 147 divisions (including air force and service units) along the Soviet borders. . . ."

Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for defense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.

Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes, we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet Army with everything that it needed. This is proven by the fact that although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and food-production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and other western parts of the country, the Soviet nation was still able to organize

ists and the Rightists for the Leninist party line." In short, he would keep the criticism of Stalin a matter for Stalinists only, a family affair.

But if there is one thing that is certain about the use of total terror to solve the complex problems of economics, politics and thought—the incalculable affairs of men in society—it is that one cannot have recourse to terror on a scale sufficient to embrace all the affairs of society without its spilling over into the very group that uses it.

The universal cruelty of the early thirties coarsened and brutalized the whole of life. It inured men to the idea of using torture and death to settle what was unsettled, to make certain what was uncertain, to silence, uproot, crush opposition, compel approval, remake men and their lives. All-encompassing torment and death spread like a plague through the countryside, then into the cities, then into the party. How can one fail to see that it was these wholesale crimes against nameless millions that created the atmosphere making possible the use of similar measures against Communist oppositionists, then against waverers, then against those who merely opposed the shedding of Communist blood, and finally against those who were in Khrushchev's words "merely inconvenient" to the wielder of the shears of fate?

There were plenty of preliminary warnings in every field of social life. Thus in 1931 the Infallible attacked "rotten liberalism" in the discussion of historical problems, and several historians disappeared. In 1932 the State decreed the death penalty for stealing a bit of coal or grain from a freight train. Then the death penalty was provided for the collectivized farmer who might steal from the fields some of the product of his "collective labor;" then for the "willful slaughter" of his own cattle; then for "letting cattle die by neglect."

In March 1933, thirty-five officials of the Commissariat of Agriculture were executed, after being "tried," tortured and "confessed," for having "willfully permitted noxious weeds to

the production of military equipment in the eastern parts of the country, install there equipment taken from the western industrial areas, and supply our armed forces with everything which was necessary to destroy the enemy.

Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the Army with the necessary matériel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not been, however, started in time. And already in the first days of the war it became evident that our Army was badly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the enemy back.

Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of tanks and artillery pieces before the war. But mass production of all this was not organized, and, as a matter of fact, we started to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war.

As a result, at the time of the enemy's invasion of the Soviet land, we did not have sufficient quantities either of old machinery which was no longer used for armament production or of new machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament production.

The situation with anti-aircraft artillery was especially bad; we did not organize the production of antitank ammunition. Many fortified regions proved to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked, because the old arms had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.

This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and planes. At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized manpower. I recall that in those days I telephoned to Comrade Malenkov from Kiev and told him, "People have volunteered for the new Army and demand arms. You must send us arms."

Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send you arms. We

grow in the fields.” That same year Stalin explained the drastic drop in cattle (from 30,400,000 in 1929 to 19,500,000 in 1934) by accusing the village leaders and agronomists of spreading the germs of anthrax. This was a dress rehearsal for the celebrated charge of Germ Warfare against the United States during the Korean War.

Suicides of Stalinists broke like flashes of lightning across the lowering skies. In 1930, the poet Mayakovsky, after some badgering for his “formalism” and his satire on bureaucracy, *Klop* (The Bedbug), suddenly wearied of singing Stalin’s praises as earlier he had Lenin’s, and committed suicide. Two ardent young Stalinists, Syrtsov and Lominadze, the former only recently promoted to Rykov’s post as Premier of the RFSFR and the latter to a high post in the Comintern, grew appalled at the famine and death being spread by the General Line. In an intimate circle they mulled over the question of changing the line and perhaps the General Secretary. It reached Stalin’s ears; they disappeared. It was reported that they had committed suicide. In November, 1932, Stalin’s own wife, at a party in Voroshilov’s home, expressed her dismay at the famine and terror. She and Stalin quarrelled. That same night she shot herself (or was shot) in her bedroom in the Kremlin.

That same year, 1932, a “Right Oppositionist” named Ryutin drafted from his prison or exile a long memorandum on how Stalin’s war on the peasants was “taking the Revolution to the edge of an abyss.” He proposed that Stalin be removed as Secretary and the line be reversed. Stalin took the document, the Lominadze-Syrtsov talk, and kindred matters, to the NKVD. He charged that the proposals to remove him were plots to assassinate him, and demanded the introduction of the death penalty into the party to deal with such “terrorist attempts.” The NKVD felt that it did not have the authority to shed the blood of Communists, without Politburo and Central Committee approval. The Politburo twice, and two Central

are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves."

(Movement in the hall.)

Such was the armament situation.

In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact: Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite Army, Kirponos, who was chief of the Kiev Special Military District (he was later killed at the front) wrote to Stalin that the German armies were at the Bug River, were preparing for an attack and in the very near future would probably start an offensive. In this connection, Kirponos proposed that a strong defense be organized, that 300,000 people be evacuated from the border areas and that several strong points be organized there: antitank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.

Moscow answered this proposition with the assertion that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, that the Germans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us. Thus, our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the enemy.

When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operation had begun, Moscow issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned. Why? It was because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German Army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.

The following fact is also known: On the eve of the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite

Committee Plenums, Stalinist though they were, rejected Stalin's demand for Communist blood. Kirov and Orjonikidze, who had been most ruthless against the peasants, were especially insistent in their reminder that Lenin had said: "Let no blood be shed among you." Kirov even suggested that now that the peasant had been beaten and "victory won," it was time to relax the terror and return to milder ways. Rudzutak, Stalin's Chairman of the Central Control Commission, also voted against the death penalty but arranged that Ryutin be sent to an isolator prison, and that "those connected with him," including Zinoviev and Kamenev, should be expelled from the party and sent to prison or camp. Stalin bided his time and nursed his wrath enlarging it to include all who had thwarted his will.*

Exactly four years later, after the shedding of Kirov's blood had provided the opening in the dike through which party blood could flow on the pretext of "blood for blood," Stalin and Zhdanov wired from Sochi where they were on vacation:

We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be named to the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinoviev Bloc. The OGPU is four years behind in this matter. . . .

On September 27, 1936, *Pravda* announced that Yezhov had been appointed head of the NKVD. The telegram from Stalin had been sent two days earlier, exactly four years to the day from the time when the Stalinist Politburo had rejected his motion calling for blood! Stalin was always a great one for remembering anniversaries.**

* For a contemporary Stalinist version of the nature of the "Ryutin Group," see *Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Ed. W. Knorin (Moscow, 1935), p. 465.

** This affair, which Khrushchev has deliberately left obscure, is analyzed in detail in *Letter of an Old Bolshevik* (Pamphlet, New York, 1937) and in Boris I. Nikolaevsky: *Behind the Great Purge* (*New Leader*, New York, June 25, 1956), pp. 5-8. The terms OGPU and NKVD used by Stalin interchangeably are only two of the many incarnations of the Soviet Secret Police which has been known successively as the Cheka, the GPU, the OGPU, the NKVD, the MVD and MGB and KGB. The names and the initials change but the institution remains.

Army, a certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies had received orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union on the night of 22 June at 3 o'clock. Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.

As you see, everything was ignored: warnings of certain Army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and even the open hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of the alertness of the chief of the party and of the state at this particularly significant historical moment?

And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of clear facts? The result was that in the first hours and days the enemy destroyed in our border regions a large part of our Air Force, artillery and other military equipment; he annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and disorganized our military leadership; consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations. During these years repressions were instituted against certain parts of military cadres beginning literally at the company and battalion commander level and extending to the higher military centers; during this time the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated.

The policy of large-scale repression against the military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the party and Komsomol cells were taught to "unmask" their superiors as hidden enemies.

One other form of experiment that prepared the flood of executions was a series of show trials in the years between 1928 and 1934, the victims of which were loyal non-communist servitors of the Soviet state. Lenin had begun the frameup system against Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and the sailors of Kronstadt, branding them as "counter-revolutionists inspired by foreign agents." But in the last year of the twenties, the show trial as such, with its completely fabricated charges, arbitrarily selected victims, and startling confessions of impossible crimes, went into regular production: the Shakhty Trial, the Vickers Trial, the "Industrial Party" trial, the Mensheviks, the Agronomists, the Fisheries Experts, the Food Handlers ("Poisoners"), the Statisticians and non-party authors of the Plan. These were the dress rehearsals for the subsequent trials of Zinovievites, Trotskyites, Bukharinites . . . and then: Stalinites!

"Evidently," Gorky had written of the Bolsheviks in 1917, "to kill is easier than to persuade. And this method is quite accessible to people who have been educated in massacres and taught by massacres."*

Khrushchev has reason to know that Stalin had already demanded blood in 1932. At any rate, Khrushchev's immediate chief of that period, Lazar Kaganovich, was almost the only Stalinist who consistently voted to give Stalin the blood he wanted. And in 1934 it was Kaganovich who prepared the new party statutes (still kept secret) which deprived the Central Control Commission of its independence, and gave the General Secretary a special apparatus of his own to handle secretly and directly the matters of State Security which involved the party. This special apparatus with its own picked troops was handled

* The writings of Maxim Gorky against the Bolshevik seizure of power and bloody dispersal of the Constituent Assembly have been systematically concealed. But a number of them can be found in Maxim Gorky: *Revolutsia i kultura: Stati za 1917* (Revolution and Culture: Articles of 1917). Berlin, no date. J. Ladyschnikow Verlag.

(Movement in the hall.)

It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the first war period.

And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the party and to the Fatherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive despite severe tortures to which they were subjected in the prisons, have from the first war days shown themselves real patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the Fatherland; I have here in mind such comrades as Rokossovsky (who, as you know, had been jailed), Gorbatov, Maretskov (who is a delegate at the present Congress), Podlas (he was an excellent commander who perished at the front), and many, many others. However, many such commanders perished in camps and jails and the Army saw them no more.

All this brought about the situation which existed at the beginning of the war and which was the great threat to our Fatherland.

It would be incorrect to forget that, after the first severe disaster and defeats at the front, Stalin thought that this was the end. In one of his speeches in those days he said: "All that which Lenin created we have lost forever."

After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take certain steps immediately in order to improve the situation at the front.

Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our Fatherland in the first period of the war was largely due to the faulty methods of directing the nation and the party by Stalin himself.

However, we speak not only about the moment when the

for Stalin by his personal secretary, Poskrebyshev, who was done away with by the "Collective Leaders" the very day Stalin died. It is this special apparatus which explains how the General Secretary could by-pass the Cheka in arresting a Politburo members, and how he could find the armed force secretly to arrest the successive heads of the Secret Police, Yagoda and Yezhov. There are indications that Aristov now holds the same post in relation to First Secretary Khrushchev.

By the Summer of 1933 the spirit of the peasant had been broken. The vast majority, diminished by several millions, had been herded successfully into the new Collective Farms. Stalin had reduced their resistance further by promising a tiny patch of their former lands as personal parcels on which eventually every peasant could have one private cow. That Summer, too, sun and rain smiled upon the capricious Eurasian plain. Enough of a harvest was brought in—though far below that of the later twenties—to convince the Stalinists that the war for meat and grain and state control of the peasantry had been won. (Twenty years later, Khrushchev was to acknowledge that the peasant had been beaten but had never really surrendered. His tiny private parcel, without benefit of tractor, was producing out of all proportion to the huge *kolkhoz*; there was less grain per capita, and less cattle even in absolute figures than there had been in 1928, the last year of the NEP, or in 1916, the last year of the Tsar.) *

But as for Stalin, in the Autumn of 1933, it seemed to him that he had won. He decided that it was time—two and one-half years late and after a fresh purge of over 300,000 members—to summon another party congress. The purpose of this Seventeenth Congress was not to decide anything, but to celebrate his victory over the workers (primacy of heavy industry), and over the peasants (complete collectivization). Appropriately, it called itself "The Congress of the Victors."

* Report of Khrushchev, *Pravda*, Sept. 15, 1953.

war began, which led to serious disorganization of our Army and brought us severe losses. Even after the war began, the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with actual military operation, caused our Army serious damage.

Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situation which was developing at the front. This was natural because, during the whole Patriotic War, he never visited any section of the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on the Mozhaisk highway during a stabilized situation at the front. To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and so many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering with operations and issuing orders which did not take into consideration the real situation at a given section of the front and which could not help but result in huge personnel losses.

I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one characteristic fact which illustrates how Stalin directed operations at the fronts. There is present at this Congress Marshal Bagramyan who was once the Chief of Operations in the headquarters of the southwestern front and who can corroborate what I will tell you.

When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for our Army in 1942 in the Kharkov region, we had correctly decided to drop an operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov, because the real situation at that time would have threatened our Army with fatal consequences if this operation were continued.

We communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation demanded changes in operational plans so that the enemy would be prevented from liquidating a sizable concentration of our Army.

Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our sugges-

V. THE CONGRESS OF THE VICTORS.

Every "victor" at the Congress opened and closed his speech on every question with a tribute to the Victor *par excellence*. And anywhere in his speech where he wanted applause he used the same sure-fire formula. Thus Kaganovich, who gave the report on *Organizational Problems of Party and Soviet Construction* concluded:

Our victories were due to the fact that at the head of our party stands a man who was able to mobilize the masses with the determination and indomitableness that Lenin displayed, who was able to safeguard the purity of the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, who was able still further to enrich those doctrines . . . able to discern the agents of the class enemy in our party . . . to lead the storm on the last stronghold of capitalism etc. etc.

His young disciple, Khrushchev, began his more modest report on the work in Moscow with a double tribute—to his immediate chief and to the Chief of Chiefs:

The leadership of our Leninist Central Committee and above all of Comrade Stalin personally has been felt by our entire party. We workers in the Moscow organization have felt this leadership . . . personally of Comrade Stalin directly and particularly from day to day in all questions. . . .

Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin the Rights have been beaten, beaten in our party, beaten in the Moscow organization (*Prolonged applause*).

The Moscow organization is ideologically united around the Central Committee, around our genius leader, Comrade Stalin. This principled ideological unity has been achieved thanks to the able daily leadership which we have had in the person of Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich. (*Stormy prolonged applause; the whole hall rises*).

As the Congress warmed to its task its panegyric became more and more extravagant. *Stalin was right . . . as Stalin has said . . . has shown . . . has taught . . . the great Stalin . . . the wise Stalin . . . the great theoretician . . . the great master . . . the genius thinker . . . the genius leader . . . our beloved*

tion and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the encirclement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at this time many Army concentrations were themselves actually threatened with encirclement and liquidation.

I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him:

“Alexander Mikhailovich, take a map”—Vasilevsky is present here—“and show Comrade Stalin the situation which has developed.” We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe.

(Animation in the hall.)

Yes, comrades, he used to take the globe and trace the front line on it. I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: “Show him the situation on a map; in the present situation we cannot continue the operation which was planned. The old decision must be changed for the good of the cause.”

Vasilevsky replied, saying that Stalin had already studied this problem and that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further concerning this matter, because the latter didn't want to hear any arguments on the subject of this operation.

After my talk with Vasilevsky, I telephoned to Stalin at his villa. But Stalin did not answer the telephone and Malenkov was at the receiver. I told Comrade Malenkov that I was calling from the front and that I wanted to speak personally to Stalin. Stalin informed me through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov. I stated for the second time that I wished to inform Stalin personally about the grave situation which had arisen for us at the front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to raise the phone and again stated that I should speak to him through Malenkov, although he was only a few steps from the telephone.

After “listening” in this manner to our plea, Stalin said: “Let everything remain as it is!”

And what was the result of this? The worst that we had

leader . . . our own dear Stalin. . . . Until at last the climax of climaxes was attained by the ardent Stalinist who had destroyed Zinoviev and his cohorts in Leningrad, Sergei Mironovich Kirov: he greeted his Chief as *the greatest leader of all times and of all peoples. . . .*

Before that same year 1934 was ended, Sergei Mironovich Kirov was dead, killed by a deranged expelled communist who had had nothing personally against him, but whose target had been selected by members of the Secret Police, whose pass to Leningrad headquarters had been issued by the Secret Police, whose pistol had been supplied, whose guard-free way was arranged, whose hand had been guided by the Secret Police on the more secret indication of "the greatest leader of all times and all peoples."

The greatest leader flew personally to Leningrad to interrogate, to investigate, to uncover—or cover—the traces of the crime. He was seen to bend over and brush with his great moustached lips the cold corpse of his erstwhile disciple, and heard to vow to avenge his death not only on those directly involved but on those who by their political agitation held moral responsibility. He was to name 80 cities and villages after S. M. Kirov, only one less than he named after himself. And ten thousand communists would die to "avenge" this one death. The time had come to exact *blood for blood*.*

Though the world was made aware of the great purges by the show trials of former oppositionists, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, and their co-defendants, most of the blood that was shed was the blood of Stalinists. "To this Congress," Stalin had said to the adoring *victors*, "there is nothing more to prove, no one more to beat." Yet, of the 1,966 victor-delegates, 1,108 were arrested "on charges of anti-

* Khrushchev scarcely dares hint at what he calls "the inexplicable, mysterious, suspicious circumstances" of Kirov's assassination. The full story can be found in Alexander Orlov: *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (New York, 1953). The earliest accurate analysis of the motives for and the uses made of Kirov's assassination is in *Letter of an Old Bolshevik* (New York, 1937).

expected. The Germans surrounded our Army concentrations and consequently we lost hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. This is Stalin's military "genius"; this is what it cost us.

(Movement in the hall.)

On one occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with members of the Political Bureau, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted.

You should have seen Stalin's fury! How could it be admitted that he, Stalin, had not been right! He is after all a "genius," and a genius cannot help but be right! Everyone can err, but Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always right. He never acknowledged to anyone that he had made any mistake, large or small, despite the fact that he made not a few mistakes in the matter of theory and in his practical activity. After the Party Congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate many wartime military operations and to present them in their true light.

The tactics on which Stalin insisted without knowing the essence of the conduct of battle operations cost us much blood until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and going over to the offensive.

The military know that already by the end of 1941, instead of great operational maneuvers flanking the opponent and penetrating behind his back, Stalin demanded incessant frontal attacks and the capture of one village after another. Because of this we paid with great losses until our generals on whose shoulders rested the whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in changing the situation

revolutionary crimes.” Of the 139 Members and Candidate-Members (Alternates) elected to the Central Committee, their servant and Secretary had “arrested and shot 98, i.e. 70%.” If 70% of the Stalinist Central Committee paid with their lives, and 80% of the Delegates vanished into the prisons, concentration camps, and execution chambers, what per cent of the party rank and file disappeared or perished? Khrushchev is silent on this, but he does tell us that after Stalin had sent his “four-years-behind” telegram and substituted Yezhov for Yagoda, “the number of arrests jumped ten times between 1936 and 1937.” Of all the Soviet propaganda claims of percentage increases in various fields, this one of 1000% in a single year is undoubtedly the most striking. And the best documented. In this at least Stalin achieved his aim of *dognat i peregnat*—“equalling and surpassing”—the level of the most advanced countries, or indeed of any countries in the bloody history of man. And “now, when these cases of some of these so-called ‘spies’ and ‘saboteurs’ have been examined,” says Khrushchev, “it was found that *all* their cases were fabricated.” (Emphasis added.)

If seven out of every ten Central Committee members and eight of every ten delegates perished, who were the three or two out of ten who survived, and why? Why did Kirov, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kossior, Chubar, Orjonikidze, Yenukidze—loyal Stalinists all—die a violent death, while Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Malenkov miraculously lived on? How did they earn their reprieves and promotions in a world of the doomed?

If we are to reject the “cult of Stalin’s person” as the doer of all “good and great” deeds, can we accept him as the sole superhuman performer of all evil ones? Did this one man alone with his single voice call all who perished *enemies of the people*,* or did those of his comrades-in-arms who accom-

* The term, *enemy of the people*, which Khrushchev credits to Stalin as an invention of his after 1934 is actually a commonplace of the vocabulary of

and shifting to flexible-maneuver operations, which immediately brought serious changes at the front favorable to us.

All the more shameful was the fact, that after our great victory over the enemy which cost us so much, Stalin began to downgrade many of the commanders who contributed so much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalin excluded every possibility that services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but himself.

Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of Comrade Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often for my opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a long time; he is a good general and a good military leader."

After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsense about Zhukov, among other things the following, "You praised Zhukov, but he does not deserve it. It is said that before each operation at the front Zhukov used to behave as follows: He used to take a handful of earth, smell it and say, 'We can begin the attack,' or the opposite, 'The planned operation cannot be carried out.'" I stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not know who invented this, but it is not true."

It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of Marshal Zhukov.

In this connection, Stalin very energetically popularized himself as a great leader; in various ways he tried to inculcate in the people the version that all victories gained by the Soviet nation during the Great Patriotic War were due to the courage, daring and genius of Stalin and of no one else. Exactly like Kuzma Kryuchkov [a famous Cossack who performed heroic feats against the Germans], he put one dress on seven people at the same time.

panied him through the river of blood join in the hellish chorus? Did this one man alone with his own single hand slay all these thousands? Before that, was it his hand alone that slew all the millions of peasants? Or did he have countless helpers and accomplices, zealous accessories and underlings, striving to win his approval by their zeal? Did not each of them make up his impressive list of enemies of the people in his own city, region, department, and field of work? In a period of "mass arrests of party, Soviet, economic and military workers" in which "many thousands of innocent Communists died . . . and all sorts of slanderers and careerists were active," could any one continue to climb in the crumbling, tumbling party hierarchy without climbing over corpses?

"Could Yezhov have arrested Kossior," asks Khrushchev, "without the knowledge of Stalin?" The name selected is an unfortunate one forced perhaps out of an uneasy sub-conscious, for it cannot fail to suggest the related question: "Could Yezhov have arrested Kossior *without the knowledge of Khrushchev*, who replaced Kossior as boss of the Ukraine?"

Communist terror. Khrushchev himself has used it scores of times both before and since Stalin's death, and supplements it with such terms as *enemy of the party*, *enemy of the working class*, *enemy of the toilers*, etc. Actually Lenin should be credited with the "invention." Its earliest recorded use in Soviet published law took place on Dec. 11, 1917, N.S. i.e. less than five weeks after Lenin seized power, when he prepared a decree outlawing the Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, the chief liberal, democratic party in Russia. The decree reads: "Leaders of the Kadet Party, the party of the enemies of the people, are to be arrested and handed over to the Revolutionary Tribunal." It was signed Vl. Ulianov (Lenin), President of the Council of People's Commissars. And it was countersigned by L. Trotsky, N. Avilov (Glebov), P. Stuchka, V. Menzhinsky, Jugashvili (Stalin), G. Petrovsky, A. Schlichter, Dybenko—People's Commissars. It was published in *Izvestia* and *Pravda* the next day, but even before it was published, seven Kadet leaders were arrested under it. They included two who were ill and in the hospital, Shingarev and Kokoshkin, who were murdered in their beds by the Red Guard detachment sent to guard them. Even in the present address Khrushchev labels the executed Beria as a "rabid enemy of our party, an agent of a foreign intelligence service." Lenin used the "foreign agent" label on those he wanted to outlaw, imprison or execute from the liberals and socialists (Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries) to the sailors of Kronstadt whose armed fist lifted him to power, but the dominance of the totalitarian party was not yet so established that he could venture to think that "enemy of the party" was enough. Hence he favored "enemy of the people," and "enemy of the toilers." "Enemy of the party" was merely a ground for expulsion, not arrest or execution.

(Animation in the hall.)

In the same vein, let us take, for instance, our historical and military films and some literary creations; they make us feel sick. Their true objective is the propagation of the theme of praising Stalin as a military genius. Let us recall the film, "The Fall of Berlin." Here only Stalin acts; he issues orders in the hall in which there are many empty chairs and only one man approaches him and reports something to him—that is Poskrebyshev, his loyal shield-bearer.

(Laughter in the hall.)

And where is the military command? Where is the Political Bureau? Where is the Government? What are they doing and with what are they engaged? There is nothing about them in the film. Stalin acts for everybody; he does not reckon with anyone; he asks no one for advice. Everything is shown to the nation in this false light. Why? In order to surround Stalin with glory, contrary to the facts and contrary to historical truth.

The question arises: And where are the military, on whose shoulders rested the burden of the war? They are not in the film; with Stalin in, no room was left for them.

Not Stalin, but the party as a whole, the Soviet Government, our heroic Army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the whole Soviet nation—these are the ones who assured the victory in the Great Patriotic War.

(Tempestuous and prolonged applause.)

The Central Committee members, ministers, our economic leaders, leaders of Soviet culture, directors of territorial party and Soviet organizations, engineers, and technicians—every one of them in his own place of work generously gave of his strength and knowledge toward ensuring victory over the enemy.

And in the Ukraine itself, where the purge thereupon raged with unexampled fury under Khrushchev, could he possibly not have prepared or approved the list of at least the higher victims, and not had a hand in the determination of the categories of those who were arrested?

Khrushchev selects as particularly monstrous Stalin's thesis that "as we march forward towards socialism the class war must sharpen." He dates its promulgation from the Central Committee Plenum of February 1937, after which the arrests and executions multiplied tenfold. But this dating is based on the impudent calculation that no one will read, or having read will dare quote the Autumn 1932 Plenum decisions or the Stenogram of the 1934 Congress of the Victors. At that Congress, Khrushchev said:

The Rights have been beaten, beaten in our party, beaten in the Moscow organization. . . . At the present moment we can say with conviction that the jig is up with all these anti-party organizations (of the Rights and the "Leftists"). . . . We have carried out in our Moscow organization a purge which has still more strengthened the fighting capacity of our ranks. But we must not fall asleep. We must not weaken our Bolshevik vigilance. We must fight against the incorrect understanding on the part of some, of the process of creating a classless society. There are some who understand this question in this fashion: We can, say they, rejoice—soon there will be no classes and we will not have to carry on a class war. *The class war will not diminish, and we must mobilize the forces of the party, the forces of the working class, to make stronger the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the final annihilation of the class enemies*, of all the remnants of the Rights and "Leftists" and all the other opportunists who have wanted and who want to put brakes on further successful movement forward. (*Emphasis added*).*

Thus Khrushchev enunciated the "monstrous doctrine" three years earlier than the date on which he attributes its invention to Stalin. If we take the 1937 date literally, then Khrushchev and not Stalin would appear to be the doctrine's author.

Actually, we can exonerate him, for Stalin first enunciated the theory that the class struggle grows sharper as the class

* *Seventeenth Congress: Stenographic Report* (Moscow, 1934), p. 147.

Exceptional heroism was shown by our hard core—surrounded by glory is our whole working class, our Kolkhoz peasantry, the Soviet intelligentsia, who under the leadership of party organizations overcame untold hardships and, bearing the hardships of war, devoted all their strength to the cause of the defense of the Fatherland.

Great and brave deeds during the war were accomplished by our Soviet women who bore on their backs the heavy load of production work in the factories, on the kolkhozes, and in various economic and cultural sectors; many women participated directly in the Great Patriotic War at the fronts; our brave youth contributed immeasurably at the front and at home to the defense of the Soviet Fatherland and to the annihilation of the enemy.

Immortal are the services of the Soviet soldiers, of our commanders and political workers of all ranks; after the loss of a considerable part of the Army in the first war months they did not lose their heads and were able to reorganize during the progress of combat; they created and toughened during the progress of the war a strong and heroic Army and not only stood off pressures of the strong and cunning enemy but also smashed him.

The magnificent and heroic deeds of hundreds of millions of people of the East and of the West during the fight against the threat of fascist subjugation which loomed before us will live centuries and millennia in the memory of thankful humanity.

(Thunderous applause.)

The main role and the main credit for the victorious ending of the war belongs to our Communist Party, to the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the tens of millions of Soviet people raised by the party.

enemies grow weaker and more desperate, in the course of the year 1928 when he was beginning his all-out war on Bukharin and preparing for his all-out war on the peasantry. The year 1937 is merely the climax of repeated formulations of it, when Stalin and his band were about to reach the climax in the "final annihilation of the class enemies." Still Stalin could not have failed to be favorably impressed by this young disciple who, in 1934, after the victory had been won over the enemies both within and outside the party, was so pat in expressing Stalin's own thought that "the class war will not diminish, and we must . . . make stronger the organs of the dictatorship for the final annihilation of the class enemies." *Molodets!* he must have said in Russian—Good boy!

Khrushchev was promoted to membership in the Central Committee, and a little later, he was given full charge of the Ukraine when the "waverers," Postyshev, Chubar, and Kossior, were arrested, and the purge was to rise to its bloody climax in the ever bloody Ukraine. To be sure, Kaganovich's recommendation must have counted, too, as well as the fact that Kaganovich could not return to the Ukraine because he had now to purge heavy industry after Piatakov and Orjonikidze fell.

VI. "THE BERIA GANG."

Stalin was manifestly waiting for the news from Leningrad that Kirov had been murdered. How anxiously he was waiting, so that "blood for blood" might be exacted, is shown by a startling coincidence of dates. One of these dates has long been known. On Dec. 1, 1934, in the evening, Leonid Nikolayev shot Kirov. *That same evening*, as Khrushchev now informs us, *a decree that had been prepared in advance by Stalin* was officially promulgated. Two days later, it was "casually approved by the Politburo." It provided literally for a speedup—a veritable automation—in the mass production of corpses:

(Thunderous and prolonged applause.)

Comrades, let us reach for some other facts. The Soviet Union is justly considered as a model of a multinational state because we have in practice assured the equality and friendship of all nations which live in our great Fatherland.

All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state. We refer to the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations, together with all Communists and Kom-somols without any exception; this deportation action was not dictated by any military considerations.

Thus, already at the end of 1943, when there occurred a permanent breakthrough at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War benefiting the Soviet Union, a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which they lived.

In the same period, at the end of December, 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic. In March, 1944, all the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April, 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway places from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic and the Republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardian Republic. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, he would have deported them also.

(Laughter and animation in the hall.)

Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children,

1. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation . . . of acts of terror.

2. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death sentences . . . because the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR does not consider it possible to entertain appeals. . . .

3. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are directed to execute the death sentences . . . immediately. . . .

How many thousands of Communists (and non-Communists) died "for the murder of Kirov" under this decree of Dec. 1, 1934, we may never know.

Though Khrushchev now denounces the decree as the main "legal" instrument of "mass repressions and brutal violations of socialist legality," he and his associates have used it repeatedly since Stalin's death. Nay more, they have used it also since Khrushchev's Address denouncing it! At least twenty-nine deaths of "Beria and his Gang" have been published as occurring under its procedure. The last such public announcement was the execution of Bagirov and three associates, carried out according to *Bakinskii Rabochii* in April 1956, i.e. more than two months after Khrushchev made a show of denouncing the decree.*

Under this act, which has no parallel in the history of law, the accused—Khrushchev points out—need only be charged with "the preparation, and/or the performance, of terrorist acts;" or be branded an enemy of the people, or of the State, or of the party, or of the working class; or be charged with service of the espionage agency of some foreign power. That charge is sufficient to prevent him from stating his "ideological position," and "deprive him of any possibility that his case

* On April 19, 1956 the Speedup Decree of Dec. 1, 1934 was repealed so far as the crimes listed in Paragraph 58, Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Penal Code are concerned. But it still applies to Section 11, covering not *individual* acts of terror but "the preparation or execution of acts of terror by an organization" or organized group. Thus further members of "the Beria Gang" or any other "Gang" can still be liquidated by "belt conveyor legality." (See *Ostprobleme*, Sept. 7, 1956, pp. 1241-2.)

old people, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.

After the conclusion of the Patriotic War, the Soviet nation stressed with pride the magnificent victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts. The country experienced a period of political enthusiasm. The party came out of the war even more united; in the fire of the war, party cadres were tempered and hardened. Under such conditions nobody could have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the party.

And it was precisely at this time that the so-called "Leningrad affair" was born. As we have now proven, this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included Comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others.

As is known, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were talented and eminent leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. It is sufficient to mention that Stalin made Voznesensky first deputy to the chairman of the Council of Ministers and Kuznetsov was elected secretary of the Central Committee. The very fact that Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the supervision of the state-security organs shows the trust which he enjoyed.

How did it happen that these persons were branded as enemies of the people and liquidated?

Facts prove that the "Leningrad affair" is also the result of willfulness which Stalin exercised against party cadres.

Had a normal situation existed in the party's Central Committee and in the Central Committee Political Bureau, affairs of this nature would have been examined there in accordance with party practice, and all pertinent facts assessed; as a result, such an affair as well as others would

may be reexamined" and of all opportunity to appeal, to petition for pardon, to secure a delay pending appeal, or to "disavow a confession secured by torture." A defendant so charged must be tried immediately and executed within twenty-four hours of the passing of sentence. But it was under this decree and these charges that "Beria and his gang" were "tried" and executed.

Khrushchev informs his auditors that "now when the cases of these so-called spies [of the past] have been reexamined, it has been found that all their cases were fabricated." Inevitably this poses the question: were the cases of the twenty-nine members of Beria's gang also fabricated? *

Beria's name weaves in and out of the report as if Khrushchev were always just about to give us real information on his

* Actually we do not know how many more than the 29 publicly announced executions there were. Mzhavanadze, Khrushchev's new First Secretary of the Georgian Party has reported that between September 1952, when Beria incurred Stalin's displeasure, and February 1954, no less than 3,011 party members were purged in Georgia. There is no way of telling how many or how few of these were executed, or what the additional number of purged is since February 1954. Moreover, the "Beria Gang" includes high officials in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Secret Police all over the country, and a number of Beria's appointees in various non-police positions in the first months after Stalin's death, as well as Beria men in the Satellites. Among those publicly reported shot are Beria and six associates, Dec. 1, 1953; Abakumov and six more; ten Georgians; Bagirov and three associates. Khrushchev told Pierre Commin of the visiting French Socialist Delegation this past summer that Beria was actually shot at a Politburo meeting many months before he was "tried." At any rate the "trial" took place "without the presence of the defendants or their attorneys," and still Beria and his accomplices "confessed." Bagirov's execution was reported only in Azerbaijan, in *Bakinsky Rabochy*, May 27, 1956. Since this account came after Khrushchev denounced "confessions," the culprits were reported to have "admitted the facts of the crimes they were charged with." The executions are apparently being spaced out—for what motives we can only conjecture—for Bagirov, who had been the leader of the party in Azerbaijan from 1937 to 1953, and Arutinov, who had been the leader for the same sixteen years in Armenia, disappeared with Beria, but Bagirov's execution was announced almost three years later, and we have yet to hear of Arutinov's fate. For the Georgian purges, see: Boris I. Nikolaevsky, "The Trial in Tiflis," *New Leader*, Jan. 16, 1956; John Ducoli and R. A. Pierce, "The Khrushchev Machine," *New Leader*, Sept. 10, 1956. Accounts of all these trials and purges can be found in the issues of *Ostprobleme* appearing shortly after their publication in the Russian press. Khrushchev's account of the death of Beria as told to Senator Pierre Commin is given in *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 7-8, p. 146. Commin is not identified there by name, but the writer has learned from a correspondent in France that he is the "leading member of the delegation" referred to. (See Appendix E.)

not have happened.

We must state that, after the war, the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies before his very eyes. After the war, Stalin separated himself from the collective even more. Everything was decided by him alone without any consideration for anyone or anything.

This unbelievable suspicion was cleverly taken advantage of by the abject *provocateur* and vile enemy, Beria, who had murdered thousands of Communists and loyal Soviet people. The elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beria. As we have now proven, it had been precisely Beria who had "suggested" to Stalin the fabrication by him and by his confidante of materials in the form of declarations and anonymous letters, and in the form of various rumors and talks.

The party's Central Committee has examined this so-called "Leningrad affair"; persons who innocently suffered are now rehabilitated and honor has been restored to the glorious Leningrad party organization. Abakumov and others who fabricated this affair were brought before a court; their trial took place in Leningrad and they received what they deserved.

The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of this affair only now, and why did we not do something earlier, during Stalin's life, in order to prevent the loss of innocent lives? It was because Stalin personally supervised the "Leningrad affair," and the majority of the Political Bureau members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances in these matters, and could not therefore intervene.

When Stalin received certain material from Beria and

deeds, but could not quite bring himself to do it. We first meet the name on p. 114 and for the last time on p. 212. The first mention is made in order to connect him with Stalin's last crimes (the Leningrad Case and the Doctors' Case). These, according to Khrushchev, were investigated only "after the unmasking of the Beria gang." But this is manifestly untrue.

Both the Leningrad case and the Doctors' Case were fabricated by Beria's bitter enemy, S. D. Ignatiev, and the latter's Deputy, Mikhail Ryumin. The same is true of the Mingrelian Case, discussed below. Stalin replaced Beria by Ignatiev as Minister of State Security in November, 1951, as once he had replaced Yezhov by Beria and earlier Yagoda by Yezhov. We do not know enough about the Leningrad Case to determine at whom it was aimed beyond its actual victims (men who had been advanced by the "poisoned" Zhdanov). But we do know that both the Doctor-Poisoners Case and the Mingrelian Case had as one of their immediate targets Beria and his appointees.

When the important Soviet physicians, mostly Jews, were charged with poisoning Zhdanov and Shcherbakov, and attempting to poison Marshals Konev, Vasilevsky, Govorov, and other high army men (significantly Zhukov was not so honored!), the announcement in *Pravda* of Jan. 13, 1953 included a charge of "lack of vigilance" against the former leaders of the MGB, i.e. Beria and his associates. The confessions of the leading physicians in the Kremlin and in Moscow were extracted by Ignatiev, Ryumin and assistants with such brutality that two of them, Drs. Kogan and Etinger, died under torture. It was in this case that Dr. Vinogradov was put in chains, that Stalin bade an inquisitor, "beat, beat, and beat again," and the doctors were beaten and brain washed until those who survived confessed. Khrushchev is manifestly trying to exculpate his personal adherent, Ignatiev, who supervised the tortures, by informing his listeners that "Stalin told him (Ignatiev) curtly, 'If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors, we will shorten you by a head.'"

Abakumov, without examining these slanderous materials, he ordered an investigation of the "affair" of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. With this, their fate was sealed.

Instructive in the same way is the case of the Mingrelian nationalist organization which supposedly existed in Georgia. As is known, resolutions by the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were adopted concerning this case in November, 1951, and in March, 1952. These resolutions were adopted without prior discussion with the Political Bureau. Stalin had personally dictated them. They made serious accusations against many loyal Communists. On the basis of falsified documents, it was proved that there existed in Georgia a supposedly nationalistic organization whose objective was the liquidation of the Soviet power in that republic with the help of imperialistic powers.

In this connection, a number of responsible party and Soviet workers were arrested in Georgia. As was later proved, this was a slander directed against the Georgian party organization.

We know that there have been at times manifestations of local bourgeois nationalism in Georgia as in several other republics. The question arises: Could it be possible that in the period during which the resolutions referred to above were adopted, nationalist tendencies grew so much that there was a danger of Georgia's leaving the Soviet Union and joining Turkey?

(Animation in the hall, laughter.)

This is, of course, nonsense. It is impossible to imagine how such assumptions could enter anyone's mind. Everyone knows how Georgia has developed economically and culturally under Soviet rule.

Industrial production of the Georgian Republic is 27

Beria was by no means the only target of this case, for the confessions included a link up with American Intelligence, with the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, with International Zionism, and with anti-Semitism. Khrushchev here, as throughout his speech, suppresses any mention of the anti-American and anti-Semitic aspects of the case.

Though Stalin had promised in 1939 that there would never again be a mass purge in the party, in 1952-3 he was preparing such a purge with the assistance of Ignatiev and Ryumin. Many Jewish Communist leaders in the satellites fell in the process. It is not impossible that Molotov and Mikoyan would also have been targets, as Khrushchev suggests ("had Stalin remained at the helm another few months, Comrade Molotov and Mikoyan would probably not have delivered any speeches at this Congress"), but it is Beria and his Deputies who are specifically accused of "lack of vigilance" and of failing to prevent the poisoning of top party leaders. Beria's life was saved—for a few months—by the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953. Beria's first act when he was restored to control of both MGB and MVD was to begin an "investigation" of the Doctor-Poisoner Case. He immediately rehabilitated all the doctors, but could not, as Khrushchev hypocritically maintains, make them "all alive . . . and working in the same places as before," for two had died.

Beria declared the Doctor's Plot a frameup on April 3, before Stalin had been dead a month. He attacked Ignatiev's and Ryumin's roles on April 6, and ordered their arrest on April 7. But Khrushchev was strong enough to save Ignatiev's life. After Beria's death, the chief architect of the Doctors' Plot was placed by Khrushchev in the post of First Secretary of the Bashkirian Communist Party, and made a Central Committee member by the Twentieth Congress. Ryumin died for his part in the crime.

In the same fashion, Khrushchev accuses Beria of having fabricated the Mingrelian case, which was also fabricated by

times greater than it was before the Revolution. Many new industries have arisen in Georgia which did not exist there before the Revolution: iron smelting, an oil industry, a machine-construction industry, etc. Illiteracy has long since been liquidated, which, in prerevolutionary Georgia, included 78 per cent of the population.

Could the Georgians, comparing the situation in their republic with the hard situation of the working masses in Turkey, be aspiring to join Turkey? In 1955, Georgia produced 18 times as much steel per person as Turkey. Georgia produces 9 times as much electrical energy per person as Turkey. According to the available 1950 census, 65 per cent of Turkey's total population are illiterate, and, of the women, 80 per cent are illiterate. Georgia has 19 institutions of higher learning which have about 39,000 students; this is 8 times more than in Turkey (for each 1,000 inhabitants). The prosperity of the working people has grown tremendously in Georgia under Soviet rule.

It is clear that, as the economy and culture develop, and as the socialist consciousness of the working masses in Georgia grows, the source from which bourgeois nationalism draws its strength evaporates.

As it developed, there was no nationalistic organization in Georgia. Thousands of innocent people fell victim of willfulness and lawlessness. All of this happened under the "genial" leadership of Stalin, "the great son of the Georgian nation," as Georgians like to refer to Stalin.

(Animation in the hall.)

The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions concerning the internal life of the country but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union.

The July plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with

Ignatiev under Stalin's order, to hit at Beria and his followers in Transcaucasia. Beria is himself a Mingrelian (the Mingrelians are a small tribe in Georgia). In 1952, Ignatiev staged three large purges of Beria's Georgian followers. As soon as he had finished rehabilitating the Doctors, on April 14, 1953, Beria rehabilitated his followers in Georgia and restored the living to their old titles and posts, jailing instead those whom Ignatiev and Stalin had named to replace them.

In reversing Ignatiev's frameups, Beria charged him with "trampling down the rights of Soviet citizens . . . extraction of false confessions by impermissible means (torture) . . . cooked up charges of non-existent nationalism (in Georgia) . . . violations of Soviet legality." In short, Khrushchev has expropriated many of the dead Beria's formulations, while making him the author instead of the intended victim of Stalin's last great frameups. Dead men cannot defend themselves, and such a dead man, who was himself the author of so many frameups, cannot even excite sympathy. Still historical truth is historical truth.*

As we continue the examination of the involuted, repetitious and apparently casually scattered references to Beria in Khrushchev's Address, we discover that its structure is by no means planless.

On p. 116, Khrushchev mentions "the series of matters fabricated by the Beria gang," but once more actually takes up a long series of cases fabricated by Yagoda for Stalin, and then a longer series fabricated by Yezhov, leaving the unwary listener with the impression that he is really talking about Beria.

Again on p. 162 Khrushchev shifts from the *Yezhovshchina* to the name of Beria. But he follows with the names of a number of persons executed under Yezhov while Beria was

* For details on the undermining of Beria by Stalin during the latter's last year or so, see the writer's "The Struggle for the Soviet Succession," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1953, or *Six Keys to the Soviet System*, pp. 18-20.

Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslavia affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of the "affair"; it was completely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a friendly country.

I recall the first days when the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began artificially to be blown up. Once, when I came from Kiev to Moscow, I was invited to visit Stalin who, pointing to the copy of a letter lately sent to Tito, asked me, "Have you read this?"

Not waiting for my reply he answered, "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."

We have dearly paid for this "shaking of the little finger." This statement reflected Stalin's delusions of grandeur, but he acted just that way: "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no Kossior"; "I will shake my little finger once more and Postyshev and Chubar will be no more"; "I will shake my little finger again—and Voznesensky, Kutnetsov and many others will disappear."

But this did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin shook, not only his little finger but everything else that he could shake, Tito did not fall. Why? The reason was that, in this case of disagreement with the Yugoslav comrades, Tito had behind him a state and a people who had gone through a severe school of fighting for liberty and independence, a people which gave support to its leaders.

You see to what Stalin's delusions of grandeur led. He

still the party boss of Transcaucasia. These include Kaminsky, Orjonikidze, Kossior, Chubar, and Kedrov. Of these only Kedrov was executed after Beria came to Moscow, but Kedrov, too, was arrested under Yezhov while Stalin was engaged in liquidating the Society of Old Bolsheviks.

Kaminsky and Kedrov are both said to have died because they knew too much about Beria's past as a policeman for the Mussavat (the Moslem governing party of Azerbaijan before the Red Army conquered that independent country in 1920). Since Kaminsky was actually executed under Yezhov in 1937 before Beria was even in Moscow, he could not have had a hand in the execution. But a word is in order on Kedrov.

Mikhail S. Kedrov (Tsederbaum) was a contemporary not of Beria's but of Lenin's. Dr. Kedrov-Tsederbaum was born in 1878. He and Lenin lived near each other in exile in Switzerland and Lenin used to play with Kedrov's son. After Lenin took power, Dr. Kedrov served on the Collegium of the *Cheka* in Moscow, until he was sent in 1920 to Archangel, where he carried out the execution of the Tsarist officers who had taken refuge there. This cruel and brutal task drove him insane, and though he partially recovered, never again could he do any work. He lived out the remainder of his life as a pensioner, in the Home for Old Bolsheviks, until Stalin closed the Home because its occupants had such long memories. Thus Kedrov's career was finished in 1920 or 21, when Beria was a mere 21 or 22 and was just beginning his career as a minor official in Baku. He could not have so much as met the Transcaucasian Beria until the latter came to Moscow in 1938. That he did not have acquaintance with the latter is implied in the very appeal which Khrushchev read (p. 212): "Neither the party, nor the Soviet Government, nor the People's Commissar L.P. Beria, will permit this cruel injustice." It puts Beria on the same high plane as the party and the Government in whose justice "I believe, I believe."

The younger Kedrov, the boy with whom Lenin played,

had completely lost consciousness of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in the U.S.S.R., but in relation to whole parties and nations.

We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia and have found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia as well as by the working masses of all the people's democracies and by all progressive humanity. The liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole camp of Socialism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the whole world.

Let us also recall the "affair of the doctor-plotters."

(Animation in the hall.)

Actually there was no "affair" outside of the declaration of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of the organs of state security) to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that doctors were applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.

Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion that there are doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally issued advice on the conduct of the investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said that the academician Vinogradov should be put in chains, another one should be beaten. Present at this Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head."

(Tumult in the hall.)

Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him

also made a career in the Secret Police. He served under both Yagoda and Yezhov, took part in the Radek interrogation and other important cases, then incurred displeasure by trying to shield his aged father and some of the latter's old Bolshevik friends. He was liquidated before his father in the last stages of the *Yezhovshchina*. Then the elder Kedrov perished in the inevitable chain reaction. Beria has plenty of blood on his hands, and, given the date of execution, perhaps the elder Kedrov's should be added, but the reasons Khrushchev alleges will not withstand scrutiny.*

Since we are obviously dealing with a whole series of new legends in the making, a fresh scrawl upon Stalin's old "Operation Psalimpsest," it becomes necessary for us to set straight a few facts of the real biography of Lavrentii Beria so far as the record permits.

Lavrentii Beria was born in 1899 near Sukhum. While he was not "an imperialist agent and spy all his life," he did work for the Azerbaijan police before the Bolsheviks invaded and conquered Azerbaijan in 1920. His employment was in a minor position. He did not share the views or ideals of his employer government which was Moslem while he was a Mingrelian Christian. Nor did they last long enough, nor have the desire to form a police resembling in any manner the Soviet Secret Police. He was working for a living in this fashion while the British occupation forces were in Azerbaijan, but was not, as Khrushchev has stated, a British agent, for the British were not there long enough to set up, nor did their interests impel them to set up a network of agents.

As soon as the Bolsheviks conquered Transcaucasia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) in 1920, Beria changed bosses. At the same time he joined the Communist Party. Stalin, and many Azerbaijanians and Georgians besides, knew about Beria's prior employment by the Mussavat Police, but

* For more on the Kedrovs, see Alexander Orlov: *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (New York, 1953), pp. 77-81, 196, 198, 199.

instructions, advised him on which investigative methods should be used; these methods were simple—beat, beat and, once again, beat.

Shortly after the doctors were arrested, we members of the Political Bureau received protocols containing the doctors' confessions of guilt. After distributing these protocols, Stalin told us, "You are blind like young kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies."

The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those who had made the confessions of guilt.

We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was questionable. We knew some of these people personally because they had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.

This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not, however, have the time in which to bring it to an end (as he conceived that end), and for this reason the doctors are still alive. Now all have been rehabilitated; they are working in the same places they were working before; they treat top individuals, not excluding members of the Government; they have our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly, as they did before.

In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very base role was played by the rabid enemy of our party, an agent of a foreign intelligence service—Beria, who had stolen into Stalin's confidence. In what way could this *provocateur* gain such a position in the party and in the state, so as to become the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee Political Bureau? It has now

it did not hamper his career in the slightest. In fact, when Stalin was promoting him to be party boss in Transcaucasia in 1931, Beria filled out a form giving his party membership as "from 1920" but Stalin told him it "would look better for such a job if he wrote down *from 1917.*" * It was perhaps, Beria's first lesson, in that "Operation Rewrite" of which he showed himself so great a master when he delivered his celebrated lecturing on July 21 and 22, 1935, rewriting Stalin's early life and deeds closer to the latter's heart's desire. (L. Beria: *On the History of Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia*).

Those who knew Lavrentii Beria intimately are in agreement that he would never have become a Communist had the Bolsheviks not conquered Transcaucasia (Malenkov and Khrushchev did not join the Communist Party either until after it conquered power.) He was cynical, free from illusions except those that came from his rise to the upper levels of the bureaucracy, and free from interests other than those of his political intrigues, activities, and fortunes. While others went hunting, on drinking bouts, chasing after women, or sought other respites from the continuous politicalization of their lives, he stuck to his desk. He was the only Bolshevik of which it has been reported that he even worked in his car. His desk was always tidy and neat, his work meticulous. He was a pedant of terror. To his subordinates he was known as a good fellow since he covered up their lapses, errors, and peculations. To his superiors he was regarded as "useful" for he studied first Orjonikidze's then Stalin's tastes in intrigue and gossip about party officials both political and personal.

Though Khrushchev was Beria's senior by five years, the two men rose more or less simultaneously and in many respects

* For this and other intimate details concerning Beria, I am indebted to Alexander Orlov, who in 1925-6 was Commander of the Transcaucasian Frontier Troops, and through him, also to Tite Lordkipanidze, who was Beria's Deputy in Georgia from 1924-1930 and later, under the name of Zagarely, Orlov's Deputy in Paris.

been established that this villain had climbed up the Government ladder over an untold number of corpses.

Were there any signs that Beria was an enemy of the party? Yes, there were. Already in 1937, at a Central Committee plenum, former People's Commissar of Health Protection Kaminsky said that Beria had worked for the Mussavat intelligence service. But the Central Committee plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's statement? No, because Stalin believed in Beria, and that was enough for him. And when Stalin believed in anyone or anything, then no one could say anything which was contrary to his opinion; anyone who would dare to express opposition would have met the same fate as Kaminsky.

There were other signs, also. The declaration which Comrade Snegov made at the party's Central Committee is interesting. (Parenthetically speaking, he was also rehabilitated not long ago, after 17 years in prison camps.) In this declaration, Snegov writes:

"In connection with the proposed rehabilitation of the former Central Committee member, Kartvelishvili-Lavryentiev, I have entrusted to the hands of the representative of the Committee of State Security a detailed deposition concerning Beria's role in the disposition of the Kartvelishvili case and concerning the criminal motives by which Beria was guided."

In my opinion, it is indispensable to recall an important fact pertaining to this case and to communicate it to the Central Committee, because I did not consider it as proper to include in the investigation documents.

On 30 October 1931, at the session of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kartvelishvili, secretary of the Trans-

made their careers together. Orjonikidze recommended Beria to Stalin as Kaganovich did Khrushchev. The year 1926 appears to be the year in which each of them won the favorable notice of a powerful Stalinist. The same "Congress of the Victors" in 1934 which elected Khrushchev to the Central Committee also elected Beria. When seven out of ten members of that Committee perished in 1937, both of them showed themselves masters of the art of serving and surviving. In that black year both improved their fortunes. In 1937, too, when Orjonikidze fell, Beria showed his skill in bandwagon jumping by persecuting Orjonikidze's friends, and relatives in Transcaucasia, as Khrushchev charges (just as Khrushchev persecuted the friends and appointees of Postyshev, Chubar and Kossior, when he succeeded them in the Ukraine in January 1938). Neither would have lasted long if he had not known how to show thus his loyalty to Stalin and Stalinism.

But when Orjonikidze quarrelled with Stalin it was early 1937. Orjonikidze was trying to save his Deputy for Heavy Industry, Piatakov, the real industrializer of Russia. Thus Beria could have no responsibility for Orjonikidze's "sudden heart attack," now labelled "suicide." If it was actually an execution, for which there is considerable evidence, it was carried out in Moscow under Stalin's orders by Yezhov just before the 1937 Plenum, which gave the latter the go-ahead for his major deeds of blood. Beria was brought to Moscow only a year and a half later, when Stalin was secretly planning to get rid of Yezhov and curb the *Yezhovshchina*.

At the January 1938 Plenum, Khrushchev as new boss of the Ukraine and replacement for Kossior, was advanced to the post of Candidate Member of the Politburo. It is for that reason, no doubt, that Khrushchev here maintains that the January 1938 Plenum curbed the *Yezhovshchina*. Far from it. Its speeches and resolutions glorified Yezhov as the "flaming sword" of the Revolution. And after it, Yezhov staged the trial of Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda, Krestinsky, Rakovsky, Grinko,

Caucasian Krai Committee, made a report. All members of the executive of the Krai Committee were present; of them I alone am alive.

During this session, J. V. Stalin made a motion at the end of his speech concerning the organization of the secretariat of the Trans-Caucasian Krai Committee composed of the following: first secretary, Kartvelishvili; second secretary, Beria (it was then, for the first time in the party's history, that Beria's name was mentioned as a candidate for a party position). Kartvelishvili answered that he knew Beria well and for that reason refused categorically to work together with him. Stalin proposed then that this matter be left open and that it be solved in the process of the work itself. Two days later a decision was arrived at that Beria would receive the party post and that Kartvelishvili would be deported from the Trans-Caucasus.

This fact can be confirmed by Comrades Mikoyan and Kaganovich, who were present at that session.

The long, unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and Beria were widely known; they date back to the time when Comrade Sergo [Orjonikidze] was active in the Trans-Caucasus; Kartvelishvili was the closest assistant of Sergo. The unfriendly relationship impelled Beria to fabricate a "case" against Kartvelishvili.

It is a characteristic thing that in this "case" Kartvelishvili was charged with a terroristic act against Beria.

The indictment in the Beria case contains a discussion of his crimes. Some things should, however, be recalled, especially since it is possible that not all delegates to the Congress have read this document. I wish to recall Beria's bestial disposition of the cases of Kedrov, Golubiev, and Golubiev's adopted mother, Baturina—persons who wished to inform the Central Committee concerning Beria's treach-

Rosengoltz, and other old Bolsheviks, along with the "poison-doctors," Levin and Pletnev.

In August 1938, Beria became for the first time a national figure when Stalin called him to Moscow as Vice Commissar of the NKVD, with the idea of undermining Yezhov. Not till December 1938 was Yezhov quietly removed, and shortly after executed. Along with him, most of the top officials and inquisitors who had carried on the purges for the glory of Stalin were sent to their death in the same cellars of the Lubyanka, or tortured by new inquisitors to extract new confessions. Since they were themselves masters of the game, they made quicker and more pliable confessors. Beria, as the "purger of the purgers," was responsible for this operation.

For this was Beria's first task: to "purge the purgers" and moderate the fury of the *Yezovshchina*, the "excesses" of which Stalin was now to unload on Yezhov's corpse. According to Walter Duranty, who got his biographical material in large measure from official sources and particularly the Soviet press,

Beria's first official act was to execute five important NKVD officials in the Ukraine, appointed by Yezhov, for criminal abuse of power in connection with the Purge. This was only the first step in the "purging of the purgers" as it was called, which Beria carried out with great vigor. . . . Beria undertook a wholesale revision of all cases of expulsion from the Party. According to figures published regarding the provinces of Moscow and Leningrad, more than 50 per cent of persons expelled were reinstated on the grounds that the action taken against them had been unjustified, based on slander or other false premises. Thousands of exiles were brought back to their homes and former positions for the same reason. . . . The newspapers were full of fantastic stories of men and women, often high-placed, who had been purged for reasons of personal gain, envy, jealousy, or sheer malice. . . . Particularly flagrant were reports of Communists with doubtful pasts who had shielded themselves by their zeal in denouncing innocent comrades. Apparently it had been enough to attach the term 'enemy of the people' to any one for his fate to be sealed.*

* Duranty: *Stalin & Co.* (New York, 1949), pp. 186-7.

erous activity. They were shot without any trial and the sentence was passed *ex post facto*, after the execution.

Here is what the old Communist, Comrade Kedrov, wrote to the Central Committee through Comrade Andreyev (Comrade Andreyev was then a Central Committee secretary):

"I am calling to you for help from a gloomy cell of the Lefortorsky prison. Let my cry of horror reach your ears; do not remain deaf; take me under your protection; please, help remove the nightmare of interrogations and show that this is all a mistake.

"I suffer innocently. Please believe me. Time will testify to the truth. I am not an *agent provocateur* of the tsarist Okhrana [secret police]; I am not a spy; I am not a member of an anti-Soviet organization of which I am being accused on the basis of denunciations. I am also not guilty of any other crimes against the party and the Government. I am an old Bolshevik, free of any stain; I have honestly fought for almost 40 years in the ranks of the party for the good and the prosperity of the nation. . . .

". . . Today I, a 62-year-old man, am being threatened by the investigative judges with more severe, cruel and degrading methods of physical pressure. They (the judges) are no longer capable of becoming aware of their error and of recognizing that their handling of my case is illegal and impermissible. They try to justify their actions by picturing me as a hardened and raving enemy and are demanding increased repressions. But let the party know that I am innocent and that there is nothing which can turn a loyal son of the party into an enemy, even right up to his last dying breath.

"But I have no way out. I cannot divert from myself the hastily approaching new and powerful blows.

"Everything, however, has its limits. My torture has

Since this was written in 1949 and utilized newspaper reports of ten years earlier, neither the rehabilitation of expelled, purged and executed is new, nor even the language used by Khrushchev. But one could never guess from his report, linking up "Beria and his Gang" with the worst of the *Yezhovshchina*, that Beria had come to Moscow to put on the brakes and reverse the bloody juggernaut.

At the Eighteenth Congress, in March 1939, there is little to choose between Khrushchev and Beria in the bloodthirstiness of their remarks on "Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Bourgeois Nationalists, and other fascist vermin." But Beria did suggest that it was time to stop blaming all failures "on the disruptive activities of enemies." Such language had not been heard for nearly a decade.

The Congress elected Beria a Candidate Member of the Politburo, advanced Khrushchev to full membership and continued Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Voroshilov on the Politburo. Malenkov, who had been a top employee of Stalin's Secretariat, was now made a Secretary and a Central Committee member. Thus in 1939, with Yezhov's fall, the men who by luck and energetic participation in the purges had survived its fury, reached their eminence around the throne which enabled them all, including Beria, to become Stalin's heirs.

Voroshilov's name was signed to the verdict against Tucha-shevsky and the Soviet Marshals; Molotov went to the Ukraine to remove Kossior and start the purges which were carried out under Khrushchev's rule; Malenkov ran the dossiers from which he helped Stalin and Yezhov to select the names of the victims; Kaganovich supervised (and survived) purges in Moscow, the Ukraine, in Agriculture and Industry, always helped by Khrushchev; Beria purged Georgia again and again, purged the purgers and carried on the creeping purge from Moscow; Bulganin took over the army while it was being blooded by the Great Surgeon, and headed its Special Section. Thus these

reached the extreme. My health is broken, my strength and my energy are waning, the end is drawing near. To die in a Soviet prison, branded as a vile traitor to the Fatherland—what can be more monstrous for an honest man? And how monstrous all this is! Unsurpassed bitterness and pain grips my heart. No! No! This will not happen; this cannot be, I cry. Neither the party, nor the Soviet Government, nor the people's commissar, L. P. Beria, will permit this cruel, irreparable injustice. I am firmly certain that, given a quiet, objective examination, without any foul rantings, without any anger and without the fearful tortures, it would be easy to prove the baselessness of the charges. I believe deeply that truth and justice will triumph. I believe. I believe."

The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found innocent by the Military Collegium. But, despite this, he was shot at Beria's order.

(Indignation in the hall.)

Beria also handled cruelly the family of Comrade Orjonikidze. Why? Because Orjonikidze had tried to prevent Beria from realizing his shameful plans. Beria had cleared from his way all persons who could possibly interfere with him. Orjonikidze was always an opponent of Beria, which he told to Stalin. Instead of examining this affair and taking appropriate steps, Stalin allowed the liquidation of Orjonikidze's brother and brought Orjonikidze himself to such a state that he was forced to shoot himself.

(Indignation in the hall.)

Such was Beria.

Beria was unmasked by the party's Central Committee shortly after Stalin's death. As a result of the particularly

men became Stalin's closest Comrades-in-Arms, and after his death, his heirs. Of each of them can be said what Khrushchev here says of Beria: "This scoundrel has climbed up the government ladder over an untold number of corpses."

VII. THE GREATEST MILITARY CHIEFTAIN OF ALL TIME.

Perhaps the darkest moment in recent history was Aug. 23, 1939, when the two totalitarian dictators, Hitler and Stalin, joined forces to partition Poland and divide Europe into spheres of "interest," with Hitler getting the lion's share and Stalin the jackal's. On the Pact and its consequences for the Soviet Union Khrushchev spends not a word.

Litvinov as a Jew and a spokesman for Collective Security was removed to facilitate the pact, and Molotov made Foreign Minister to sign it. But Molotov's negotiations with Ribbentrop, his bullying of the Baltic Republics to accept "eternal guarantees" which spelled their doom; Voroshilov's ignominious role in the Finnish War; Mikoyan's strenuous efforts to supply Hitler with food and raw materials; Ribbentrop's birthday message to Stalin on his Sixtieth Birthday (Dec. 21, 1939), and Stalin's reply that the new friendship would be durable because it was "cemented in blood"*—these dark pages in Soviet history are passed over in silence by the loquacious Khrushchev.

For his purposes the war started, not in 1939 when Hitler and Stalin invaded Poland together, but in 1941, when Hitler double-crossed his partner of the Pact, and invaded the Soviet Union. And of this invasion we get little more than the news that the Great Tyrant was also a great coward, and the Military Genius a mediocre blunderer.

But how seriously are we to take such tales as the one that Stalin did not even know how to read a map? Since Khrush-

*The blood was Polish blood.

detailed legal proceedings, it was established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes and Beria was shot.

The question arises why Beria, who had liquidated tens of thousands of party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked during Stalin's life. He was not unmasked earlier because he had utilized very skillfully Stalin's weaknesses; feeding him with suspicions, he assisted Stalin in everything and acted with his support.

Comrades:

The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person. This is supported by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-glorification and of his lack of even elementary modesty is the edition of his "Short Biography," which was published in 1948.

This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery, an example of making a man into a godhead, of transforming him into an infallible sage, "the greatest leader, sublime strategist of all times and nations." Finally, no other words could be found with which to lift Stalin up to the heavens.

We need not give here examples of the loathsome adulation filling this book. All we need to add is that they all were approved and edited by Stalin personally and some of them were added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book.

What did Stalin consider essential to write into this book? Did he want to cool the ardor of his flatterers who were composing his "Short Biography"? No! He marked the very places where he thought that the praise of his services was insufficient. Here are some examples characterizing Stalin's activity, added in Stalin's own hand:

chev still insists that his quondam Chief “performed great services during the Civil War,” one finds it difficult to believe that he was quite illiterate in military matters.

Churchill tells that he used a map to explain to Stalin the difficulties of a premature “Second Front” and the advantages of an invasion of Italy, then walked with Stalin to a globe where they discussed other matters of world strategy. Certainly, all military and civil leaders of the Allied countries who conferred with him during the War were impressed by his grasp of its problems, though the pathos of manifest power may account for some of this feeling.

Among Khrushchev’s gossip and children’s tales about the war, two things stand out starkly:

1) The military purge did not end with the general mass purge in 1939, but Stalin kept arresting officers (as “agents of Hitler?”) all through the Pact period, until Hitler attacked and Stalin had no more officers to waste. Then he even took them out of concentration camps, and men like Rokosowsky, present vice-roy of Poland, actually served him loyally against Hitler and against the Poland in which he now rules. That the military purge had run so long and gone so deep (“literally to the company and batallion level”) is news to the outside world.

2) Stalin not only believed that he could do business with Hitler, but when the attack came he was in a funk, gave way to fits of melancholia, withdrew from all activity. If this is so, then the heroes who denounce Stalin’s crimes three years after he is safely dead might have been rid of him and might have established a true “collective leadership” in June 1941. But they could not do without his cult and the iron rule which was carried on in his name. They visited him and humbly begged him “to return to active leadership,” while they themselves attained a new high in their cult of his person and celebration of his genius. They are the conscious creators of the legend concerning the greatest military genius of all time.*

* Bulgainin: “Stalin is the creator of the Soviet armed forces, the greatest

"In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators, the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites, there was definitely welded together, after Lenin's death, that leading core of the party . . . * that upheld the great banner of Lenin, rallied the party behind Lenin's behests, and brought the Soviet people into the broad road of industrializing the country and collectivizing the rural economy. The leader of this core and the guiding force of the party and the state was Comrade Stalin."

Thus writes Stalin himself! Then he adds:

"Although he performed his task of leader of the party and the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self-adulation."

Where and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this worthy of a leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. Precisely against this did Marx and Engels take such a strong position. This also was always sharply condemned by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

In the draft text of his book appeared the following sentence: "Stalin is the Lenin of today." This sentence appeared to Stalin to be too weak, so, in his own handwriting, he changed it to read: "Stalin is the worthy continuer of Lenin's work, or, as it is said in our party, Stalin is the Lenin of today." You see how well it is said, not by the people but by Stalin himself.

It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals written into the draft text of that book in Stalin's hand.

* Khrushchev has omitted the rest of the sentence which reads: ". . . consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Kalnin, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Frunze, Dzerzhinsky, Kaganovich, Orjonikidze, Kirov, Yaroslavsky, Mikoyan, Andreyev, Shvernik, Zhdanov, Shkiriyatov and others." (Josef Vissarovich Stalin: *Kratkaya Biografiya*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 104-5.)

Khrushchev's other war-time anecdotes are little more than petty self-serving: flattery of the army officers who are needed to give popularity to his colorless and compromised regime and support in internal affairs while the Secret Police is being purged and reorganized; self-praise in which Khrushchev tells how he understood what was needed on the Ukrainian front and how Malenkov (!) and Stalin spurned his budding military insights; implausible pictures of Khrushchev's being brave enough to defend Zhukov against Stalin ("Comrade Stalin it is not true!"), and of Mikoyan's daring to tell Stalin that Khrushchev was right on the Battle of Kharkov and Stalin wrong! After Khrushchev himself has told us that so many died for less, we find these self-serving tales hard to swallow.

All the celebration of Stalin's military glories, in histories, speeches, articles, paintings, novels, poems, films, Khrushchev now tells us, "make us feel sick." If they made the Court flatterers feel sick, what effect must they have had upon the people who were the targets and the victims? It seems that their sickening incense made him "so popular" with the targets of their psychological warfare that, though they knew he was murdering innocent victims and losing whole armies and regions, they did not dare to stay his hand, bring him to justice, remove him, or even curb his power.

There are three peaks in their celebration of his genius which tower even above the everyday mountains of flattery. And each of these three was higher than its predecessor. They were his Fiftieth Anniversary, in 1929, his Sixtieth, in 1939, and his Seventieth in 1949. The first coincided with the opening of his all-out war upon the peasants; the second celebrated his wisdom just after he had signed the Pact with Hitler and

general of the contemporary era . . . the creator of the advanced Soviet military science. . ." (*Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1949).

Voroshilov: "It is correct to call our military science Stalinist military science. . . . The victorious Great Patriotic War will go down in history as a triumph of the military genius both in strategy and direct command of the Great Stalin."
—*Ibid.*

Especially generously does he endow himself with praises pertaining to his military genius, to his talent for strategy.

I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning the theme of the Stalinist military genius.

“The advanced Soviet science of war received further development,” he writes, “at Comrade Stalin’s hands. Comrade Stalin elaborated the theory of the permanently operating factors that decide the issue of wars, of active defense and the laws of counteroffensive and offensive, of the co-operation of all services and arms in modern warfare, of the role of big tank masses and air forces in modern war, and of the artillery as the most formidable of the armed services. At the various stages of the war Stalin’s genius found the correct solutions that took account of all the circumstances of the situation.”

(Movement in the hall.)

And, further, writes Stalin:

“Stalin’s military mastership was displayed both in defense and offense. Comrade Stalin’s genius enabled him to divine the enemy’s plans and defeat them. The battles in which Comrade Stalin directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples of operational military skill.”

In this manner was Stalin praised as a strategist. Who did this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist but in the role of an author-editor, one of the main creators of his self-adulatory biography. Such, comrades, are the facts. We should rather say shameful facts.

And one additional fact from the same “Short Biography” of Stalin. As is known, “The Short Course of the History

partitioned Poland; the third celebrated his wisdom in winning the Great Patriotic War and annexing all the countries of Eastern Europe which he had pledged to liberate.

In January 1940, fifteen of the 1939 tributes were published in all major tongues. One is an official Resolution of the Central Committee; eight are by members of the Post-Stalin "collective leadership;" the others are by men now dead. The titles will serve to give the flavor: *Stalin—Lenin's Successor*, by Molotov; *Builder of the Red Army*, by Voroshilov; *Great Driver of the Locomotive of History*, by Kaganovich; *The Lenin of Our Day*, by Mikoyan; *On Cadres—People the Most Precious Capital*, by Malenkov.*

Khrushchev was not yet important enough to rate translation into all major tongues. But in 1949 he had risen in the court to a point where he could have a pamphlet of his own published all over the earth: *Stalin Friendship among the Peoples Makes Our Motherland Invincible*.** It celebrates Stalin as genius, leader, teacher, father of the nationalities, great industrializer, great collectivizer, creator of Soviet culture, careful gardener tenderly rearing (and pruning?) the human beings in his charge. "Make us feel sick," indeed. . . .

A startling feature of the war-time section of the Address is the casual mention of the name of an unperson who is not to be rehabilitated, since his murder was undoubtedly one of the first collective acts of the new "collective leadership." When he was derisively called Stalin's "loyal shield-bearer," the stenogram records "laughter in the hall." It must have been nervous, startled laughter.

Alexander N. Poskrebyeshev, even while alive, was a name men did not pronounce lightly. From the day Stalin died until this speech, no one dared mention it at all.

Besides the Secretariat of which he was General Secretary (in his last year, "First Secretary"), Josef Stalin had a personal

* English (New York, 1940).

** English (Moscow, 1950).

of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" was written by a commission of the party Central Committee.

This book, parenthetically, was also permeated with the cult of the individual and was written by a designated group of authors. This fact was reflected in the following formulation on the proof copy of the "Short Biography of Stalin":

"A commission of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), under the direction of Comrade Stalin and with his most active personal participation, prepared a "Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)."

But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin: The following sentence replaced it in the final version of the "Short Biography":

"In 1938 appeared the book, 'History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short Course,' written by Comrade Stalin and approved by a commission of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)."

Can one add anything more?

(Animation in the hall.)

As you see, a surprising metamorphosis changed the work created by a group into a book written by Stalin. It is not necessary to state how and why this metamorphosis took place.

A pertinent question comes to our mind: If Stalin is the author of this book, why did he need to praise the person of Stalin so much and to transform the whole post-October

staff. It handled matters he did not see fit to handle in the Secretariat, nor report to the Politburo. Among them were "Security Affairs" involving the party. The head of this personal staff was Lieutenant General A. N. Poskrebyshev.

When Stalin wanted a Politburo member, or still more, when he wanted a Minister of State Security arrested—a Yagoda, a Yezhov, or a Beria—it was Poskrebyshev, Stalin's private secretary and chief of his private security armed forces, who carried out the Dictator's will. Afterwards, the Politburo would "casually" learn about it, and "casually"—or frenetically—approve. When a high Stalinist was *suicided*—we need a new form of the verb to describe a new mode of putting an end to a life—it was Poskrebyshev who helped the presumptive author of his own death to finish his last hour quietly. It is thus, we may conjecture, that Orjonikidze had his "heart attack" or "committed suicide." "Shield-bearer" does less than justice to this man's role.

The fresh general purge that Stalin was preparing just before he died was still in the "private secretariat" stage. The poison-doctor case was the opening move, and with it came the usual hue and cry for vigilance. How many in the Politburo were in danger?

The charge that the poisoning of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov and attempts to poison certain generals had taken place because of "lack of vigilance in the Security Forces" while Beria was their head, made it clear that he was target number 1, as Yagoda had been of the earlier poison-doctor case. Of this Khrushchev prefers to say nothing.

But Khrushchev does tell us that all of them were accused of lack of vigilance, and even of lack of the ability to be vigilant ("blind like young kittens"). He tells us further that Voroshilov was being walled in ("British agent"); that Andreyev, too, had been "separated from the Politburo;" that Molotov and Mikoyan were in danger ("would probably not have spoken at this congress"); and that "Stalin evidently had

historical period of our glorious Communist Party solely into an action of "the Stalin genius"?

Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the party in the socialist transformation of the country, in the construction of socialist society, in the industrialization and collectivization of the country, and also other steps taken by the party which undeviatingly traveled the path outlined by Lenin? This book speaks principally about Stalin, about his speeches, about his reports. Everything without the smallest exception is tied to his name.

And when Stalin himself asserts that he himself wrote the "Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" this calls at least for amazement. Can a Marxist-Leninist thus write about himself, praising his own person to the heavens?

Or let us take the matter of the Stalin Prizes.

(Movement in the hall.)

Not even the tsars created prizes which they named after themselves.

Stalin recognized as the best a text of the national anthem of the Soviet Union which contains not a word about the Communist Party; it contains, however, the following unprecedented praise of Stalin:

"Stalin brought us up in loyalty to the people, He inspired us to great toil and acts."

In these lines of the anthem the whole educational, directional and inspirational activity of the great Leninist party is ascribed to Stalin. This is, of course, a clear deviation from Marxism-Leninism, a clear debasing and belittling of the role of the party. We should add for your information that the Presidium of the Central Committee

plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau." It is this news that makes many serious students ask whether the "collective leadership" did not themselves put an end to the life of their Beloved Leader. In truth his death came most conveniently.

While that is necessarily speculative there is nothing speculative about the fact that Stalin's "shield-bearer," Poskrebyshev, who was working on all these plans, did not survive his master's death. The faithful shield bearer did not even attend the funeral. On March 5, 1953, he became an unperson, not so much as mentioned by any one until Khrushchev mockingly pronounced his name.

Was Khrushchev himself one of "the old members of the Politburo" all of whom Stalin was preparing to "get rid of?" His situation is less clear than the others, and the evidence is fragmentary and inconclusive. All we know for certain is that Andreyev fell after criticizing Khrushchev's agrarian program; that Bagirov and Arutinov, both egged on by Beria, also criticized his program, and, after Stalin's death, disappeared in the purge of the "Beria Gang;" and that Ignatiev, who had charge of the fabrication of the Doctor-Poisoner Case, was specifically exonerated and rehabilitated by Khrushchev and his blame falsely loaded on the corpse of Beria, the case's first intended victim in high place.

But all that does not add up to much, so that we shall have to wait until some rival or successor becomes interested in telling us more about Khrushchev's relations with Stalin in the latter's last days.

Khrushchev's remarks on the Second World War are singularly free from any reference to Stalin's real crimes. On the Pact with Hitler, as we have noted, not a word. And not a word on the partition of Poland, the deportation of a million and a quarter Poles; the betrayal of the Warsaw uprising (Bulganin and Rokossowsky directed the operation), the execu-

has already passed a resolution concerning the composition of a new text of the anthem, which will reflect the role of the people and the role of the party.

(Loud, prolonged applause.)

And was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the largest enterprises and towns were named after him? Was it without his knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected in the whole country—these “memorials to the living”? It is a fact that Stalin himself had signed on 2 July 1951 a resolution of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers concerning the erection of the Volga-Don Canal of an impressive monument to Stalin; on 4 September of the same year he issued an order making 33 tons of copper available for the construction of this impressive monument.

Anyone who has visited the Stalingrad area must have seen the huge statue which is being built there, and that on a site which hardly any people frequent. Huge sums were spent to build it at a time when people of this area had lived since the war in huts. Consider, yourself, was Stalin right when he wrote in his biography that “. . . he did not allow in himself . . . even a shadow of conceit, pride, or self-adoration”?

At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect for Lenin's memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite the decision taken over 30 years ago to build a Palace of Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, this Palace was not built, its construction was always postponed and the project allowed to lapse.

We cannot forget to recall the Soviet Government resolution of 14 August 1925 concerning “the founding of Lenin prizes for educational work.” This resolution was published in the press, but until this day there are no Lenin prizes. This, too, should be corrected.

tion of Ehrlich and Alter, the officers' corpses in the Katyn Forest. There is nothing on the war with Finland; the betrayal of pledges to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia; the conquest and enslavement of the Balkans; the war on Greece; the threats to Turkey and Iran; the partition of Germany; the partition of and war in Korea. These are "positive achievements of Stalin" and "Socialist conquests" which Stalin's heirs intend to keep.

The one crime that Khrushchev does condemn, that of genocide, is strangely selective. The wiping out of Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechen-Ingush, and Balkarians is here. "Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for hostile activity, including women, children, old people, Communists . . . to expose them all to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons."*

Well said! But where is the autonomous German Volga Republic? Where the Crimean Tartars? Where the theater, culture, press, organizations of the Jews?

The actions he criticizes, he says, "were not dictated by any military considerations." Are we to think that the extinction of the German Volga Republic was? But these "Germans" were not German nationals. They were Mennonites and Moravians whose ancestors had fled Germany in the days of Catherine the Great. Their children and children's children had served the Russian land and state for generations. More than one war took place between Russia and Germany, and they remained loyal to the land in which they were born and had lived and toiled. Can it be that this most precious exhibit of the Leninist nationalities policy was less loyal because of its beauties than it had been under the Tsars?

And how was the fate of the Crimean Tartars a matter of military necessity? And the Jews, who above all others would find it impossible to come to terms with Hitler—why did their

* If not whole nations, then why whole classes? All collective guilt by category is totalitarian: true guilt is always individual and incurred by individual acts.

(Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)

During Stalin's life—thanks to known methods which I have mentioned, and quoting facts, for instance, from the "Short Biography" of Stalin—all events were explained as if Lenin played only a secondary role, even during the October Socialist Revolution. In many films and in many literary works the figure of Lenin was incorrectly presented and inadmissibly depreciated.

Stalin loved to see the film, "The Unforgettable Year 1919," in which he was shown on the steps of an armored train and where he was practically vanquishing the foe with his own saber. Let Kliment Yefremovich [Voroshilov], our dear friend, find the necessary courage and write the truth about Stalin; after all, he knows how Stalin had fought. It will be difficult for Comrade Voroshilov to undertake this, but it would be good if he did. Everyone will approve of it, both the people and the party. Even his grandsons will thank him.

(Prolonged applause.)

In speaking about the events of the October Revolution and about the civil war, the impression was created that Stalin always played the main role, as if everywhere and always Stalin had suggested to Lenin what to do and how to do it. However, this is slander of Lenin.

(Prolonged applause.)

I will probably not sin against the truth when I say that 99 per cent of the persons present here heard and knew very little about Stalin before the year 1924, while Lenin was known to all; he was known to the whole party, to the whole nation, from the children up to the graybeards.

leaders and their institutions perish? Could it be that Khrushchev had a hand in these last two? Certainly, the Crimea, which has since been “ceded” to the Ukraine, was under his charge during the war.

On the treatment of the Ukraine itself he offers only an unfeeling jest. About the surrender of Ukrainian regiments, about the Ukrainian volunteers in Vlassov’s Army of Liberation, about the Ukrainian liberation forces that fought as guerrillas against both German and Soviet armies—not a word. Indeed, Khrushchev prefers not to speak at all of the millions of Russians as well as Ukrainians who welcomed the German invader as a possible liberator and surrendered by entire regiments, until Hitler’s maniacal master-race policy taught its own lessons. Yet, as much as Stalin’s unpreparedness and military incompetence and the purge of his officers, these wholesale surrenders explain why the Soviet armies had to abandon an area thirteen times the size of France before they could stabilize their lines at Stalingrad.

Khrushchev is naturally not disposed to talk of this, any more than of the purges he himself conducted in the Ukraine both for two years before the Second World War and for five years after it. When he succeeded Kossior, Chubar and Postyshev in 1938, a Soviet *History of the Ukraine* declared:

With the arrival in the Ukraine of the close comrade-in-arms of Stalin, N. S. Krushchev, the eradication of the remnants of the enemy and the liquidation of wrecking activities proceeded particularly successfully . . .

And Khrushchev himself in his Report to the Fourteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in June 1938 promised: “We will smash their heads in once and for all!”

After the reconquest of the Ukraine, Khrushchev returned to his party secretaryship, and to his purges. In August 1946, he reported to the Ukrainian Central Committee (what was left of it) that he had just completed a “mass replacement” over the course of eighteen months of more than fifty per cent

(Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)

All this has to be thoroughly revised so that history, literature and the fine arts properly reflect V. I. Lenin's role and the great deeds of our Communist Party and of the Soviet people—the creative people.

(Applause.)

Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the employment of faulty principles in party work and in economic activity; it brought about rude violation of internal party and Soviet democracy, sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, covering up of shortcomings and varnishing of reality. Our nation gave birth to many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit.

We should also not forget that, due to the numerous arrests of party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness, feared all that was new, feared their own shadows and began to show less initiative in their work.

Take, for instance, party and Soviet resolutions. They were prepared in a routine manner, often without considering the concrete situation. This went so far that party workers, even during the smallest sessions, read their speeches. All this produced the danger of formalizing party and Soviet work and of bureaucratizing the whole apparatus.

Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the fact that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the provinces can be illustrated by his direction of agriculture.

All those who interested themselves even a little in the national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him, but he did not support us. Why?

of all personnel high and low, from party committees and soviets to local committees and Machine-Tractor Stations. This does not sound like the language of a man who had to have Stalin breathing down his neck and pointing out each victim that he was to purge. But it does help to explain why there were Ukrainians in great numbers among the displaced persons, the non-returners, the mass surrenders, the Vlassov Army, and the guerrilla army of Ukrainian Liberation. Khrushchev would seem to have translated faithfully into Ukrainian the blessings of Stalin's system of statecraft.*

VIII. WHAT'S WRONG WITH SOVIET AGRICULTURE?

Since 1929 Soviet agriculture has been "in a difficult situation." The cause, we are told, was that Stalin never travelled anywhere, did not know the actual situation, had not visited a village since 1928. But Khrushchev and Bulganin, Mikoyan and Kaganovich, like to get around, see and be seen, so we may assume that things will get better. What could be simpler?

Actually one could wear one's feet to the stumps and one's seat to the bones travelling around the vast Russian land and not come any closer to the heart of what is wrong with the Soviet agricultural economy which has kept it in perpetual crisis from 1929 to 1956.

As early as 1934, Stalin told the Congress of the Victors that "the practice of the indiscriminate expansion of the crop areas under cultivation" must be discontinued for it was ac-

* For a picture of Khrushchev's rule in the Ukraine as it looked to a Ukrainian nationalist, see the article of W. Hamaliya in *Ukrainian Thought* (London), April 18, 1956, reprinted in condensed form in the *Ukrainian Bulletin* (New York), July 1-15, 1956. It contains among other things a version, new to me, of how Molotov and Stalin arranged the purging of Kossior and his replacement by Khrushchev. The version coincides in essential details with a briefer one given by Tito to Dedijer and told by Dedijer in his *Tito* (New York, 1953), p. 107. Khrushchev's own report on his Ukrainian purge of 1945-46 is reprinted in *Pravda*, Aug. 23, 1946. Characteristically, the chief enemy as painted there is "bourgeois nationalism."

Because Stalin never traveled anywhere, did not meet city and kolkhoz workers; he did not know the actual situation in the provinces.

He knew the country and agriculture only from films. And these films had dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture.

Many films so pictured kolkhoz life that the tables were bending from the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently, Stalin thought that it was actually so.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently; he was always close to the people; he used to receive peasant delegates and often spoke at factory gatherings; he used to visit villages and talk with the peasants.

Stalin separated himself from the people and never went anywhere. This lasted tens of years. The last time he visited a village was in January, 1928, when he visited Siberia in connection with grain deliveries. How then could he have known the situation in the provinces?

And when he was once told during a discussion that our situation on the land was a difficult one and that the situation of cattle breeding and meat production was especially bad, a commission was formed which was charged with the preparation of a resolution called, "Means toward Further Development of Animal Breeding in Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes." We worked out this project.

Of course, our propositions of that time did not contain all possibilities, but we did chart ways in which animal breeding on kolkhozes and sovkhozes would be raised. We had proposed then to raise the prices of such products in order to create material incentives for the kolkhoz, MTS [machine-tractor station] and sovkhoz workers in the development of cattle breeding. But our project was not accepted and in February, 1953, was laid aside entirely.

What is more, while reviewing this project, Stalin pro-

accompanied by a drop in the yield per hectare. He spoke of "the gravity of the situation regarding livestock" and the "impermissibility of trying to conceal the real state of affairs in regard to livestock." Thus Khrushchev is slandering his old hero when he claims that "Stalin never even noted the difficult situation in agriculture," and plagiarizing him when he, like Stalin, "sounds the alarm and mobilizes the people to attack the livestock problem" and when he pursues afresh the policy of "the indiscriminate expansion of the crop areas under cultivation."*

One has a nightmarish sense of moving in a blind ended labyrinth when one studies the history of Soviet agriculture over the years from 1929 to 1956: always the same problems, always the same solutions, always the same problems remain unsolved.

It is a mistake to believe that Stalin tried to run everything in detail. As he entrusted the Railroads and Heavy Industry to Kaganovich, Trade to Mikoyan, Foreign Affairs to Molotov, and watching Generals to Bulganin, so he entrusted agriculture first to Andreyev and then to Khrushchev. In 1946, Khrushchev was appointed a member of the Council on Collective Farm Affairs. In 1948, twenty years after forced collectivization was undertaken, Khrushchev wrote:

We must bear in mind that the 'little worm' of individual property still sits in the mind of the kolkhoznik. Now as in the past, the most important vestigial residue of capitalism in the consciousness of the collective farm peasantry is the tendency to private property. This tendency . . . is a great hindrance to . . . the accumulation of capital . . . it is directed against the correct balance between the interests of the state, the kolkhoz and kolkhoznik peasant.

What happens to the Marxist theory that consciousness is determined by material conditions if now, after more than a quarter of a century of experience with the "superior" material

* All the quoted phrases are taken from Stalin's Report to the Seventeenth Congress *On the Work of the Central Committee*.

posed that the taxes paid by the kolkhozes and by the kolkhoz workers should be raised by 40 billion rubles; according to him the peasants are well off and the kolkhoz worker would need to sell only one more chicken to pay his tax in full.

Imagine what this meant. Certainly, 40 billion rubles is a sum which the kolkhoz workers did not realize for all the products which they sold to the Government. In 1952, for instance, the kolkhozes and the kolkhoz workers received 26,280 million rubles for all their products delivered and sold to the Government.

Did Stalin's position, then, rest on data of any sort whatever? Of course not.

In such cases facts and figures did not interest him. If Stalin said anything, it meant it was so—after all, he was a “genius,” and a genius does not need to calculate, he only needs to look and can immediately tell how it should be. When he expresses his opinion, everyone has to repeat it and to admire his wisdom.

But how much wisdom was contained in the proposal to raise the agricultural tax by 40 billion rubles? None, absolutely none, because the proposal was not based on an actual assessment of the situation but on the fantastic ideas of a person divorced from reality.

We are currently beginning slowly to work our way out of a difficult agricultural situation. The speeches of the delegates to the Twentieth Congress please us all; we are glad that many delegates deliver speeches to the effect that there are conditions for the fulfillment of the sixth Five-Year Plan for animal husbandry, not during the period of five years, but within two to three years. We are certain that the commitments of the new Five-Year Plan will be accomplished successfully.

conditions of collectivized farming, the little worm of individual property will not die?

Khrushchev's remedy was simple: to amalgamate the already elephantine collective farms into larger and larger units, until they would be so large and so few that every one of them could be chaired by a Communist Chairman, penetrated by a Communist cell, watched over by an individual Machine-Tractor Station. On January 1, 1950, there were 254,000 kolkhozes. By the Nineteenth Congress in 1952 these had been reduced to 97,000. By the Twentieth, they had been cut to 87,371. The drive is still continuing. At the beginning of the drive the overwhelming majority of kolkhozes had not only no Communist Cell, they did not even have a single Communist apiece. Last year alone 30,000 city Communists were sent to be "elected" chairmen of collective farms and at the Twentieth Congress all but 8.4% of the kolkhozes were reported to have party cells. And yet . . . And yet . . .

Khrushchev gave the Congress some figures on the growth of agricultural production in the past 26 years, i.e. from 1929 through 1955. They showed that the agricultural output had grown by 35%. But the population for the same period grew by 45%, part of it by annexation. Thus at the end of the period, the average Soviet citizen had less grain, less meat, less milk, less butter, less leather, less linen and wool per capita than at the beginning. And, as Khrushchev made painfully clear in 1953, the whole Soviet Union, including its new territories, had less cattle even in absolute terms than in 1928, the last year of individual farming, and than in 1916, the last year of the Tsar.*

In January 1954, the leading Soviet "theoretical organ," *Kommunist* published an article entitled "The Principle of Material Personal Interest—Lever for Powerful Development in Agriculture."

* *Pravda*, Sept. 15, 1953.

(Prolonged applause.)

Comrades!

If we sharply criticize today the cult of the individual which was so widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak about the so many negative phenomena generated by this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the party and the country for 30 years and many victories were gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet state, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of the party and of the people in the development of Soviet society.

The Socialist Revolution was attained by the working class and by the poor peasantry with the partial support of middle-class peasants. It was attained by the people under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin's great service consisted in the fact that he created a militant party of the working class, but he was armed with Marxist understanding of the laws of social development and with the science of proletarian victory in the fight with capitalism, and he steeled this party in the crucible of revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people.

During this fight the party consistently defended the interests of the people, became its experienced leader, and led the working masses to power, to the creation of the first socialist state.

You remember well the wise words of Lenin that the Soviet state is strong because of the awareness of the masses

In pre-war years—says the article—the [personal] garden plots of the collective farmers totalled about 5% of all the collectivized sown acreage of collective farms. Yet the relative output of these personal holdings totalled approximately 20%.

Without tractor or fertilizer or socialist superiority, on a tiny plot no bigger than a handkerchief, working with a spade, a watering can and the song in the heart that comes when you know you are producing for yourself and your family, not for the state to rob your product, the peasant produced 4 times as much per hectare on the small parcel than on the collective land. Still the little worm sits in the peasant's mind. The new remedy, adopted after the Twentieth Congress, is once more to curb—as was tried thrice before—the private plot and private cattle.*

In 1955 Khrushchev sent a number of his peasant overseers and police to America as visiting “farmers.” Propagandistically they were a great success: they laughed, joked, ate hot dogs, drank beer and coca-cola; the farmers of Iowa thought they were dealing with other farmers like themselves, and gave them a rousing welcome. But the boss of the Soviet farm bosses, Vladimir Matskevich, Khrushchev's Minister of Agriculture, could not conceal his astonishment at what he saw in the green and pleasant Iowa. Not privately owned automobiles and tractors,** but a fact of production statistics overwhelmed him, to wit:

In the Soviet Union approximately half the population is engaged in agriculture, yet it cannot feed and clothe the other half. There is a perpetual shortage of meat, butter, milk, grain, hides, cotton, wool.

In the United States only about ten per cent of the working population is in agriculture, yet it produces not merely enough

* Pravda, Mar. 10 and June 29, 1956.

** In the Soviet Union individual farmers have no automobiles and even Collective Farms are not allowed to own tractors. The law makes them a monopoly of the Machine-Tractor Stations which the State uses to control the Collective Farms.

that history is created by the millions and tens of millions of people.

Our historical victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the party, to the many provincial organizations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great nation. These victories are the result of the great drive and activity of the nation and of the party as a whole; they are not at all the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the individual.

If we are to consider this matter as Marxists and as Leninists, then we have to state unequivocally that the leadership practice which came into being during the last years of Stalin's life became a serious obstacle in the path of Soviet social development. Stalin often failed for months to take up some unusually important problems, concerning the life of the party and of the state, whose solution could not be postponed. During Stalin's leadership our peaceful relations with other nations were often threatened, because one-man decisions could cause and often did cause, great complications.

In recent years, when we managed to free ourselves of the harmful practice of the cult of the individual and took several proper steps in the sphere of internal and external policies, everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes, how the creative activity of the broad working masses developed, how favorably all this acted upon the development of the economy and of culture.

(Applause.)

Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now?

to feed and clothe the other 90% but a perpetual surplus: too much meat, butter, milk, grain, hides, cotton, wool.

Verily, the "enemy of the people," Bukharin was right when he declared that the crises of the Soviet system are "the crises of the capitalist world turned inside out or upside down."*

Can it be that travel is not as broadening as Nikita Khrushchev thinks, and that not Stalin's failure to get around, but his forced collectivization of agriculture, expropriation of the peasant lands, and turning them into state serfs, are what have been holding back agricultural production since 1929?

Surely it is not Stalin's lack of travel that transformed Rumania from "the breadbasket of Eastern Europe" into a grain importing land, and made the rich and fertile plains of Hungary into a food deficit area.

As we review more than a quarter of a century of collectivized agriculture in Russia, and the state of agricultural production in the new "People's Democracies" from East Germany to North Korea, the conclusion forces itself upon us that these are the lands that need above all others an agrarian revolution, a sweeping agrarian reform that will distribute the land now owned by the all-powerful overlord, the State, to the peasants who cultivate it.

But for Khrushchev, collectivization was one of Stalin's "great services" that must now be pushed to its logical end. Stalin's line in agriculture in his closing years was Khrushchev's line, and now that he has been freed from the fetters of Stalin's caprice and experience, he is pushing through with more energy and determination the same Stalinist line.

IX. WHERE WERE THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO?

Some comrades may ask us, says Khrushchev towards the close of his Address, *Where were the members of the Polit-*

* In *Notes of an Economist*. See Appendix D, p. 297 ff.

First of all, we have to consider the fact that the members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and party work.

It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during the first years, actively fought for Leninism against the enemies of Leninist theory and against those who deviated. Beginning with Leninist theory, the party, with its Central Committee at the head, started on a great scale the work of socialist industrialization of the country, agricultural collectivization and the cultural revolution.

At that time Stalin gained great popularity, sympathy and support. The party had to fight those who attempted to lead the country away from the correct Leninist path; it had to fight Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and Rightists, and Bourgeois Nationalists. This fight was indispensable.

Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent party and Government leaders and to use terroristic methods against honest Soviet people. As we have already shown, Stalin thus handled such eminent party and Government leaders as Kossior, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Postyshev and many others.

Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. This characterized the fall of Comrade Postyshev.

In one of his speeches Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?"

Postyshev answered clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, Comrade Stalin, a Bolshevik."

This assertion was at first considered to show a lack of respect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act and

buro? Why did they not assert themselves in time against the cult of the individual? Why is it being done only now?

The answer is to be found in the Address itself.

The members of the Politburo were Stalin's men. They advanced their fortunes by advancing his. They won his notice by supporting his line, executing his will, glorifying his name. They would never have found vacancies at the top unless they had helped him to destroy Lenin's other lieutenants. They would never have reached the top unless they had excelled in their zeal in his service.

They began by believing in his line and his methods. They liked his crude simplification of the questions of social life, his organizational moves to prepare his "ideological" victories, his glorification of and skill in the use of the party machine. They were pleased with his victorious methods of outlawing all variant and rival views, his belief in haste and force in town and countryside, his solution of the "difficulties" with the peasants by means of liquidation of the independent peasantry as a class, his contention that heavy industry meant more than the well-being of men. By advancing him and his line they advanced themselves.

Where were they when the cult of his person was being created? They were creating it. It served to advance their line and faction and personal fortunes. It prevented a serious discussion of variant views. By their cheers and heckling, by their speeches and articles, by their reports to their "constituents," by their purges of doubters and dissenters in their own staffs and fields of work, they created Stalinism and made it strong and unshakeable. By means of it they completed the change of the party from a multiform human organism into something inorganic, a thing of granite, a "monolith"—his monolith and theirs. Lenin had already reduced Soviet society into a land of silence where only one party still had a voice. He had outlawed factions and rival platforms in that party. But he had

consequently resulted in Postyshev's annihilation and branding without any reason as a "people's enemy."

In the situation which then prevailed I talked often with Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin; once when we two were traveling in a car, he said, "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And, when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next—home or to jail."

It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. And, when we also consider the fact that in the last years Central Committee plenary sessions were not convened and that sessions of the Political Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time, then we will understand how difficult it was for any member of the Political Bureau to take a stand against one or another unjust or improper procedure, against serious errors and shortcomings in the practices of leadership.

As we have already shown, many decisions were taken either by one person or in a roundabout way, without collective discussion.

The sad fate of Political Bureau member, Comrade Voznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's repressions, is known to all. It is a characteristic thing that the decision to remove him from the Political Bureau was never discussed but was reached in a devious fashion. In the same way came the decision concerning the removal of Kuznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.

The importance of the Central Committee's Political Bureau was reduced and its work disorganized by the creation within the Political Bureau of various commissions—the so-called "quintets," "sextets," "septets" and "novenaries." Here is, for instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of 3 October 1946:

not yet curbed all discussion and expression of difference. They completed the process of silencing the party as the rest of society had been silenced. In place of discussion, approval and cheers . . . compulsory approval and cheers.

By 1929, they had already made the party into a solid granite monolith to mark the place where there had once been multiform life, difference, discussion. By 1929, they had already made him the only one to think for the party, had already named him *Vozhd*. Khrushchev and Malenkov, the one in his early thirties and the other in his late twenties, had already had a proud share in advancing their Leader's fortunes in their respective spheres, as the older Kaganovich and Molotov in theirs.

By 1933, the "enemy" had been "beaten, beaten, beaten." (Khrushchev's words). The "enemy" was the peasant who had been beaten in the forced collectivization, the worker who had been beaten in the forced, one-sided industrialization, and the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, and Bourgeois-Nationalist Communists who had been beaten in the party itself. In January, 1934, they proclaimed themselves the Congress of the Victors, and their *Vozhd* the Greatest Leader of all Ages and all Lands.

They knew that five times ten million peasants, tilling their own soil as the Revolution had promised, could not be enemies of the people, for they were the people. They knew that ten million together with their women and children could not be guilty of nameless crimes. But it was useful for socialism. So they had condemned an entire class to death, carried out its forcible expropriation, herded their best and most active into concentration camps and the rest into state serfdom. This was the greatest victory celebrated by the Congress of the Victors in 1934. And still today Khrushchev holds that the death of millions and the enserfment or enslavement of tens of millions was not one of history's greatest crimes but one of Stalin's "great achievements."

“Stalin’s Proposal:

“1. The Political Bureau Commission for Foreign Affairs (‘Sextet’) is to concern itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of internal construction and domestic policy.

“2. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chariman of the State Commission of Economic Planning of the U.S.S.R., Comrade Voznesensky, and is to be known as a Septet.

“Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin.”

What a terminology of a card player!

(Laughter in the hall.)

It is clear that the creation within the Political Bureau of this type of commissions—“quintets,” “sextets,” “septets” and “novenaries,”—was against the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau were in this way kept away from participation in the decision of the most important state matters.

One of the oldest members of our party, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was actually deprived of the right of participation in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents. When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction.

Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was an English agent.

They knew that Lenin's closest comrades, who had made the Revolution, organized the new government, fought and won the Civil War, were loyal Communists who differed with them only in some details of how to achieve Communism, how to maintain and strengthen their dictatorship, how to run the party and the state. But the silencing, crushing, forced confession of error, moral debasement and self-debasement, expulsion as enemies of the party, the people, the revolution, and socialism, was another of the victories celebrated so joyously by the Congress of the Victors. And today as in 1934, Khrushchev still proclaims this as one of Stalin's "great achievements."

Only after the juggernaut they had created and given crushing and irresistible momentum began to roll over the Victors themselves, did the best of them begin to have second thoughts. But by then it was too late. All those who were decent or thoughtful enough to interpose their persons in the path of the juggernaut were crushed in nameless infamy. That is why Kirov died, Postyshev died, Orjonikidze died, Yenukidze died. And Eikhe, Kossior, Chubar, and the rest

"Attempts to oppose the groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent's falling victim of the repression," says Khrushchev now by way of extenuation. "This characterized the fall of Comrade Postyshev."

The present "collective leadership" are Stalin's living heirs precisely because they were not the kind to make such attempts. Where were the members of the Politburo when Kirov, Postyshev and Kossior died? They were kicking the corpses of their fallen comrades. They were striving to be the first to shovel a spadeful of infamy into their graves. If they had displayed the slightest doubt or lack of zeal, they too would have been digging themselves a traitor's grave.

It was not enough to be silent or to ask for proof. One had to join the hunt or be hunted, head the pack or be torn to pieces by it.

(Laughter in the hall.)

It's true—an English agent. A special tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there.

(Indignation in the hall.)

By unilateral decision, Stalin also separated one other man from the work of the Political Bureau—Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of willfulness.

Let us consider the first Central Committee plenum after the Nineteenth Party Congress when Stalin, in his talk at the plenum, characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our party were guilty of some baseless charges. It is not excluded that, had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably have not delivered any speeches at this Congress.

Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Political Bureau. He often stated that Political Bureau members should be replaced by new ones.

His proposal, after the Nineteenth Congress, concerning the selection of 25 persons to the Central Committee Presidium, was aimed at the removal of the old Political Bureau members and the bringing in of less experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways.

We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation of the old Political Bureau members and, in this way, a cover for all the shameful acts of Stalin, acts which we are now considering.

Comrades! In order not to repeat the errors of the past, the Central Committee has declared itself resolutely against the cult of the individual.

Often even that was not enough. One had to remain more useful to the party and its Leader as a hunter than as one who was hunted, otherwise even zeal in tearing others to pieces did not save one's skin. That is how Yagoda died, Yezhov died, all his inquisitors died. That is why Beria saw his death approaching, just before Death called for the Dictator himself. They died because, to please the Tyrant, they had killed too many, and come to know too much.

And one had to have a courtier's skill in diverting the suspicions and flattering the whims of a tyrant who had become increasingly suspicious and arbitrary and whose head had been turned by the arduous and unnerving trade of tyrant.

Besides all these things, one had to have luck.

When Generals Tukhashevsky, Gamarnik, Yegerov, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Putna, Eideman, Feldman, Primakov, died a traitor's death, where were the members of the Politburo?

Budyenny was signing his name to the verdict of a Court Martial that had never taken place. Voroshilov was reporting on the "traitors'" deeds and death to the other members of the Politburo. And they were voting approval of their death with enthusiasm, without asking so much as a single question. By the time 5000 officers had died as traitors, Bulganin was becoming Stalin's watchdog over the resentful remainder.

In the whole history of mankind, no army has ever produced more than single, isolated traitors in a given generation in any general staff or officers' corps. How could believers in the Soviet system possibly have credited the idea that their system was so much more corrupting than any other in history that more than 70% of all its officers of the rank of colonel and above had become traitors? *

* One can understand perhaps why under the coercion of universal terror men pretended to believe this impossible tale. But it is harder to comprehend how men who lived in freedom in other lands could have accepted it. To be sure, there was a dilemma from which there was no escape:

Either the Communist Regime was the most corrupt in all history because it had produced this incredible majority of traitors in high place;

We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, in the past, Stalin doubtlessly performed great services to the party, to the working class and to the international workers' movement.

The question is complicated by the fact that all this which we have just discussed was done during Stalin's life under his leadership and with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that this was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp.

He saw this from the position of the interest of the working class, of the interest of the laboring people, of the interest of the victory of Socialism and Communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interest of the party; of the working masses, in the name of the defense of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!

Comrades! Lenin had often stressed that modesty is an absolutely integral part of a real Bolshevik. Lenin himself was the living personification of the greatest modesty. We cannot say that we have been following this Leninist example in all respects.

It is enough to point out that many towns, factories and industrial enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhoses, Soviet institutions and cultural institutions have been referred to by us with a title—if I may express it so—of private property of the names of these or those Government or party leaders who were still active and in good health. Many of us participated in the action of assigning our names to various towns, *rayons*, undertakings and kolkhozes. We must correct this.

(*Applause.*)

But this should be done calmly and slowly. The Central

Where were the men of the Politburo when 5000 innocent officers died? Approving their death and the defaming of their names. Cheering frenetically at the "timely exposure of treason."

By then, even in their own hearts was fear.

"What are you actually?" Stalin had asked Postyshev.

"I am a Bolshevik, Comrade Stalin, a Bolshevik."

This assertion was first considered to show a lack of respect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act, and consequently resulted in Postyshev's liquidation . . . as an enemy of the people.

If Postyshev, who had been so ruthless against the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, so ruthless against "Bourgeois Nationalists" and "Kulaks" in the Ukraine, if Postyshev, who had been such a fanatical Stalinist, could die, who then was safe?

Bulganin, Stalin's watchdog in the Army, and Khrushchev, Stalin's new watchdog in the Ukraine and over the peasantry, perhaps because of their intimacy or perhaps because they were in their cups, once discussed Stalin's growing cruelty and madness. When they were traveling in a car, Bulganin said: "It has happened that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next—home or to jail."

"Where were the members of the Politburo? Why did they not assert themselves in time? Why only now?"

Because they were afraid. Not only an entire people was in terror. Even the ruling party was in terror. Even the Secret Police was in terror. Even Stalin's closest comrades-in-arms were afraid. Dictatorship having become total, fear had become total. Even the dictators were afraid. Even the Dictator-in-Chief was afraid. Afraid of the prostrate people over whom he tyrannized. Afraid of his Secret Police and his Palace

Or it was the most corrupt in all history because it had murdered this incredible number of loyal servants.

Doubtless, a number of gentle men of good will accepted the first impossibility because they preferred to believe that the second was impossible.

Comittee will discuss this matter and consider it carefully in order to prevent errors and excesses. I can remember how the Ukraine learned about Kossior's arrest. The Kiev radio used to start its programs thus: "This is radio Kossior." When one day the programs began without naming Kossior, everyone was quite certain that something had happened to Kossior, that he probably had been arrested.

Thus, if today we begin to remove the signs everywhere and to change names, people will think that these comrades in whose honor the given enterprises, kolkhozes or cities are named have met some bad fate and that they have also been arrested.

(Animation in the hall.)

How is the authority and the importance of this or that leader judged? On the basis of how many towns, industrial enterprises and factories, kolkhozes and sovkhoses carry his name. Is it not about time that we eliminate this "private property" and "nationalize" the factories, the industrial enterprises, the kolkhozes and sovkhoses?

(Laughter, applause, voices: "That is right.")

We should, in all seriousness, consider the question of the cult of the individual. We cannot let this matter get out of the party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes. I think that the delegates to the Congress will understand and assess properly all these proposals.

(Tumultuous applause.)

Comrades! We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper con-

Guards. Afraid of his closest comrades, who were afraid of him. "There is a sickness that affects all tyrants; they cannot trust their friends." But in a totalitarian dictatorship the terror becomes ubiquitous and absolute and total, and the fear as well. That way lies madness. It is a system which can elevate a madman to absolute power, and drive the holder of absolute power to madness.

"Why only now?" Because totalitarianism has to wait for the death of the tyrant before it can correct even the maddest of his acts. So it was with Hitler. So it was with Stalin.

Even after that, Stalin's henchmen took another three years before they dared to say a word about his crimes. And even now they still praise and build upon the worst of them. They call the crimes by the shameful, evasive term: Cult of the individual! They still seek to keep its enormities secret from their people.

We cannot let this matter get out of the party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed session of the Congress. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes. I think that the delegates to the Congress will understand and assess properly all these proposals. (*Tumultuous applause*).*

And this secretive discussion of a few of the evils of the "cult of the personality," kept secret from the Soviet people, "is an evidence of the great moral and political strength of our party. (*Prolonged applause*)."

The real measure of this "moral strength" is in Khrushchev's final verdict on his dead Leader:

We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, Stalin doubtless performed great services for the party, the working class, the international workers movement. This question is complicated by the fact that all this which we have just discussed was done during Stalin's life under his leadership and with his approval. Here Stalin

* An applause which signified relief, for which of his auditors had not been an accomplice in some of Stalin's crimes?

clusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work.

It is necessary for this purpose:

First, in a Bolshevnik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another.

To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work the most important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people as the creator of history and as the creator of all the material and spiritual good of humanity, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society, about the victory of Communism.

In this connection we will be forced to do much work in order to examine critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely spread erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy, economics and of other sciences, as well as in literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our party which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War.

Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the party's Central Committee during the last years, a work characterized by minute observation in all party organizations, from the bottom to the top, of the Leninist principles of party leadership, characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterized by the observation of the norms of party life described in the statutes of our party, and, finally characterized by

was convinced that this was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of the interest of the working class, of the interest of the laboring people, of the interest of the victory of socialism and communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interest of the party, of the working masses, in the name of the defense of the gains of the revolution. In this lies the whole tragedy!

What can we think of this passage, after the recital of such deeds of madness and of crime? As with Dostoyevsky's Peter Verkhovensky in *The Possessed*, as with Nechaev in the actual history of the Russian revolutionary movement, Stalin has so involved his accomplices in his crimes that neither Khrushchev nor any of his auditors nor any party member is without guilt. By labeling the forced collectivization, the cruel power-industrialization, the crushing of dissent in the party and the conquests of other lands—by labeling all the major crimes “achievements” and by having participated in all the crimes within the party and outside, Khrushchev and his associates are estopped from calling these crimes by their true names and the criminal by his.

In place of a *mea culpa*, a *sua culpa*, now that their leader is dead. In place of a reexamination of the dictatorship that led to this, a reaffirmation of that dictatorship. In place of renunciation of the privileges they have gained by such means, a reaffirmation of their privileges. In place of letting the people know, a continued conspiracy of secrecy.

Because they are so deeply involved in his despotism, they exculpate him of the charge of having been a “giddy despot.” And indeed the crimes were really not the acts of a giddy despot so much as those of a despotic dogma and a despotic system, of which the despot himself is but a product.

That is why they are able to identify themselves in their hearts with their dead leader whose dogmas, whose system, and whose crimes they shared and justified and benefited by

the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight the arbitrariness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected.

Comrades! The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has manifested with a new strength, the unshakable unity of our party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building Communism.

(Tumultuous applause.)

And the fact that we present in all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the cult of the individual which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is an evidence of the great moral and political strength of our party.

(Prolonged applause.)

We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the historical resolutions of the Twentieth Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories.

(Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)

Long live the victorious banner of our party—Leninism!

(Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.)

and believed in. Only by virtue of this identification with the tyrant can Khrushchev bring himself to speak of the latter's motives as those of "defense of the interests of the working class and the toiling people." Only by virtue of this identification can Khrushchev have hit upon this mealy mouthed term for all the crimes: "the cult of the individual."

Only by virtue of this identification can Khrushchev see "tragedy" here. For the essence of the sense of tragedy is precisely this: identification with the sufferings and the fate of the protagonist.

Khrushchev was speaking to a Congress of the Communist Party. It was an audience of 1,436 leaders of that party which pronounces itself the voice of the Russian people yet never for a moment identifies itself with the real fate of the protagonist whose lips they have sealed and whose voice they have usurped. Identifying himself with his dead Leader, Khrushchev could really believe that he was narrating the tragedy of Josef Stalin. Identifying themselves with their leaders and their party, the delegates, too, could believe that what Khrushchev had been recounting was the tragedy of Josef Stalin. But those who identify themselves with the Russian people will consider that the real tragedy is not Stalin's but the Russian people's. All this that Khrushchev has recounted, and many crimes more besides, were indeed "done in the name of the toiling masses." *In this lies the whole tragedy!* And Khrushchev's report makes it pitifully clear that this great tragedy has not yet been played to the end.

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Part III

DOCUMENTS AND APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

SECRET DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED TO THE DELEGATES TO THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS IN CONNECTION WITH KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH.

Each delegate to the Congress, but none of the Fraternal Delegates from foreign Communist Parties, signed for by name and received one set of numbered documents, for the loss of which he was to be held personally responsible. There were eighteen such documents, of varying importance, especially printed for the Congress. Prior to the Congress their very existence had been unknown, or where, as in the case of the Letter to the Party known as Lenin's Testament, the contents had become known, their authenticity had been officially denied. In its voluminous and supposedly full reports on the Congress, Pravda omitted all reference to these documents, as it did to the Address of Secretary Khrushchev to which they were supposed to serve as supporting material.

On June 30, 1956, Kommunist No. 9 finally published the most important of these. The covering notes of transmittal and attestation of authenticity were omitted, as was any reference to the fact that they had been kept secret, or that they had had any connection with what was still in the Soviet Union a secret, namely that Khrushchev had delivered his midnight report on Stalin's crimes. When the Stenographic Report of the Sessions of the Twentieth Congress was published later in the year, once more Khrushchev's Secret Address, and, of course, the documents, were omitted. Eight months after the Congress was held, there had been still only two references in the Soviet press to the fact that Khrushchev had made a Secret Report. Each of these references was limited to a single phrase, the one affirming, and the other casting doubt upon the fact that there had been any report at all. Neither indicated the nature of the report. The Lenin

Documents, printed in No. 9 of Kommunist, were also published on July 1 as a separate pamphlet in an edition of 1,000,000 copies. The introduction is ostensibly technical. Its tone can be judged from the opening and closing paragraphs in Kommunist:

Below are published notes dictated by V. I. Lenin, December, 1922-January, 1923. . . . These documents belong among V. I. Lenin's last works of programmatic significance. . . .

By decision of the Party Central Committee, the Leninist documents now being published were brought to the attention of the delegates to the Twentieth Party Congress, and then circulated to the Party organizations. V. I. Lenin's letters are published in this issue of Kommunist in accordance with instructions of the Party Central Committee.

The rest of the introduction is a guide to how the faithful should understand these documents and an attempt to diminish their impact by one-sided explanation of the more upsetting things contained in them. Thus the brief commentary, less than 1500 words for all the documents together, contains a fresh attack on Trotskyites and Bukharinites as an offset to Lenin's favorable words on Trotsky and Bukharin; and praise of the present nationalities policy of the Soviet Union as an offset to Lenin's warnings and strictures in this field. Aided by this exegesis, party members are now studying the documents in study groups and "political literacy" courses.

For the sake of greater clarity and simplicity I have grouped the eighteen documents into sixteen by combining Krupskaya's, Kamenev's and the Central Committee's notes of transmittal as a single document. I have slightly revised the translation by the State Department on June 30, by checking against the original Russian.

I. COVERING NOTES BY N. K. KRUPSKAYA, L. KAMENEV, AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM COMMISSION, TRANSMITTING LENIN'S NOTES TO THE THIRTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS.

FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

I transmitted the notes which V. I. Ilyich dictated to me during his illness from 23 December to 23 January—thirteen separate notes. This total number does not yet include the note concerning the national question (Maria Ilyishna* has it). Some of these notes have

* *Lenin's younger sister.*

already been published (on the workers-peasants inspection, and on Sukhanov). Among the unpublished notes are those of 24-25 December 1925 and those of 4 January 1923 which contain personal characterizations of some C. C. members. Vladimir Ilyich expressed the definite wish that this note of his be submitted after his death to the next party congress for its information.

N. KRUPSKAYA.

The documents mentioned in the declaration of Com. N. K. Krupskaya, which are to be transmitted to the C. C. plenum commission, were received by me on 18 May 1924.**

L. KAMENEV.

Vladimir Ilyich's notes mentioned above and transmitted to Com. Kamenev—are all known to me and were earmarked by Vladimir Ilyich for transmittal to the party.

N. KRUPSKAYA.

18 V 24

End of protocol.

Having familiarized itself with the documents which were transmitted to Com. Kamenev by N. K. Krupskaya on 18. V. 24, the C. C. plenum commission decided:

To submit them to the nearest party congress for its information.
19. V. 24.

G. ZINOVIEV
A. SMIRNOV
M. KALININ
N. BUKHARIN
J. STALIN
L. KAMENEV

II. LENIN'S LETTER RECOMMENDING ENLARGEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

I should very much like to advise that a number of changes in our political organization be undertaken at this Congress.

I should like to share with you those considerations which I consider to be most essential.

I suggest, as of primary importance, that the size of the C. C. membership be enlarged to several dozen, possible even to one hundred members. It seems to me that our Central Committee would be exposed to great danger in case future developments should not be

** Lenin died 21 January, 1924. The XIIIth congress of the Russian Communist party (Bolsheviks) took place from 23-31 May 1924. These letters of transmittal have not been published in *Kommunist*.

completely favorable to us (and we cannot count on this)—if we have not undertaken such a reform.

Next, I would like to call the Congress' attention to the proposal that under some conditions Gosplan resolutions should be given legislative force, in this respect accepting Comrade Trotsky's proposals—to a certain extent and under certain conditions.

Referring to the first point, i. e., enlargement of C. C. membership, I am of the opinion that it is necessary for the raising of C. C. authority and for the serious work aimed at raising the efficiency of our apparatus, as also for the prevention of conflicts between small C. C. groupings which would gravely affect the fate of the party as a whole.

I think that our party has the right to demand fifty to 100 C. C. members from the working class whom it [the working class] can give up without taxing its strength too highly.

This reform would lay the foundation for a greater stability of our party and would help it in its struggle under the conditions of encirclement by hostile states, a struggle which in my opinion can and must greatly sharpen in the next few years. I think that thanks to such a move the stability of our party would increase a thousandfold.

LENIN.

23 XII '22.

Dictated to M. V.*

III. LENIN'S TESTAMENT.

The document commonly called Lenin's Testament was the most important of several letters suggesting measures to avoid a split in the party after his death. He intended it to be read to the next party congress, discussed by it, acted upon, and, no doubt, published in the Stenographic Report of the Congress. According to the general editorial procedure used in publishing Lenin's Collected Works, it should have been included in Volume XXVII of the Second and Third Editions, and Volume XXXIII of the Fourth Edition. But Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin, possessing a majority in the Politburo and the arrangements committee for the Thirteenth Congress (1924), decided over the protest of Lenin's wife that it should be read only to separate delegations and not discussed by the Congress as a whole. The delegations were also instructed to keep it secret from the party members and the public.

* M. V., initials of Lenin's secretary, M. Volidicheva.

One of the Correspondents of the Russian Menshevik journal, Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik, published at that time in Berlin, sent it two letters giving most of the contents of the Testament, which letters were published in the issue of July 24, 1924. This version was utilized by Max Eastman, then an admirer of Trotsky, in a book entitled: Since Lenin Died (New York, 1925). The following year, Max Eastman secured the complete text, presumably from Trotsky. He published it in the New York Times, Oct. 18, 1926. Stalin and his Politburo majority, using their "disciplinary" powers, compelled Trotsky and Krupskaya to issue statements which seemed to deny the authenticity and belie the purpose of the document. Trotsky's statement declared that the contention in Eastman's book and in Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik "that the Central Committee had 'concealed' from the party exceptionally important documents written by Lenin in the last period of his life (. . . on the national question, the so-called 'will' and others) was a slander against the Central Committee of our party. . . . All talk about concealing or violating a 'will' is a malicious invention."

The following year, when Krupskaya, Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev finally sought to let the party know the contents of Lenin's last letters and suppressed articles, Stalin quoted against them the statement forced out of Trotsky. He took cognizance of the Testament letter in the following words:

Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev are now spinning a yarn. . . .

*It is said that in that 'will' Comrade Lenin suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin's 'rudeness' it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin's place as General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the party. I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the Thirteenth Congress, I asked to be relieved of my duties as General Secretary . . . Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev compelled Stalin to remain at his post. What could I do? Desert my post? . . . When the party imposes an obligation upon me I must obey.**

That is all the party members were permitted to hear of Lenin's Testament: later they were instructed even to push that fragmentary reference out of their memories. Thus the document, as distributed to the Twentieth Congress, must have come as a surprise to the majority

** Speech to the Plenum, Oct. 23, 1927. Stalin's Collected Works, Vol. X, 174-6. At the Plenum, Stalin read one sentence verbatim from Lenin's letter, the one concerning his rudeness and the need of replacing him, but he censored out the direct quotation when he published the speech (as above) in his Collected Works.*

of the delegates. Certainly, its publication in Kommunist of June 30, 1956 comes as a surprise to the party membership as a whole. The text follows:

By the stability of the Central Committee [of the Communist party], of which I spoke before,* I mean measures to prevent a split, so far as such measures can be taken. For, of course, the White Guard in Ruskaya Mysl (I think it was S. E. Oldenburg) was right when, in the first place, in his play against Soviet Russia he banked on the hope of a split in our party, and when, in the second place, he banked for that split on serious disagreements in our party.

Our party rests upon two classes, and for that reason its instability is possible, and if there cannot exist agreement between these classes its fall is inevitable. In such an event it would be useless to take any measures or in general to discuss the stability of our Central Committee. In such an event no measures would prove capable of preventing a split. But I trust that is too remote a future, and too improbable an event, to talk about.

I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a split in the near future, and I intend to examine here a series of considerations of a purely personal character.

I think that the fundamental factor in the matter of stability—from this point of view—is such members of the Central Committee as Stalin and Trotsky. The relation between them constitutes, in my opinion, a big half of the danger of that split, which might be avoided, and the avoidance of which might be promoted, in my opinion, by raising the number of members of the Central Committee to fifty or one hundred.

Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated enormous power in his hand; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. On the other hand Comrade Trotsky, as was proved by his struggle against the Central Committee in connection with the question of the People's Commissariat of Ways of Communication, is distinguished not only by his exceptional abilities—personally he is, to be sure, the most able man in the present Central Committee—but also by his too far-reaching self-confidence and a disposition to be too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs.

These two qualities of the two most able leaders of the present

** i.e., in the preceding document on the enlarging of the Central Committee. Lenin reverts to this subject again in the next document.*

Central Committee might, quite innocently, lead to a split; if our party does not take measures to prevent it, a split might arise unexpectedly.

I will not further characterize the other members of the Central Committee as to their personal qualities. I will only remind you that the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, accidental, but that it ought as little to be used against them personally as the non-bolshevism of Trotsky.

Of the younger members of the Central Committee I want to say a few words about Bukharin and Piatakov. They are, in my opinion, the most able forces (among the youngest), and in regard to them it is necessary to bear in mind the following: Bukharin is not only the most valuable and most important theoretician of the party, but also may legitimately be considered the favorite of the whole party; but his theoretical views can only with the very greatest reserve be regarded as fully Marxist, for there is something scholastic in them (he never has studied, and I think never has fully understood, dialectics).

And then Piatakov—a man undoubtedly distinguished in will and ability, but too much given over to administration and the administrative side of things to be relied on in a serious political question.

Of course, both these remarks are made by me merely with a view to the present time, on the assumption that these two able and loyal workers may find occasion to increase their knowledge and correct their one-sidedness.

LENIN.

Dec. 25, 1922

Postscript: Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man who in all respects differs from Stalin in one superiority—namely, that he be more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may seem an insignificant trifle, but I think that from the point of view of preventing a split and from the point of view of the relation between Stalin and Trotsky which I discussed above, it is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle as may acquire decisive importance.

LENIN.

Jan. 4th 1923.*

** Lenin dictated the first part of this Letter to his secretary Voldicheva on Dec. 24, 1922. The remarks on Pyatakov were dictated to her on Dec. 25. The postscript on Stalin's rudeness and the need to remove him were dictated to Miss Fotieva on Jan. 4, 1923.*

IV. LENIN'S LETTER ON THE ENLISTMENT OF NEW WORKER C. C. MEMBERS TO REFORM THE STATE APPARATUS

The enlargement of the C. C. membership to fifty or even one hundred persons should serve, as I see it, a two- or three-fold purpose; the more C. C. members there are, the more persons will get to know the C. C. work and the smaller will be the danger of a split as a result of taking some careless step. Enlistment of many workers will help improve the efficiency of our apparatus, which is very bad.

Actually we have inherited it from the old regime, because it was entirely impossible for us to reorganize it completely in such a short time, especially during the period of war, or famine, etc. For that reason the "critics," who, in a derogatory or sarcastic manner, point out the defects of our apparatus, can be boldly answered that they have no concept whatever of the conditions of our present revolution.

Effective reorganization of the apparatus within five years has been entirely impossible—especially during the period of the revolution. It is enough that during five years we have managed to create a government of a new type in which the workers at the head of the peasants stand against the bourgeoisie, and this at the time when we are encircled by a hostile world; this was a tremendous accomplishment. This knowledge should not, however, blind us to the fact that it is actually the old apparatus which we have taken over, the apparatus of the Tsar and of the bourgeoisie.

And that now, when we have attained peace and have satisfied our minimal needs, we should devote all our effort toward improving the efficiency of the apparatus. I picture this to myself in this manner; several dozen workers taken into the C. C. machinery will be more able than anyone else to occupy themselves with the control, efficiency and transformation of our apparatus.

It has become clear that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which initially possessed this function, is incapable of performing it and can be used only as an "auxiliary," or, under some conditions, as an assistant of these C. C. members. Workers drawn into the C. C. should, in my opinion, not be recruited from among those who have behind them a long period of service in the Soviet apparatus (in this part of my letter I count the peasants as workers in every case because these workers have acquired certain habits and certain prejudices, which we specifically consider it necessary to combat).

The C. C. staff should be enlisted largely from among the workers

who are below the level of the group which were promoted during the last five years to positions in the Soviet apparatus, and from among those who are close to the common workers and peasants, who are not directly or indirectly in the category of the exploiters. I think that such workers now attending all C. C. meetings, and all Politbureau meetings, and having the opportunity to read all C. C. documents—are capable of creating the cadre of loyal supporters of the Soviet system; they will be able also, firstly, to add to the stability of the C. C. itself, and secondly to work actually on rebuilding the apparatus and making it efficient.*

Dictated to L. F.**

26 XII '22.

V. LENIN'S LETTER ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS TO THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION (GOSPLAN)

This idea was, it seems to me, first put forth by Com. Trotsky. I opposed it, because I considered that in such a case this would introduce a basic inconsistency into the system of our legislative institutions. After a thorough examination of this question, I have nevertheless come to the conclusion that it contains an essentially healthy idea, namely, that Gosplan is somewhat divorced from our legislative institutions despite the fact that, being an assembly of competent individuals, experts and representatives of science and technology, it actually has the most data necessary to assess the situation.

Until now, however, our viewpoint was that Gosplan should deliver to the State carefully compiled materials sufficient for State institutions to decide the affairs of the State. I consider that in the present situation, when governmental affairs have become unusually complicated, when

** This part of Lenin's dying injunctions was eagerly adopted by Josef Stalin. As General Secretary and head of the Orgburo, he was in charge of personnel. It was easy for him to select workers already beholden to and loyal to him and swamp the Central Committee with them. This served but to hasten the upward movement of power from the thenceforth unwieldy Central Committee to the Politburo, Orgburo, Central Control Commission, and General Secretary. Lenin's dogmatic faith was that there was some miraculous power in the plain worker from the bench which would enable the novices to judge among the squabbling intellectuals and professional revolutionaries and bureaucrats who were his heirs, and to decide controversies and squabbles in Lenin's spirit. At every juncture of his fight with his rivals, Stalin used the party machinery to swamp the party with new "Lenin recruitments" of fresh workers, selected for their uncritical devotion to the party as embodied in its machine and its General Secretary.*

*** L. F., initials of Lenin's secretary, L. Fotieva.*

it is continuously necessary to decide questions which require the expert knowledge of Gosplan members, and occasionally questions which do not require such expert knowledge, and, what is more, when it is necessary to decide questions, parts of which do and parts of which do not require such expert knowledge of Gosplan—I consider that at the present time we have to take the step to broaden Gosplan's powers.

I picture to myself this step as follows: Gosplan's decisions cannot be put aside by the regular governmental processes, but require special procedures such as presentation of the matter before a V. Ts. I. K.* session, its preparation in accordance with special instructions, accompanied by special regulations and notes necessary for consideration of whether a given Gosplan decision should be abrogated and finally—the review of Gosplan's decisions should be made at regular and specific intervals, etc.

Com. Trotsky's concurrence in this matter, in my opinion, could and should be obtained, but not as to the assignment to the post of Gosplan chairman of one of our political leaders or the chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, etc. It seems to me that in this question the basic consideration is much too closely tied up with personal considerations. It seems to me that the currently expressed objections to the chairman of Gosplan, Krzhizhanovsky, and his deputy, Pyatakov, are twofold.

On the one hand they are criticized on the grounds that they are too easy-going, that they do not assert themselves, that they lack character, and on the other hand, that they are supposedly too uncouth, that they behave like top sergeants, that they do not have sufficiently solid scientific background, etc. It seems to me that these criticisms encompass two sides of the question pushed to their extremes and that we do need in Gosplan the skillful combination of both of these types, one represented by Pyatakov and the other by Krzhizhanovsky.

In my opinion Gosplan should be headed by a man with scientific background, specifically in technology or agriculture, a man with great practical experience, an experience of several dozen years in the field of technology or agriculture. In my opinion such a man does not need so much administrative ability as wide experience and the ability to lead.

LENIN.

27 XII '22

Dictated to M. V.

* V. Ts. I. K., *All-Union Central Executive Committee*.

VI. LENIN'S SECOND LETTER ON GOSPLAN

I have noted that some of our comrades, who are in positions to affect the affairs of the state in a decisive manner, over-emphasize the administrative side of the question, which at the proper time and place is, of course indispensable, but which, however, should not be erroneously equated with scientific knowledge, with the capacity for knowledge, with the capacity for comprehension of broad realities, with leadership, talent, etc.

Every government institution, and specifically Gosplan requires the happy combination of these two qualities; thus, when Com. Krzhizhanovsky told me that he managed to get Pyatakov for the work in Gosplan and that there was a meeting of minds as to the division of labor—I, giving my consent, felt, deep within me, on the one hand, certain doubts, but conceived, on the other hand, that we might realize the desired combination of the two types of governmental leaders.

Whether my hope was realized—to assess this, we must wait awhile; we must, over a period of time, check this in practice; in principle, however—I think—we cannot doubt that the proper functioning of governmental institutions absolutely requires such a combination of characters and types (men, qualities). In my opinion, in this case, the exaggeration of “administrativeness” is just as harmful as exaggeration generally.

A director of a governmental institution should possess in the highest degree the capacity for leadership and a solid scientific and technical knowledge to the extent needed for checking a person's work. This is essential. Without it no real work can be done. On the other hand, he has to know how to administer and has to have for this purpose a suitable assistant or even assistants. It is doubtful whether we will find the combination of these two qualities in one person; it is equally doubtful whether such a combination is necessary.

LENIN.

Dictated to L. F.
28 XII. 22

VII. LENIN'S THIRD LETTER ON GOSPLAN*

Gosplan, it appears, is being completely transformed into a commission of experts. At the head of this institution there should be a man

** The three letters on the State Planning Commission are really one. As Lenin wearied easily now he dictated the various parts on successive days, alternately to his secretaries, Volodicheva and Fotieva, whose initials are in each case signed to the transcript.*

of great and broad scientific attainments in the field of technology. Administrative ability should be here only a useful adjunct. Gosplan doubtless needs to be to a certain degree independent and self-governing provided only that the employees of this institution are honest and honestly seek to carry out our plan of economic and social construction.

The last quality is found today, of course, only as an exception, because the overwhelming majority of scientists, of which Gosplan is naturally made up, are heavily burdened with bourgeois views and preconceptions. To control these people in this respect should be the task of several individuals who can constitute a Gosplan presidium. These individuals should be Communists and should be checking daily, during the progress of work, to what degree the bourgeois scientists are devoted to the cause, whether they are divesting themselves of their bourgeois prejudices, and also whether they are gradually accepting the Socialist point of view. This twofold activity—scientific control coupled with purely administrative work—is the ideal to which Gosplan leaders in the new republic should aspire.

Is it rational to chop up the work done by Gosplan into separate assignments, or—on the other hand—should we aim at the creation of a permanent band of specialists who would be subject to systematic control by the Gosplan presidium, who could reach decisions as to the entirety of the problems within the scope of Gosplan's activity? In my judgment, the second of the two is more rational and we should make an effort to limit the number of burning and important specific problems.

LENIN

Dictated to M. V.

29. xii. 22

VIII. LENIN'S THIRD LETTER ON THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND USE OF NEW MEMBERS TO REFORM THE APPARATUS

When raising the number of C. C. members, it is necessary, in my opinion, to solve—probably first of all—the problem of control and efficiency of our apparatus, which is good for nothing. For this purpose we should utilize the services of highly qualified specialists; the task of making these specialists available belongs to the workers-peasants inspection.

How the work of these control specialists, who also have sufficient knowledge, is to be co-ordinated with the work of these new C. C.

members—practice should decide. It appears to me that the Workers-Peasants Inspection (as the result of its development and also as the result of doubts in regard to this development) has reached a stage of transition from a separate people's commissariat to the assignment of special functions to C. C. members. This transition is away from an institution which inspects absolutely everything—away from a group consisting only of a few members who are, however, first-class inspectors who have to be well-paid (this is particularly indispensable in our era when everything has to be paid for and in the situation when the inspectors are employed only in those institutions which offer better pay).

If the number of C. C. members is adequately raised and if they attend each year a course on administration of governmental affairs, benefiting from the help of the highly qualified specialists and of the members of the Workers-Peasants Inspection who are highly authoritative in every sphere of activity—then, I think we will successfully solve this problem which has so long evaded solution.

Hence, to sum up: about 100 C. C. members and no more than 400-500 assistants, who, in their capacity as members of the workers-peasants inspection, will conduct checkups in accordance with their directives.

LENIN

29 December 1922

Dictated to M. V.

IX. LETTER OF TRANSMISSION OF LENIN'S LETTERS ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Proletarians of all countries, Unite!

THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) OF RUSSIA

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE BUREAU OF THE SECRETARIAT

No. 12644

16 April 1923

TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE C. C./R. C. P.

On order of Com. Stalin there are sent for the information of C. C. members:

- a. Letter of Com. Trotsky to the C. C. members;
- b. Articles of Com. Lenin on the national question, written at the end of December, 1922;
- c. A letter of Com. Fotieva to Com. Kamenev together with his answer;

- d. A letter of Com. Fotieva to Com. Stalin;
- e. Com Stalin's declaration.

Assistant to the C. C. Secretary,
U. AZARETYAN.

X. TROTSKY'S LETTER TO STALIN ON LENIN'S ARTICLE ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

To All Members of the CC/RCP

I have today received the enclosed copy of a letter from the personal secretary of Com. Lenin, Com. Fotieva, to Com. Kamenev concerning an article of Com. Lenin about the national question.

I had received Com. Lenin's article on 5 March together with three notes of Com. Lenin, copies of which are also enclosed.

I made at that time a copy of this article, as of a document of particularly basic significance and have used it as the basis of my corrections (accepted by Com. Stalin) of Com. Stalin's theses, as well as for my own article on the national question published in Pravda.

This article, as already stated, is of singularly basic significance. It also contains a sharp condemnation of three C. C. members. As long as even a shadow of hope existed that Vladimir Ilyich had left some instruction concerning this article for the party congress, for which it was obviously meant, judging by all signs and especially by Com. Fotieva's note—I avoided bringing this article up.

In the situation which has now arisen—as is also evident from Com. Fotieva's letter—I have no alternative but to make this article known to the Central Committee members, because, in my opinion, this article has no lesser significance from the viewpoint of party policy on the national question than the former article on the question of the relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry.

If—on the basis of motives of an inner-party nature, whose significance is self-evident—no C. C. member will make this article in one or another form known to the party or to the party congress, I, on my part, will consider this as a decision of silence, a decision which—in connection with the party congress—removes from me personal responsibility for this article.

16. IV. 23
No. 199/T

Enclosures: Com Fotieva's letter, three
notes and an article of Com. Lenin.

L. TROTSKY.

Received at 8:10 P. M.

16. IV. 23

Checked for accuracy: E. Lepeshinskaya

XI. LENIN'S ARTICLE ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION.

PART I.*

I have committed, I think, a great offense against the workers of Russia because I have not intervened with sufficient energy and sharpness in the notorious question of 'autonomization,' which is, it seems, officially called the U.S.S.R.

In the summer, when this question arose, I was ill, and then in the autumn, I had great hopes that I would recover and be able to press this matter at the October and December Plenums. However, I was not able to attend either the October Plenum (devoted to this problem) or the December Plenum, and thus the question passed me by almost entirely.

I did manage to talk with Com. Dzerzhinsky, who had come back from the Caucasus and told me how matters stood in Georgia. I also managed to exchange a few words with Com. Zinoviev and express to him my anxiety concerning this question. What I heard from Com. Dzerzhinski, who headed the commission sent by the Central Committee to "investigate" the Georgian incident, only increased my fears. If things have gone so far that Orjonikidze could lose his temper and go so far as to resort to physical force, as was reported to me by Com. Dzerzhinski, then one can imagine the mess we have gotten into. Apparently the whole enterprise of "autonomization" was fundamentally incorrect and inopportune.

It is said that we need a single unified apparatus. But where do these assertions come from? Is it not from the same Russian apparatus, which, as I observed in one of the previous numbers of my diary,** was taken over from Tsarism and only thinly anointed with Soviet holy oil?

Undoubtedly we should have waited to take this measure until we could vouch for the apparatus as being our very own. At present, we must in all conscience state the opposite: what we call ours is an apparatus that is still thoroughly alien to us, representing a bourgeois

* *Had his disciples not suppressed them, Lenin's three related articles on the Nationalities Problem and the Question of Autonomization would have made up the last, and some of the most important pages in Vol. XXXIII (the last volume of articles) of Lenin's Collected Works. The article was first printed, in incomplete form, in Sotsialisticheski Vestnik, Berlin, Dec. 1923. When Lenin sent it to Trotsky, the latter made a copy of it, now in the Trotsky Archives at the Harvard Library, and later quoted part of it in his life of Stalin, published posthumously and uncompleted because of Trotsky's assassination. Richard Pipes published the first complete English translation in The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 273-7. I have made a fresh translation.*

** *From time to time Lenin would publish observations on some problem under the general title of "Pages from a Diary."*

Tsarist mechanism which we have had no chance to conquer during the past five years, in the absence of help from [a revolution in] other countries, and in view of the overriding pressures of the 'business' of war and the struggle against famine.

Under such circumstances it is quite obvious that the "freedom to withdraw from the Union," with which we justify ourselves, will prove to be nothing but a scrap of paper, incapable of defending the minorities in Russia from the incursions of that hundred percent Russian, the Great-Russian, the chauvinist, in reality, the scoundrel and despoiler which the typical Russian bureaucrat is. There can be no doubt that the insignificant percentage of Soviet and sovietized workers will drown in this Great-Russian sea of chauvinist riff-raff like a fly in milk.

It is said in defense of this measure* that the People's Commissariats which deal with matters of national feeling and national education are autonomous. But here the question arises whether it is possible to keep these Commissariats fully separate [from the control of the Center] and whether we have shown enough concern in adopting measures really to defend the people of the other nationalities from the truly Russian *Derzhimorda*.** I think we have failed to take such measures as we should and could have taken.

I think that a fatal role was played here by Stalin's haste and administrative impulsiveness, and also by his spiteful attitude towards the much talked of "social nationalism."*** Spitefulness in general plays the worst possible role in politics.

I am afraid that Com. Dzerzhinsky also, when he went to the Caucasus to investigate the case of the 'crimes' of these "social nationalists," distinguished himself there only by his one-hundred percent Russian attitude (it is common knowledge that the Russified non-Russian always likes to exaggerate when it comes to 100% Russian attitudes). The impartiality of the entire commission is sufficiently characterized by Orjonikidze's 'achievements' in the use of force. I think that no provocation and no offense can justify such deeds, and

* Presumably the formation of the unified, centralized Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

** A character in Gogol's Inspector General, whose very name is a symbol of a narrow and domineering police mentality.

*** What Khrushchev in his speech designates as the Communist deviation of "bourgeois nationalism"—"social" because its adherent believes in socialism, and "national" because he also believes in some measure of national autonomy. Lenin had set the example in the coining of such terms by his invention of "social chauvinism," "social pacifism," "social patriotism," etc. for socialists whose views on the first World War did not coincide with his program of "defeat for your own government," shortened to "revolutionary defeatism."

that Com. Dzerzhinsky has committed an irreparable offense by treating such deeds lightly.

To all other citizens of the Caucasus, Orjonikidze represented the government. Orjonikidze had no right to display the temper with which both he and Dzerzhinsky have attempted to excuse themselves. Quite the contrary, Orjonikidze was duty bound to show a degree of self-control not obligatory for the ordinary citizen, still less for one who is accused of a 'political crime.' After all, the 'social nationalists' were actually citizens accused of a political crime, as the entire background shows.

With this we come to an important question of principle: what should we understand by internationalism.

LENIN.

XII. LENIN'S ARTICLE ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION. PART II.

I have already written in my works on the national question that an abstract formulation of the question of nationalities in general is worthless. It is necessary to distinguish between the nationalism of an oppressing nation and the nationalism of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a great nation and the nationalism of a small nation.

In regard to the second type of nationalism, we the nationals of a great nation almost always in historical practice are guilty of an endless amount of oppression, and, what is more, are unconscious of the fact that we commit an endless number of acts of coercion and abuse. I need only recall my own experiences on the Volga to show how we treat non-Russians with contempt: always referring to a Pole as a *Polyachishka*, invariably ridiculing a Tartar by calling him *Prince*, a Ukrainian by calling him *khokhol*, a Georgian or other Caucasian by calling them *kapkazski*.*

For that reason, internationalism on the part of the oppressor or so-called 'great' nation (even though it be great only in the violence of its oppression, great only as a *Derzhimorda* is great) must consist not merely in a formal assertion of equality among nations but in such inequality by which the oppressing great nation compensates for that

* *Polyachishka* is a derogatory diminutive of *Pole*; *Prince* is a mocking reference to the survival of numerous titles of tribal nobility among some of the smaller Tartar peoples; *khokhol* refers to the topknot or special hardt once prevalent among Ukrainian Cossacks; *kapkazski* is a deliberate and mocking mispronunciation of the Russian word for *Caucasian*.

inequality which actually exists in life. He who does not understand that does not understand the genuine proletarian attitude towards the national question. Actually, he retains a petit-bourgeois approach and cannot fail to slip constantly into the bourgeois attitude.

What is important for the proletariat? For the proletariat it is not only important but indispensable to win from the other nationalities the maximum of trust for the proletarian class struggle. And what is needed for that? What is needed is more than a formal equality. What is needed is to compensate in one way or another by one's treatment of or concessions to the other nationalities for that distrust, that suspicion, those insults which were inflicted upon them in the past by the government of the 'great-power' nation.

I should think that for a Bolshevik, for a Communist, it is not necessary to explain this further. And I think that in this instance, in regard to the Georgian nation, we have a typical case in which the proletarian attitude requires of us that we be extremely careful, courteous and generous.

A Georgian who adopts a scornful attitude towards this side of the matter, who scornfully accuses others of 'social nationalism' (when he is himself not only a real and authentic 'social nationalist,' but also a brutal Great-Russian *Derzhimorda*), that Georgian actually violates the interests of proletarian class solidarity. For nothing so hinders the development and consolidation of proletarian class solidarity as much as national injustice. The members of an oppressed nationality are not as sensitive to any other thing as they are to the feeling of equality and its violation by their proletarian comrades—even if this violation be only through carelessness or in the form of an insensitive jest. That is why in such cases it is better to lean over backwards and be overly generous and indulgent towards national minorities rather than not enough.

That is why in this case the fundamental interests of proletarian struggle as well, require that we should always and unflinchingly take into account the indispensable difference which should exist in the relationship of the proletariat of an oppressed (or small) nation and the proletariat of the oppressor (or great) nation.

LENIN.

Dictated to M. V.

31/XII/22.

Checked for accuracy: Lepeshinskaya.

XIII. LENIN'S ARTICLE ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION. PART III.

What practical measures should be taken in the situation which has developed?

First, we should retain and strengthen the Union of Socialist Republics; there can be no doubt about this. We need this as the Communist proletariat of the whole world needs it in the fight with the international bourgeoisie and in the defense against its machinations.

Second, we should retain the Union of Socialist Republics in regard to the diplomatic apparatus. It should be mentioned here that this apparatus is quite exceptional in the governmental apparatus. We excluded everyone from the old Czarist apparatus who formerly had even the slightest influence. Here, the whole apparatus, insofar as it possesses the slightest influence, has been made up of Communists. For this reason this apparatus has acquired for itself (we can boldly say) the reputation of a Communist apparatus which has been tested and cleansed of the old Tsarist bourgeois and petty bourgeois apparatus to a degree incomparably higher than that attained in the apparatus with which we have to be satisfied in the other people's commissariats.

Third, Comrade Orjonikidze has to be punished as an example (I say this with regret, the more so because I myself belong to the circle of his friends and worked with him abroad, in the emigration); it is also necessary to examine again or anew all the materials of the Dzherzhinsky commission in order to correct that great mass of injustices and of biased judgments, definitely contained in them. Political responsibility for this whole truly Great-Russian nationalistic campaign should be placed squarely on Stalin and Dzherzhinsky.

Fourth, we should introduce the most rigorous rules concerning the use of the national language in the republics of other nations which are members of our union; and we should insure the most meticulous observance of these rules. There is no doubt that under the pretext of the unity of railway service, under the pretext of fiscal unity, etc., a great number of abuses of the essentially Russian type will occur. To fight these abuses an exceptional ingenuity is needed, in addition to the special integrity required of those who will devote themselves to this fight.

We will need here a detailed code which can be compiled, with some degree of success, only by the nationals residing in a given republic. While we do this, this does not exclude our considering at the next congress of Soviets the return to the former situation, i.e., that we will

retain the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics only in the sphere of military affairs and diplomacy, while in other matters each of the people's commissariats will have full independence restored to it.

We should keep in mind that the split of the people's commissariats and the lack of coordination of their work in relation to Moscow and to other centers can be overcome to a sufficient degree with the authority of the party provided this authority is used with a more or less satisfactory circumspection and impartiality. The harm to our state which could result from lack of unity of the national apparatuses with the Russian apparatus will be incomparably smaller, infinitely smaller, than that other harm to us and also to the whole international, to the hundreds of millions of the nations of Asia, who, treading in our footsteps, are expected in the nearest future to appear on the stage of history.

It would be unforgivable opportunism if we, on the eve of this emergence of the East and in the dawn of its awakening, would undermine in its eyes our authority even through the smallest tactlessness toward and injustice against our own members of other races. The necessity of solidarity against the imperialism of the West, which is defending the capitalist world, is a different matter. Here, there is no doubt and I need not say that I praise these measures without any qualification. It is another thing, however, when we see that we ourselves generate an imperialistic outlook in relations with the oppressed nationalities, even if it concerns only insignificant points. This undermines completely our whole sincerity of principle and the whole principle of our defense of the fight against imperialism. And tomorrow in the history of the world will be precisely that day when the decisive, long and hard fight for their liberation will begin.

LENIN.

31. XII. 22

Checked for accuracy: Lepshinskaya

XIV. LENIN'S LAST LETTER—TO LEON TROTSKY
ASKING HIM TO DEFEND THE GEORGIANS
AGAINST STALIN AND DZERZHINSKY*

Copy from a *copy for eyes only*

TOP SECRET

Dear Com. Trotsky.

I ask you urgently to undertake the defense of the Georgia case in

** If this had not been suppressed it would have been the final letter in Volume XXXV (Letters) of Lenin's works. It is, so far as we know, the last letter Lenin ever dictated or wrote.*

the C.C. of the party. This case is at present "being shot at" by Stalin and Dzerzhinsky and I cannot count on their objectivity. Quite the contrary. If you should agree to undertake the defense of that case, I would be at ease. If you can not for some reason agree to do this, please return to me all the materials. This will be for me the sign of your refusal.

Hearty party greetings,

LENIN.

Dictated to M. V.

5 March '23

Checked for accuracy: M. Volodicheva

To Comrade Trotsky.

Vladimir Ilyich asked me that, in addition to the letter whose content you were given by telephone, I should inform you that Com. Kamenev is going to Georgia on Wednesday; V. I. wants to know if you would not want to send there something from yourself.

5 March '23

M. VOLODICHEVA.

XV. CORRESPONDENCE OF FOTIEVA, KAMENEV, AND STALIN ON LENIN'S LAST ARTICLE

The Letter of Com. Fotieva to Com. Kamenev, Copy to Com. Trotsky Lev Borisovich:

I am transmitting to you, as the acting chairman of the Political Bureau, the following which is pertinent to our telephone conversation.

As I have already informed you: on 31. XII. 22, Vladimir Ilyich dictated an article concerning the nationality question.

He was greatly interested in this question and was himself preparing to present this question to the party congress.

Shortly before his last illness he informed me that he would publish this article, but after that he took ill and made no final arrangements.

V. I. considered his article as a document of guidance and attached great importance to it. On the order of Vladimir Ilyich this article was transmitted to Com. Trotsky to whom V. I. entrusted the defense of his position on this question at the party congress because they have both held identical views in this matter.

The only copy of this article which I have is preserved at V. I.'s order in his secret archive.

I am transmitting this for your information.

Personal secretary to Com. Lenin.

16. IV. 23

L. FOTIEVA.

Checked for accuracy: E. Lepeshinskaya.

Answer of Com. Kamenev to the C. C. Secretariat

Only a moment ago, at 35 minutes after 5, I received the enclosed note from Com. Fotieva. I am sending this note to the C. C. because it contains nothing which pertains to me personally. In my opinion the C. C. should immediately decide affirmatively the question of publishing the article of Vladimir Ilyich.

L. KAMENEV.

Checked for correctness E. Lepeshinskaya.

16. IV. 23

5:45.

The Letter of Com. Fotieva

Com. Stalin,

I have today sought the advice of Mariya Ilyinishna* on the question whether Vladimir Ilyich's article which I sent to you should be published because of the fact that Vladimir Ilyich had expressed the intent to publish it in connection with a speech which he intended to make at the congress.

From my point of view I need only to add that V. I. did not consider this article to be in its final form and ready for the printer.

L. FOTIEVA.

16. IV. 23

9 o'clock in the evening

XVI. STALIN'S DECLARATION SUPPRESSING LENIN'S LAST ARTICLE.**

The Declaration of Com. Stalin Transmitted to C. C. Members

I am greatly surprised that the articles of Com. Lenin which, without a doubt, are of a distinct basic significance, and which Com. Trotsky received as early as 5 March of this year—he has considered admissible to keep his own secret for over a month without making their content known to the Political Bureau or to the C. C. plenum, until one day before the opening of the Twelfth Congress of the party. The theme of these articles—as I was informed today by the congress delegates—is the subject of discussion and rumors and stories among the

* *Lenin's younger sister.*

** *In his decision to suppress Lenin's last article Stalin was supported by Zinoviev, Kamenev and a majority of the "Leninist Politburo and Central Committee." Trotsky out of false pride or false tactics was silent on this question at the Congress. Of the Politburo members only Bukharin openly backed the Georgian (and Ukrainian) Oppositions that Lenin had planned to defend.*

delegates; these articles, as I have learned today, are known to people who have nothing in common with the C. C.; the C. C. members themselves must seek information from these rumors and stories, while it is self-evident that the content of these articles should have been reported first of all to the C. C.

I think that Com. Lenin's articles should be published in the press. Only it is regrettable that—as is clearly evident from Com. Fotieva's letter—these articles apparently cannot be published because they have not been reviewed by Com. Lenin.

J. STALIN.

10 o'clock P. M.

16. IV. 23.

APPENDIX B

“A PARTY OF A NEW TYPE.”

(Some Comments on the Nature of the Bolshevik Party)

Back in 1900, when Lenin was thirty, he joined with two men of his own generation and three veterans twenty to thirty years their senior to set up the journal *Iskra* (“The Spark”—“*Out of the spark shall come the flame.*”)

All six editors, by their own reckoning, were “Orthodox Marxists.” Their first concern was to refute and rout all the other socialist currents to make their own brand of orthodoxy the foundation of a Social Democratic Party which their journal was to help bring into being.

For the long run their enemy was the Autocracy, and, for the still longer run, capitalism. But their immediate concern was to dispose of the other socialist currents: those socialists who thought that the economic improvement of the lot of the workers should take precedence over politics; those socialists who reckoned that the peasants were part of “the people” as much as the workers were; the “Revisionists,” who held that Marx’s generalizations made on the basis of nineteenth century observations were badly in need of open-minded reexamination; and all the other varieties of social reformers and revolutionaries whom they thought of as heterodox.

All six were in varying degrees dogmatic, self-righteous and doctrinaire. But in this respect, as they were all to realize in time, Lenin was in a class by himself. In the end he was to break with them all, both his masters and teachers, and his

contemporaries, and to consider that his own views on all matters large and small were the only true orthodoxy.

From the first he distinguished himself even from the acidly polemical and intolerant Plekhanov, his revered Master, by the bitterness of his polemics against the other varieties of socialism. The editorial statement which he drafted for the first issue declared: "Before we can unite . . . we must firmly and definitely draw lines of separation." The first programmatic pamphlet he wrote in the name of the little band carried on its fly-leaf the ominous words: "A party becomes stronger by purging itself!" And this for a party that had not yet been born!

His five comrades thought of *Iskra* as a journal which was to serve the nascent movement and give it "ideological clarity." But Lenin, as every article from his pen made clear, thought of it as a "Central Organ" which was to lead, guide, dominate, and control the movement. It was to be "a collective organizer," and set up a "network of agents" who would become the "officers' cadres" of a future party. The Center would appoint men of its confidence for each locality. They in turn would pick men of their confidence, subject to the "confirmation of the Center."

This whole apparatus would consist not of workingmen who continued to work at their trades and engage in politics as one of their spare time activities. They were to be men who made politics and revolution their full-time profession: professional revolutionaries," devoting to the revolution "the whole of their lives." They were to be as professional in the stimulating of disorder as the secret police in the maintaining of order.

Indeed, there were to be a kind of underground counterpart of the police, subject to strict military discipline. So far, wrote Lenin, "our military detachments consist mainly of volunteers and rebels. We have but a few detachments of regular troops, and even these are not mobilized, not linked up with each other, not trained to form any sort of military column, still less storm troop or shocktroop columns. . ."

There was poetry and imagination in this audacious con-

ception of the role of an obscure underground paper, published abroad and smuggled into the country in handfull. In the whole history of journalism, no other paper had been assigned so vast a role. Lenin's concern from the start with organization technique and power levers caused him to take care personally to name the secret agents, personally to bind them to him, and to have his own wife named secretary to carry on all the correspondence with the Russian underground. But even if he had not shown a greater concern for the apparatus side of their paper, his large conception of the role of its "network of agents" would have been sufficient to attract that network to him. Already at this early date, the second youngest man on the editorial board had begun to sign his letters to his agents and admirers with the pseudonym, *Starik* ("The Old Man").

The paper was to be the creator of a unified movement. But as we have seen, to Lenin "unification" had a special meaning. It meant exclusion of difference (it was Lenin who eventually substituted for the rational word, *difference*, the theological-emotional word, *deviation*). It meant ideological uniformity and ideological subordination of all the units and members to the center, the paper whose Editorial Board was "to guard the purity of doctrine." Lenin proposed that the journal should set up an Organization Committee (called by its Russian initials the O.K. for short) to control the movement, instead of the movement setting up its own committees to determine its own affairs and control its journal.

The Russian O.K.—he wrote to his fellow editor, Martov—must act with care in *all* matters . . . but must *take a stand* that will be arch-important and arch-strict, i.e. such that the Russian OK directs everybody and that no one in the party should be able to do *anything* of a general party importance except by order of the Russian Organization Committee. . . . *Either* recognition of the *present* OK and *submission* to it, *or else* war. *Tertium non datur*.*

* "Arch-important and arch-strict are no better Russian than they are English, but they are characteristic of Lenin's style which I am trying to follow closely. I have not wished to clutter up the brief appendices with a multitude of footnotes, but all the quotations used so far can be found in Volume IV (English and Russian) of the Third Edition, and in Volumes IV and V of the Fourth Russian Edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*. I have analysed their meaning in more detail in the Chapter on "Lenin's Organization Plan" in *Three Who Made a Revolution*.

Either submission to the leading committee in everything, or war. That would seem to be the *nec plus ultra* of discipline. But when, within two years five out of six editors voted against him, Lenin had no thought of submission. It was he who declared war!

Others might think that the first need of a still unborn party was a full and free discussion of principles and of the realities and possibilities of the Russian scene. But to the six orthodox editors all that had already been settled by Marx and Engels, and by the Russian polemics of their chief theoretician, Plekhanov. And when the most self-righteous of the six came to differ with the other five, even with Plekhanov, it seemed to him that the rights and wrongs of their differences had already been settled by him in his articles in *Iskra*.

From the start his articles referred back to each other and built upon each other to expound a selfconsistent set of doctrines that were unique in the history of socialist thought. They were to constitute the great divide between Lenin and the other Marxists.

Most interesting and important of these special views were his fundamentally undemocratic conception of the workers and peasants as classes incapable of understanding their "true interests" and "historic role," hence incapable of ruling their own destinies.

First Lenin began on the peasants, towards whom he had a prejudice shared by most Marxist socialists. Because it was the dream of the peasant to till his own soil and not work for feudal lord, landowner, or state but for himself, Lenin set him down as *petit-bourgeois*. Any socialism which looked upon the peasantry as part of the toiling people destined to share in the rule of the future democratic socialist society, was no socialism at all, but "inevitably bourgeois" because it did not base itself exclusively on the industrial proletariat, "the only class which can act as an independent fighter for socialism."

But after 1900, the *Iskra* period Lenin added the startling new idea that the working class, too, "left to itself," could not possibly attain to consciousness of its own true interests and historic destiny. At best it might attain to a "narrow trade

union consciousness" concerned with the mere improvement of its lot under capitalism. This spelled inevitable "subordination of the workers to the bourgeoisie." It condemned the working class to "become petty and inevitably bourgeois."

What class then was to become the fountain-head and source of socialist ideas and activities? No class at all, but a special classless elite, recruited primarily from the bourgeois intelligentsia, or that section of it which might master the recondite doctrines of socialism, then cut loose from the bourgeoisie and existing society, and become professional revolutionaries living in the twilight world of outlawry. These would provide for the "most revolutionary class" the ideas, activities and leadership which it could not possibly attain if "left to itself."

This is the characteristic and distinguishing Leninist dogma, at once organizational and ideological in its implications: the idea of the classless elite or vanguard party.

It was to be a self-constituted and self-designated vanguard. It would establish its right to be "*the*" vanguard by defeating and destroying all competitor ideologies and organizations, and securing leadership over the working class. By its discipline, by its mastery of esoteric doctrine, by its activity and devotion, by its ability to penetrate the organizations of the workers and to capture positions of leadership, by its ability to set them in motion and stir them up against the state, this self-appointed vanguard or elite would become the guardians and leaders of the party, of the class and the people as a whole, and eventually, the guardians of the state.

If the first dogma of the incompetence of the peasantry contained hidden in it the germ of a minority proletarian dictatorship over the majority of the Russian people, i.e. the peasants;* the second dogma contained within it the germ of the future party dictatorship *over* the proletariat itself, exercised in its "true" interests and in its name.

* Even after 40 years of "proletarian rule" and the titanic industrialization of five five-year plans, the industrial proletariat is still today a minority in Russia, even if we add to it the concentration camp proletariat. The peasantry is still the largest class in Russia.

With tireless explicitness Lenin repeated this arrogant doctrine of the eternal immaturity of the working class and its eternal need of a board of self-appointed guardians, a self-declared vanguard sharing Lenin's every view and made in the image of Lenin's doctrine. Whole chapters of his *What's to Be Done?* spell it out in detail. He let no chance slip to reiterate it. Thus when the "unifying" Congress was finally convened in 1903, Lenin attacked the program committee for saying in the program that, as the contradictions inherent in capitalism grew, "the consciousness of the proletariat" would grow, too. This, said Lenin, was false and heretical, because it implied that "the development of class consciousness is a spontaneous thing. . . . Aside from the influence of the Social Democracy, there is no *conscious* activity of the workers."

Time would show that this was no pedantry, but the very core of Leninism, of the Leninist conception of a "party of a new type." As the belittling of the role of the worker and the peasant in determining or understanding their own destiny spelled a rejection of democracy and an insistence on the dictatorship of the party over all classes in the name of one of them, so the rejection of "spontaneous" development signified a belief in the need of rigid controls by the masters of the "scientific truth" or "doctrine."

The peculiar dilemma Lenin faced was the fact that he had inherited from Marxism a tendency to exalt the workingman above all other elements in society as the bearer of progress, the chosen instrument of history, the embodiment of the consciousness of man's most urgent need, the future ruler of society. But Lenin solved this simply enough. The class might not know enough to accept its leadership, but the party was "the vanguard of the class." When it spoke it spoke for the working class. Its voice was the "true," indeed the "only" voice of the workers.

This explains Lenin's fury towards all other parties claiming to be socialist or working class. It explains his zeal to prove that their doctrines were not merely wrong, but "bourgeois" or "petit-bourgeois"—"expressions of an alien class." When

opposition or difference arose within his own party, he took the same fanatical care to demonstrate that it was not mere difference but "deviation," not mere wrong-headedness or error but *wrong-classness*, a "bourgeois or petit-bourgeois deviation," an "expression of the views of an alien class." This explains, too, his readiness to outlaw all other parties, especially those containing working class membership and claiming to speak as socialists in the name of that class. It explains, too, why he ended up by outlawing all factions in his own party. When one of these factions opposing his methods of ruling Russia called itself the *Workers Opposition* and actually rallied great numbers of worker Communists, its fate was sealed. And with it the fate of all factions and oppositions in his party.

From this Leninist dogma flowed his high and mighty attitude towards the trade unions and their struggle. As "inevitably narrow and petit-bourgeois" in their ideology and activity, they were organizations to be penetrated or infiltrated; infested with disciplined fractions of the "vanguard," which set the interests of the party above the interests of the union itself; to be conquered, utilized, manipulated, split, as the interests of the Board of Guardians and Keepers of the Workers' Consciousness might dictate.

From this doctrine of a classless elite or vanguard of professional revolutionaries would flow, too, the possibility that one day a party of bureaucrats, officials, technicians, administrators, managers, ideological manipulators, army officers and officers of the secret police could, without grinning, pronounce itself "the party of the working class."

When Khrushchev told the Twentieth Congress that there might be various paths by which the working class might come to power, he hastened to add that

the indispensable and decisive condition of all forms of transition to socialism is the political leadership of the working class by its advanced detachment. Without this condition the transition to socialism is impossible.

And when *Pravda* set forth as it did in its leading article of

July 6, 1956, that “Lenin’s immortal service is the creation of a Marxist party of a new type,” it was right indeed, for this is what it had in mind. Lest any one miss the true meaning of “a Marxist party of a new type,” the same article declared:

the Communist party has been, is, and will be, the only master of the minds, the only expresser of the thoughts and hopes, the only leader and organizer of the people.

There could be no better statement of the core of Leninism.

Since whatever the self-appointed vanguard may say or do is the expression of the true interests and true future destiny of the workingclass, it no longer mattered to Lenin, as it had seemed to matter to Marx, that the working class should first become numerous, mature, a majority in society in a mature capitalist economy. The party of a new type might make a “proletarian revolution” of a new type.

Why might not a classless elite take power in a backward country in the name of an immature and still numerically weak and intellectually backward working class, then use its power to create modern industry and a numerous proletariat, into which it would inject consciousness and on which it might impose the necessity to obey the guardians of science and doctrine and hearken to the true voice of the class?

What has been done in Communist China, where the workmen are a tiny isle submerged in a peasant sea, or in Vietminh, where the proletariat is not even existent in embryo, is but the carrying of Lenin’s dogma to its logical absurdity.

APPENDIX C

LENINIST NORMS OF PARTY LIFE.

(Some Milestones from Lenin's Writings)

1. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A POLICE RAID WHICH HAD SEIZED THE MEMBERS OF A COMMITTEE HE DID NOT CONTROL.

And so your task now is to create out of *yourselves* a committee to prepare the Congress, to admit the Bundist into the Committee (after sizing him up *from all angles*—note this well), to push your people onto as many local committees as possible, taking the utmost care of yourself and your people until the Congress. All this extremely important. Remember this! Be wise as serpents; and as gentle (with committees, the Bund and Petersburg) as doves.

(Letter to Lengnik, May 23, 1902, Collected Works, Third Edition, Vol. XXVIII, p. 139; omitted from the Fourth Edition.)

2. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AS FIST.

Delegate Popov: The Central Committee as a guiding spirit, omnipresent and one . . .

Lenin interrupting: Not spirit but *fist!*

Protocols of the Second Congress, 1903, p. 241.

3. FIGHTING WITH POISONED WEAPONS.

My words were calculated to evoke hatred, aversion and contempt . . . not to convince but to break up the ranks of the opponent, not to correct an opponent's mistake, but to destroy him, to wipe his organization off the face of the earth. This formulation is indeed of such a

nature as to evoke the worst thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent. And indeed, as contrasted with a formulation that would convince and correct, it does 'carry confusion into the ranks of the proletariat.' . . .

A split means a shifting of the struggle of ideas . . . from the ground of correcting and persuading comrades to that of destroying their organization, to the ground of inciting the masses of the workers (and of people generally) against the separated organization. . . . It is wrong to write about party comrades in language that systematically spreads among the working masses hatred, aversion, contempt, etc. for those holding differing opinions. But *one may and must write* in that strain about a separated organization.

Why must one? Because when a split has taken place it is one's duty to *wrest* the masses from the leadership of the seceded section. I am told: 'You carried confusion into the ranks of the proletariat.' My answer is: I purposely and deliberately carried confusion into the ranks of that section of the Petersburg proletariat which followed the Mensheviks . . . and *I shall always act that way whenever a split . . . occurs*. . . . Against such political enemies I then conducted—and in the event of a repetition and development of a split, *I shall always conduct* a fight of extermination. . . .

It is said: fight, but not with poisoned weapons. That is a very pretty and striking expression, that there is no denying. But it is either a pretty and empty phrase, or it expresses in a mushy and vaguely confused and unclear form the self-same thought concerning a struggle which spreads hatred, aversion, and contempt among the masses against an opponent—concerning the kind of struggle that is impermissible in a united party but indispensable in the case of a split. . . .

Are there any limits to the permissible in a struggle on the basis of a split? There are no limits set by party standards in such a struggle, nor can there be. . . . The limits to the methods of struggle in the case of a split are not party limits but general political limits, or rather even more than that, general civic limits, the limits of the criminal code and not another thing. . . .

Comrade judges, by your decision in my case you will in a large measure determine . . . whether there will be a new split, and as a result, a new struggle with poisoned weapons.

From Lenin's Defense before a Party Tribunal when charged with "Using Language Impermissible in a Party Member" in a Party Fight. (Vol. XII, pp. 378-389.)

4. LENIN INTRODUCES POLICE DEPORTATION.

(Description by Yurenev.)

I wish to touch on one more method of running our party . . . a method that has been raised to a system: the system of deportation, of exile in various forms. One goes off to Christiania, another they send to the Urals, a third to Siberia. . . . We read how the Norwegian workers are welcoming Shlyapnikov with warmth—but it is no secret why he wandering around Norway instead of being here at the Congress. (*Laughter.*)

From the speech of Yurenev against Lenin's increasingly Dictatorial Methods of Running the Party, delivered at the Ninth Congress (March, 1920).

5. THE REMEDY FOR THE FEVER OF DISCUSSION IS PROHIBITION OF "IMPERMISSIBLE" DISCUSSIONS.

The party is sick. The party is being shaken by a fever. . . .

The formation of various groups (especially before a Congress), is of course permissible (and to make a drive for votes also). But this must be done within the limits of Communism (and not syndicalism) and be done in such a way that it does not arouse laughter. . . .

The sickness in our party, without doubt the capitalists of the Entente will try to use for a new crusade, and the SR's (Social Revolutionaries) for the development of conspiracies and uprisings.

From a pamphlet by Lenin, first published in Pravda of Jan. 21, 1921, as Discussion Material in preparation for the Tenth Congress. The "Syndicalist Deviation" was the Workers Opposition. Its chief leader was the Metal Worker, Shlyapnikov, who had been Lenin's main party organizer during the war. The "Syndicalist" demand was that the Program of the Party drafted by Lenin and adopted in March 1919 should be put into life so far as point 5 in the Economic Field was concerned. Point 5 read: "The Unions should achieve the actual concentration in their hands of the entire direction of the entire national economy as a unified economic whole."

(Text in Lenin: Collected Works, Third Russian Edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 701.)

This was Lenin's first attempt to distinguish between "permissible" and "impermissible" discussions and groupings, and to use systematically the doctrine that any opposition within the

single monopoly party was a comfort to encircling capitalism and outlawed parties.

6. TIME TO PUT THE LID ON THE OPPOSITIONS.

We have lost enough time in discussion. And I must say that now to 'discuss with rifles' is much better than with theses such as are being brought in by the Workers Opposition. We don't need an opposition now, comrades, this is not the time for it! Either here—or there: with a rifle and not with the Opposition. . . . We have no use for an opposition now, comrades! And I think it necessary for the Congress to draw that conclusion: that for the opposition it is finished now, the lid is on, now we have had enough of opposition! . . . If they continue to play at opposition, then the party must expel them from its ranks.

Lenin to the Tenth Congress, March 9, 1921 (Vol. XXXII, p. 177). Lenin opened the Congress with the words: "This is the first time that we are meeting in a Congress without any hostile armies on the territory of the Soviet Republic." The "rifle" that Lenin was talking about was to be used against the Kronstadt sailors, and despite his words, the Workers Opposition had compromised their own stand for workers' democracy by supplying more than their proportionate share of armed delegates for the attack on the Kronstadt sailors, whose chief demand was Soviet democracy.

7. LENIN INVENTS THE TERM, DEVIATION, SUBSTITUTING IT FOR DIFFERENCE, AND GIVES A GENTLY MENACING DEFINITION.

. . . when classes still exist, when the remnants of the bourgeoisie are observable in all the crevices of our life, inside Soviet institutions—under such circumstances the appearance among us of platforms with theses such as I have read to you represents an obvious and clear anarcho-syndicalist deviation. These words are not extreme. They have been carefully thought out. A deviation is not yet a finished current. A deviation is something which can be corrected. People have gotten a little off the road, or are beginning to leave the road, but setting them right is still possible. This, in my opinion, is just what is expressed by the Russian word *uklon* [deviation]. This emphasizes the fact that here there is as yet not something final, that the affair can be easily corrected: it is the desire to warn, and to raise the problem in all its sweep

and as a matter of principle. If any one can find a Russian word that better expresses this thought, please!

Lenin to the Tenth Congress, March 16, 1921 (Vol. XXXII, pp. 227-8).

8. LENIN'S METHOD OF "IDEOLOGICAL" STRUGGLE.

On the basis of all the above, the Congress of the RKP [Russian Communist Party], decisively rejecting the indicated ideas in which a syndicalist and anarchist deviation are expressed, recognizes as necessary:

First, undeviatingly and systematically an ideological war against these ideas;

Second, the Congress recognizes the advocacy of these views as incompatible with membership in the RKP.

Lenin's Draft of a Resolution for the Tenth Congress (Vol. XXXII, p. 224).

To this Lenin added a secret annex, adopted on the last day of the Congress with a number of Workers Opposition delegates already sent off on "special missions," providing that members elected to the Central Committee by a Congress could be expelled by the Central Committee without reference to another Congress. Shlyapnikov refused to run for the Central Committee but was drafted under discipline, and then, shortly after, Lenin called for his expulsion.

9. "DISCUSSION" WITH THE KRONSTADT SAILORS.

Lenin told the Tenth Congress in a frank and unguarded moment that the sailors of Kronstadt, who had once lifted him to power, and to whom he had threatened to appeal against his own Central Committee, "do not want the White Guards, but they do not want our power either." But when he sent troops and armed Congress delegates against them, he branded them as "counter-revolutionary and White Guardist."

Vol. XXXII, p. 204.

10. "DISCUSSION" WITH THE OTHER WORKERS PARTIES.

Contrary to Khrushchev's statement that Lenin had recourse to "the severest measures" only while the Civil War was on, it was only when the Civil War ended that he permitted himself to outlaw groups in his party, break the freedom-loving spirit of the Kronstadt sailors by

frameup and force of arms, and outlaw the Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries and Anarchists who supported the Soviet regime, and contended with the Bolsheviks in Soviet elections. The Mensheviks provided both officers and troops during the Civil War and war with Poland; twenty Mensheviks worked in the military administration during the Civil War; the speech of their leader, Martov, supporting the Soviet Government in the Polish War, was published in various languages by the Comintern. There was an alliance with the Anarcho-Communist armies of Nestor Makhno until they had jointly beaten Denikin and Wrangel, after which Makhno's principal leaders were shot and he narrowly escaped to flee abroad. In 1921, Lenin put the new line in these words:

Non-party conferences are no fetish. They are valuable when they help us to get nearer to the masses who have not yet been touched. . . . But they are harmful if they give a platform to the Mensheviks and SR's disguised as 'non-party.' . . . For Mensheviks and SR's, whether open or disguised as non-party, the proper place is in prison . . . not at non-party conferences.

(Vol. XXXII, pp. 340-1.) For a documentation of the above statements, see Leonard Schapiro: The Origin of the Communist Autocracy (New York, 1955), Chapters X and XI.

11. RETREAT IS A TIME FOR THE MACHINE GUN.

a. For the Mensheviks.

Precisely at such a time, the most important thing is to retreat in good order, to fix the precise limits of retreat, and not give way to panic. And when the Menshevik says: 'You are now (in the NEP) retreating . . . I agree with you . . . let us retreat together,' we reply: 'For the public advocacy of Menshevism our revolutionary courts must pass sentence of death, otherwise they are not our courts but God knows what.'

. . . (when) the Mensheviks say, '. . . We have always said what you are saying now; permit us to repeat it again,' we say in reply, 'Permit us to put you up against the wall. . . .'

Report of Lenin to the Eleventh Congress, March 27, 1922 (Vol. XXXIII, p. 253).

b. For Communists in Opposition.

When such a retreat is taking place in a real army, they set up

machine guns, and wherever a genuine retreat becomes disorderly, they give the command: *Shoot!* And rightly.

If people spread panic, even though they are guided by the best of intentions, at such a moment in which we are carrying on an incredibly difficult retreat and when everything depends upon keeping good order—at that moment it is necessary to punish severely, brutally, mercilessly, the slightest infraction of discipline. . . .

Ibid., p. 253.

c. *For All Soviet Citizens.*

17/V/1922.

Com. Kurskii!

In accordance with our conversation, I am sending you a draft of a supplementary paragraph of the Criminal Code. . . . The basic thought, I hope, is clear: openly to express the proposition in principle and politically justified (and not only in a juridical-narrow sense) which motivates the *essence* and *justification* for terror, its necessity, its limits.

The court must not eliminate terror; to promise that would be either to deceive one's self, or to deceive, but should give it a foundation and a lawfulness in principle, clearly, without falsification and without adornment. It is necessary to formulate it as widely as possible, for only a revolutionary consciousness of justice and a revolutionary conscience sets conditions for its application in fact, more or less widely.

With Communist greetings,
Lenin.

Letter of Lenin to the Commissar of Justice, Kursky (Vol. XXXIII, p. 321).

APPENDIX D

NOTES OF AN ECONOMIST (THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING)

BY NIKOLAI IVANOVICH BUKHARIN.*

The new economic year is approaching. . . . We ourselves have not sufficiently realized all that is *novel in the conditions of the reconstruction period*. That is why we are so 'late.' . . . We got started on the problem of the sovkhoses and the kolkhozes, for instance, only after there was already a crisis in procurement of grain and the disturbances connected with that crisis. In short, we have largely acted according to the good old Russian proverb: 'Unless it thunders, the peasant doesn't cross himself.'

. . . There is a tremendous difference between simply repairing a bridge and constructing a new one. The latter requires knowledge of higher mathematics and the resistance of materials, and a thousand other bits of wisdom. The same is true of the *whole range* of our economy. The reconstruction period has posed a whole series of the most complicated *technical tasks* (the planning of new factories, a new technology, new branches of industry), a series of the most complicated organizational-economic tasks (new systems of the organization of labor, problems of the location of industries, of division into districts or regions, the forms of the whole economic apparatus, etc.), a whole series of the most important difficulties of the problems of *directing of the economy as a whole* (coordination under the new conditions of the basic elements of the economy, problems of socialist accumulation, problems of the relations of the economy to problems of the class

* First published in *Pravda* in October 1928, then as a pamphlet. Later suppressed. The full text in a not always accurate translation is in *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. VIII, pp. 1327-9; 1377-80; 1434-7. I have made a new translation from the Russian pamphlet, slightly condensed by the omission of some statistical material and ephemeral passages that have lost their interest. The omissions are indicated in the text. The footnotes and subheads are supplied by the author of the present work.

struggle, here also under the *new* conditions of that struggle, etc.). And finally, a series of problems of the *human* apparatus (the drawing of the masses into the process of production, on the one hand, and the problem of skilled cadres on the other). The great technical achievements of the capitalist world (especially in Germany and the United States), and the growth of world production have enormously sharpened the problems of our own internal development. Moreover, we have not accomplished the necessary regrouping of our forces, or, to be more exact, we have not done so on the scale and with the energy which the objective march of things has demanded.

The economic year that has just come to an end brings to a close and draws up the balance of the entire three year period of the reconstructive development of our economy. The country has made an enormous leap forward. . . . In these years we have already made a serious technical advance in a number of branches of production, and especially in industry. Our *oil* industry . . . has passed through a genuine technical revolution and has been freshly equipped with machinery that almost raises it to the American level. Our *machine construction* industry, the basic lever of a further transformation and industrial remaking of our country, has marched ahead with great strides. The special section of the machine industry devoted to the *construction of agricultural machinery* has reached three times its pre-war level. An entirely new branch of industry has been born: the *electrotechnical* industry. The foundations of a *chemical* industry have been laid, and for the first time in our land we have undertaken the air-fixing of nitrogen. *Electrification*, the construction of power stations is unswervingly conquering ever new positions. The technical-industrial revolution is even beginning to penetrate into the village. It is powerfully supporting and developing the unification of the peasants in cooperatives; it has already sent some 30,000 *tractors* into the fields and steppes of our land, and tractor colonies, those fighting bands of a technical transformation, are appearing no longer as rare guests in the most backward, truly barbaric regions of our Union. For the first time the blades of the tractor drawn plough cut the virgin soil of the Salskian, Ukrainian, Volga and Cossack steppes, and the waving wild grasses sing for the last time their dying song.

Take a look at the dry figures which in their austere tongue speak to us of the continuing revolution in our Union.

[Here follow figures which show a general rise in the capital of the State-Cooperative sector of 14% in the three year period; that of

State and Cooperative capital in industry by 15%, and other related figures.]

This data tells of real accumulation of capital, that is of *extended reproduction*. . . .

It is of interest, too, to note the systematic growth of the entirely *new industrial construction*. [Here follow figures showing that the share of investment assigned to industry in the total economy grew from 12% in the first year to 23% in the third year]. All this shows how rapidly the process of the industrialization of the country is moving, how clearly at the same time the process of socialization of the entire economy is developing. The goods exchange of the country is growing, especially the exchange between city and village. Freight movement is growing. The budget is growing. From year to year the numbers of the working class are growing. The material and cultural level of their life is growing too.*

The Upsidedown Nature of Soviet Crises

But at the same time, the growth of our economy, and the indubitable growth of socialism are accompanied by peculiar 'crises,' which, despite all *decisive* difference between the laws governing our development, seem to 'repeat' the crises of capitalism, but as in a concave mirror. Both with us and with them there is a disproportion between production and consumption. But in our case this disproportion is 'turned upsidedown'—there overproduction, here goods famine; there the demand of the masses is far below the supply, here this demand is greater than the supply. Both there and here there is an investment of enormous sums of 'capital,' which involve, under capitalism, specific crises, and with us, 'difficulties.' But in this respect, too, the relationship is 'reversed'—with them there is overaccumulation, with us a lack of capital. Both here and there there is a disproportion between various spheres of production, but with us what is typical is the *metals famine*. *Unemployment* in our case occurs simultaneously with the systematic growth of the number of employed workers.

* All the above figures, while less sensational than those published after 1929, are more accurate. The great ruble inflation began in 1929, as did the great propaganda inflation. Until then statistics and statisticians were respected. And, as various studies by experts have shown, the real wages of the working class were higher in 1928 than they have been at any time since. For the fate of statistics and statisticians after Stalin's Year of the Great Turn, see the author's *Six Keys to the Soviet System*, pp. 112-117.: "The Great Blackout."

Even the agrarian 'crisis' in our case is 'upside-down'—an insufficient amount of grain offered for sale.* In short, particularly the year that has just ended has confronted us with the problem of *our 'crisis,'* which occur in the initial stages of the transitional economy in a land of a backward and basically petit-bourgeois population, surrounded by a hostile encirclement.

The Problem of an Expanding Equilibrium

Marx provided a theory of *capitalist crises*. These crises he derived from the general planlessness ('anarchy') of capitalist production, from the impossibility under capitalism of correct *proportions* between the various elements of the process of production, among these disproportions being that between production and consumption, or, in other words the *impossibility for capitalism to 'balance'* (put into continuous equilibrium) *the various elements of reproduction. . . .*

In the transition period (in transition from capitalism to socialism) classes still exist, and the class struggles may at times even grow sharper. But the society of the transition period is at the same time to some extent a unity, even though a unit which still embraces contradictions. For this reason for such a society . . . we can draw up "schemata for reproduction" (such as Karl Marx did in the Second Volume of 'Capital'—and with much more 'right' for this kind of society). That is, we can ascertain the conditions for the correct coordination of the various spheres of production and consumption and for the various spheres of production among themselves. In other words, we can ascertain the conditions of an *expanding economic equilibrium*. It is this which constitutes the central problem of the working out of a *national-economic plan*.

Is a 'Goods Famine' a General Law of Our Development

Now let us put another question. If with us 'crises' possess as it were the character of capitalist crises 'turned insideout,' if with us the effective demand of the masses strides ahead of production, then *may not the 'goods famine' be a general law of our development?* Are we not perhaps condemned to either periodic or non-periodic 'crises' on a *reverse* basis, on the basis of a *different* relationship between produc-

* 1926-8 were the first years of America's grain surplus crisis which in turn produced our "ever-normal granary," our AAA measures for taking land out of cultivation, our parity support, our soil bank, etc. We have had our crisis of plenty and the Soviet Union its crisis of shortage of grain from that day to this.

tion and consumption? May not these 'crisis' difficulties be the *iron law* of our development.*

. . . Here two completely different matters are being confused: on the one hand, the lagging—at any given moment—of the developing productive forces behind the even more rapidly growing consumption ('demand' in the wider sense of the word); and on the other hand, a specifically sharp 'crisis-like' form, namely the form of the *goods famine* (with the demand being effective in the sense of *possession of the means of payment*).

The first type of phenomenon is merely an expression of the fact that society is really in transition towards socialism, that the growth of consumption is the *direct* driving force of its economic development, that production has become a *means*, etc.**

Crises from Errors in Our Plan

Quite another matter are the *phenomena of a crisis character* which disturb the course of reproduction. These can only have their origin in the violation of the conditions of economic equilibrium, i.e. flow from the *incorrect coordination of the elements of reproduction* (including here also the aspect of consumption). The 'distorted' character of the 'crises,' as compared with capitalist crises, is determined by the relations, truly *new* in principle, between needs of the masses and production. This relation is not, however, one of *growing antagonism*. On the contrary, production is constantly catching up with mass consumption, which keeps in advance of production as the main stimulus to its development. Hence, here there is no basis for a 'LAW of crises,' for a law of inevitable crises. But here there may be 'crises' arising from the *relative anarchy*, i.e. the *relative planlessness* of the economy of the transition period.

The relative *planlessness*—or *relative planfulness*—of the economy of the transition period has its basis in the existence of small enterprises, of market connections, i.e. significant elements of an incalculable character [literally, "significant elements of spontaneity"]. Hence

* Cf. Mikoyan's formulation of, and evasive and slovenly answer to, the same question at the Twentieth Congress held twenty-eight years later.

** According to Marx, capitalist production has a "fetshistic" character, i.e. it has become production for production's sake, for the sake of the self-expansion of capital rather than the satisfaction of human needs, for the accumulation of wealth and power by the owners of the means of production. In place of this "production for profit," socialism would substitute "production for use," i.e. for the sake of human consumption and satisfaction. Thus production would once more become a *means* in place of an *end*.

the very plan has a special nature: it is by no means the more or less 'finished' plan of a developed socialist society. In this plan there are many elements of the forecasting of the spontaneous or incalculable (for example, estimate of the crop, the amount of grain coming to market, the amount of products of peasant production as a whole that will be offered on the market, and, consequently, also the estimate of prices, etc. etc.),* and these forecasts become the starting point of one or another directive. It is just for this reason that with us there is no possibility of an 'ideal' plan. And just for this reason there is room up to a *certain* point for errors. But the fact that an error can be explained and may even be *unavoidable* does not prevent it from being an *error*. This is the first point. Secondly, the gravest violations of fundamental proportions (as was the case with us in the grain economy, of which more below), and the resultant miscalculations are *by no means unavoidable* errors. Thirdly, even if a good plan is not omnipotent, then a bad 'plan' and bad economic maneuvering in general can ruin even a good cause.

In the old polemic with the Trotskyites we had occasion to show that *the possibilities of the planning principle should not be overestimated* nor the very considerable elements of incalculable spontaneity (*stikhinost*) overlooked. Even then we had to chew over again the elementary truth that the concept of proportionality among the branches of industry, taken 'by itself,' i.e. without taking into account the peasant market, is a conception *without meaning*, and that precisely for this reason the power of our plan is *relative* and its structure unique. And in our polemics with E. A. Preobrazhensky, we had to make it clear that we cannot abstract from the economic policy of the state, for here an enormous part of the economy is *state economy* . . . and the most important economic organizations are *state organizations*. . . . For this reason, despite the relativism of our planning, its role is really *enormous*. Major errors in the directing of the economy which result in a violation of the basic economic proportions in the country therefore of themselves may engender a highly unfavorable change in the relations of the classes. The reverse side of such a violation of the necessary *economic* proportions would

* It was Stalin's belief, as it is Khrushchev's, that by controlling everything and dictating everything from the center, he could plan everything. This was one of his reasons for driving the peasants into the sovkhoz and kolkhoz. But both nature and the human nature of the peasant have proved recalcitrant to centralized dictation, and twenty-five years later in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Stalin proposed to eliminate the "spontaneous" by transforming the kolkhozes into factory farms.

be a resultant upsetting of the *political* equilibrium in the country.

. . . To avoid a 'goods famine' and a 'crisislike' violation of the basic economic proportions, which are by no means inevitable or absolute laws, it follows that:

In order to attain the most favorable possible march of social reproduction (the most crisis-free), and to attain the systematic growth of socialism, and, in consequence, to attain the most favorable possible situation for the proletariat in the relations of class forces in the country—it is necessary to achieve a coordination of the basic elements of the national economy that is the best possible one. That is, it is necessary to 'balance' them, arrange them, arrange them in such fashion that they best fulfill their respective functions, and actively influence the course of economic life and the class struggle so as to attain the best possible balance or equilibrium.

A Strong Industry Requires a Strong Peasant Market

The reconstruction period demands of our economic leadership the most intense thinking through of the problems of current policy. In the first place we once more come up against the 'accursed' problem of the *relations between city and village*. And once more the old 'recipes' are warmed over which are supposed to save us from all evil and harm. . . . All the old panaceas have been stirred up again by the fresh difficulties with the grain supply problem . . . with all the old wishes, demands, warnings and threats. Let us too then examine once more this 'problem of problems,' let us once more critically test our line.

We have drawn a historical divide between the capitalist world and the world of the proletarian dictatorship. But it is useful for us to utilize the historical experience of capitalism. . . .

Within the framework of capitalism it is easy to distinguish three basic types of relationships between city and village.

The first type is that of the most backward, semi-feudal *village* economy, with its pauperized peasants, its starving tenants, its merciless exploitation of the peasant, the weak purchasing power of the domestic market. (Example: Pre-revolutionary Russia).

The second type: Considerably less remnants of bondage, the feudal landowner has in large measure already become a capitalist, the peasantry is better off, there is a peasant market with more developed purchasing power, etc.

The third type: the 'American' type: with almost complete absence

of feudal relationships, 'free' land, the first stages of the disappearance of absolute ground rent, well-to-do farmers, an enormous internal market for industry.

And what follows? It is not hard to see that the *might and sweep* of industrial development, the might and sweep of the growth of the productive forces has reached the greatest heights precisely *in the United States*.

The Trotskyites, when they put the problem of the *greatest possible* pumping of resources out of the village (take all that it is 'technically possible to get at'; take more than tsarism took, etc.), wanted to put the USSR *in the same line with old Russia*, at a time when what is needed is to put us *in line with the United States of America*. For if the United States has realized *within the limits of capitalism* the most rapid development of agriculture and the most rapid march of the productive forces as a whole, then we should go even faster on a *socialist* basis, on the basis of the most determined war with all the capitalist elements, and on the basis of the closest *alliance* with the decisive masses of the peasantry.

In their simplicity, the ideologists of Trotskyism assume that the maximum annual pumping out of resources from the peasant economy into industry will assure the maximum tempo of the development of industry. But that is clearly not so. The greatest *not temporary but continuous* tempo can be attained by such a coordination in which industry develops on the foundation of a *rapidly growing* agricultural economy. It is then that industry attains its own record-breaking figures in its development.

But this assumes the possibility of a rapid real accumulation in agriculture, and consequently anything but the policy of Trotskyism. The transition period opens *a new epoch* in the relations between city and village, an epoch which puts an end to the systematic backwardness of the village, of the 'idiocy of rural life,' an epoch in which we set our course towards the *wiping out* of the antagonism between city and village, in which industry itself 'turns its face towards the village,' industrializes the rural economy and thus leads it from the back of the stage of history to the front of the stage of economic life. Thus what the Trotskyites fail to comprehend is that *the development of industry is dependent on the development of agriculture*.

On the other extreme are the petit-bourgeois knights who 'defend' agriculture from all levies in favor of industry. In essence their standpoint is that of the perpetuation of the petty enterprise, its god-forsaken technique, its 'familial' structure, its narrow cultural

horizon. . . . If the Trotskyists do not understand that the development of industry depends on the development of agriculture, these ideologists of petit-bourgeois conservatism fail to comprehend that *the development of agriculture depends on industry*, i.e. that without tractors, chemical fertilizer, electrification, the village economy is condemned to stagnation . . . that precisely industry is the lever of the radical transformation in agriculture and that without the *leading role* of industry it is impossible to abolish village narrowness, backwardness, barbarism and poverty.

. . . Now let us take up the concrete question of the relation between industry and agriculture *at the present moment* here in the USSR. The basic facts which strike the eye are these: a general growth in the exchange between city and village is accompanied by a goods famine, i.e. both an insufficient (terribly insufficient) meeting of the village demand, a kind of lagging behind of industry as regards to agriculture; and on the other hand, difficulties in the matter of the grain supply, insufficient offer of grain in comparison with the demand for it, i.e. a kind of lagging behind of agriculture; a mighty growth of capital construction, and *at the same time*, a quite significant goods *shortage*. All these 'paradoxes' of our economic life must be resolved. From this solution depends the basic directives of our policy.

The Causes of Our Grain Crisis

[At this point Bukharin enters into a long polemic with Trotsky on the meaning of the statistics of production and investment in agriculture and industry for the period 1925-8. Both these figures and their interpretation are now largely only of interest to the historian. Among the matters that are still of interest are the following assertions of Bukharin:

1) Much of the effective village demand for industrial goods arises not from village earnings in agriculture but from the fact that the peasant also hired himself out for wages in industry itself. "Almost half the income of the peasantry is at present derived from sources other than agriculture."

2) Actually the crisis in the grain supply did not come from an enormous increase in grain production and the wilfull withholding of this grain from the market. Statistics are cited to show that grain production was either stagnant or actually dropped in quantity. "Today every child knows that the oppositional fairy tales on the 'frightfully tremendous' grain reserves held back by the village, the legends of the

900 million poods of grain that have been supposed to be hidden away, have burst once and for all like soap-bubbles. Nobody believes these fairy tales any longer.”*]

Thus, *along with a stormy growth of industry, along with a significant growth in the population and a rise in the needs of the population, the quantity of grain has not grown in the country.* Isn't it clear that a contemptuous attitude to the grain problem under such conditions would be a real crime? And is it not clear . . . that a Trotskyist 'solution' would lead straight to a real, and not an imaginary collapse?

The grain supply crisis is an expression not of an excess of grain in the presence of a shortage of industrial goods. This 'explanation' will not stand serious examination. The crisis was brought on under the conditions of a dispersed small scale agriculture by a stagnation or even an actual falling off in grain production. And its attendant phenomena are:

- 1) a rising disproportion between the price of grain on the one hand and the prices of agricultural products grown for industry on the other;
- 2) an increase in the supplementary income of the peasantry from non-agricultural work;
- 3) an inadequate increase in taxation on the kulak economy;
- 4) an inadequate supply to the village of industrial goods;
- 5) a growing economic influence of the kulaks in the village.

Essentially, this crisis is connected with an incorrect price policy, with an enormous disparity in the price of grain and other agricultural products. The result has been a transfer of productive forces away from grain production, and a comparative flight from production. . . .

If the process of stagnation (and even drop) in grain production has shown itself most strongly in the regions of grain surplus, it could not help but take place also in the regions which have a grain shortage: the lack of grain supply in those regions had to lead to a growth of the tendency to produce only for their own consumption.

At this point it would be well to say a few words on the law of prices. Basing themselves on the legerdemain of E. A. Preobrazhensky, the ideologists of Trotskyism have declared that the law of socialist accumulation is bound to weaken progressively the law of prices, which is the law of equilibrium of *commodity* production (i.e. produc-

* In 1929 and 1930, Stalin was to accept and act on these "fairy tales" by sending young Stalinist zealots into the villages to collect for the state the "hidden grain." This drive deprived the villages of bread and even of seed, and was a major cause of the man-made, or state-made famine of the early thirties.

tion for the free market). This is not the place to examine in detail all the absurdities of this proposition. All we wish to point out here is that the counter-posing of the law of value . . . and the law of socialist accumulation as replacer and successor to the law of value, is absurd on the face of it for the simple reason that under capitalism, too, there has always been a law of accumulation acting on the basis of the law of value. Hence the law of value may be transformed under our conditions into anything you please, but never into the law of accumulation. The very law of accumulation presupposes some other law on the basis of which it 'acts.*' What this may be, whether the law of expenditure of labor, or some other law, is a matter of indifference to us here in the present context. But one thing is clear: if any branch of production systematically fails to receive in return for its products the costs of production, plus a certain addition corresponding to a *part* of the surplus labor** which can serve as a source of expanding reproduction, then that branch of industry either stagnates or *retrogresses*. This law "applies" to grain growing as it does to any other branch of the economy. If neighboring branches of agriculture are in better circumstances, then there takes place a process of *redistribution* of the productive forces. If this does not occur, then there takes place under our conditions a general process of development *towards an agricultural natural economy****.

Those who believe that the growth of the planned economy brings with it the possibility—as a result of the dying out of the law of value—of doing whatever one pleases, simply do not understand the ABC of economics. These considerations are sufficient to define the limit of the process of "pumping over" resources from agriculture to industry. *The opponents of industrialization* come out against any alienation even of a part of the surplus product, i.e. against all "pumping over" whatsoever. But in that case the tempo of industrialization will be slowed up. The Trotskyists define the magnitude of the pumping over by the limits of the 'technically achievable,' i.e. they

* As the Nineteenth Congress opened in 1952, Stalin was still wrestling with this question of the operation of the law of value under socialism, and devoted to it a section of his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. Several speakers at the Twentieth Congress wrestled with the same problem, but more indecisively and evasively. To discuss the reason for this shadow-boxing on the part of Soviet Marxists would carry us beyond the limits of the present work.

** A marxist economic term. "Surplus labor" is the part of labor over and above the "necessary labor." From these two labor categories Marx derives necessary value and surplus value

*** i.e. production for direct domestic consumption by the peasant and his family, in place of production for exchange.

go even beyond the limits of the entire surplus product. It is clear that in that case there can be no thought of the *development* of agriculture or its grain section, which in turn is required for the development of industry itself. Here the truth lies somewhere in between.

But the development (. . . i.e. the expanded production) of agriculture as a whole (and this includes both the production of raw materials, and of grain), such a development is necessary from the standpoint of *export and import*. For the import of machinery it is necessary to pay. And the same for the import of raw materials. It would be fantastic if we should renounce forever all export of grain merely because we have had to stop exporting it now because of the grain crisis. It is bad enough that we are dependent on the outside world for the importation of machinery. But that we should depend on it at the same time for machinery, *and* for raw materials, *and* for grain is *unthinkable*. We should support ourselves on the foundation of our agriculture, utilize its production to pay for our imported machinery by means of 'agricultural valuta'—which, of course, does not exclude the need of strengthening our industrial export also—we should *develop our own heavy industry* and, gradually free ourselves from our dependent position also in regard to machinery, and thus stand more and more on our own feet. (This, of course, does not exclude the necessity of continuing to utilize international economic interconnections.)*

Problems and Errors of Our Planning

[Bukharin next works out, acknowledging the help of a number of economists, a rough or tentative plan of the percentage proportions in the demand for industrial goods on the part of industry itself, other branches of the socialist economy, demand by wage earners, demand by the rest of the city population, demand by the peasantry, and

* Bukharin is revealed here as still wavering between the temptations of autarchy and a belief in the social utility of the world market. If he already puts the major emphasis on autarchy, Stalin was soon to go over completely to autarchy as the sole appropriate form for the economy of the beleaguered garrison-totalist state. This did not prevent him from borrowing technology and technicians and even exporting grain from a famine-beset land in exchange for the machine tools which were to render the Soviet Union "economically independent" of the surrounding capitalist world. The ideology of autarchy reached its fantastic climax in the campaign against "cosmopolitanism and kowtowing to the West" that was carried on from the end of World War II until shortly before Stalin's death. His heirs have returned to open "borrowing" of technique from the West, but not to any thought of economic interdependence.-

requirements for industrial export. What is significant about Bukharin's plan is: 1) its acknowledged tentativeness and experimental nature; 2) his expectation that it would have constantly to be revised on the basis of experience, in other words, to be treated not as an untouchable set of figures but quite the contrary; 3) his attention to the idea of balance between or among the various categories, including "the rest of the city population" along with "wage-earners," the peasantry along with the proletariat, agriculture along with industry; 4) his recognition that the leadership of which he was still the most important "theoretician," i.e. "planner," had made a number of serious mistakes in their first calculations, mistakes which help to explain the "goods famine" in both city and village, the "metals famine" in industry, and a temporary decline in grain production together with "difficulties in procuring grain" in exchange for non-existent industrial goods. Bukharin concludes:]

But when industry in the course of its expansion comes into collision with (pushes against) its own limits, that signifies:

1) obviously, we have adopted not sufficiently correct proportions between the various branches of industry itself (e.g. the visible lag in metallurgy);

2) obviously, we have adopted insufficiently correct proportions between the expansion of current production of industry and the expansion of capital construction (this is not only true of industry but of the whole socialized sector as well)

If there are not enough bricks and if, for technical reasons, no more than a certain quantity can be produced during the current season, then we *must not* draw up a building program which *exceeds* this limit and thus creates a demand which cannot be met. For no matter how much you may force building activities, still you cannot build factories out of air* (To this problem which shall return once more when we examine the problem of capital investment).

3) It is obvious, too, that the limits set by the *production of raw materials*, such as cotton, leather, wool, flax, etc. cannot be overcome by production of these out of thin air. But as every one knows, these things are *products of agriculture*, and that a shortage of these things is one of the reasons for the insufficient development of the total

* Stalin's answer to this suggestion of objective limits to plan figures was to proclaim that "there is no fortress which Bolshevnik determination cannot conquer." As the Israelites were ordered to make bricks without straw so the Russians were ordered to make factories without bricks. When the machinery rusted for lack of walls and a roof, since the plan figures could not be questioned and reexamined, it could only be sabotage and wrecking of the perfect plan.-

production of industry, which in turn is thus rendered unable to cover completely the demand either of the city or the village population.

Thus if there is a raw material shortage, plus a grain shortage (which last means also a shortage of export and hence of the import of goods), plus a shortage of building materials, then one must be a really clever fellow to demand a program of 'superindustrialization.'

To sum up:

1) *as regards basic capital, in gross output and goods production, the tempo of the development of industry very greatly exceeds that of agriculture;*

2) *grain production, having been placed in extremely unfavorable conditions, is falling dangerously behind even the minimum requisite tempo of development;*

3) *the demand of the village population is roughly one-half non-agricultural demand, and is to a considerable extent engendered by the development of heavy industry, of the socialized economy;*

4) *the further increase in the tempo of development of industry finds its limits to a considerable extent in the present limits of agricultural raw materials and export;*

5) *it is further obvious that the distribution of means within industry (and as regards capital construction, within the entire socialized sector) must be planned on the basis of a many-sided calculation of all the factors which guarantee a 'more or less crisis-free development' (Resolution of the Fifteenth Congress), and a more correct coordination of the relationships between the branches of industry and the branches of the socialized sector.*

How to Overcome the Grain Crisis

. . . the backwardness of our grain provision is so painfully obvious. In this matter, 'the pure production' standpoint, i.e. the standpoint of the increase in production' (Lenin) coincides with the standpoint of 'class transformation,' with the gradual replacement of the capitalist elements in agriculture by the growing collectivization of the individual poor and middle peasant enterprises, by the development of large-scale and socialized agricultural production. This is an enormous, new problem, which by no means implies neglect of the individual farms of the working peasantry, but, on the contrary, must be solved on the basis of the elevation (flourishing) of the individual farms—that is how Lenin saw it. This problem demands special attention and special effort precisely because of its newness. It is a matter, to a

certain extent, of making large capital investments in agriculture, which requires both a *new technology* (tractorization, mechanization, chemicalization, etc.) and *new cadres of qualified (skilled) workers*. A rise in the individual peasant sector, especially that devoted to grain, a limiting of the kulak sector, the construction of sovkhoses and kolkhoses, in combination with a correct price policy, and along with a development of cooperatives embracing the mass of the peasantry, etc.—these are the measures which should correct the very great economic disproportion which has found its expression in the stagnation and even decline of *grain production* and in a *weak development of the agricultural economy as a whole*.

In drawing up our plans we must remember *the directive of the Fifteenth Congress*:

'It is incorrect to take as a starting point the demand for a maximum pumping over of means from the sphere of agriculture into the sphere of industry, for this demand not only signifies a political rupture with the peasantry, but an undermining of the raw material basis of industry itself, and an upsetting of the equilibrium of the whole economic system. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to renounce the use of means drawn from agriculture for the furtherance of industry. At the present time this would mean a retardation of the speed of development, and an upsetting of the balance, to the detriment of the industrialization of the country.'

Our Industrialization Must Not Impoverish the Village

The center of all our plan calculations, of all our economic policy, must be concern for the steadily developing *industrialization of our country*. . . . From every point of view—development of the productive forces, development of agriculture, growth of the specific gravity of socialism in the total economy, strengthening of the class alliances within the country, strengthening of our international specific gravity, of our powers of self-defense, growth of mass consumption, etc. etc.—the industrialization of the country is for us a *law*.

But in carrying this out we must always remember that our socialist industrialization must differ from capitalist industrialization in that it is carried out *by the proletariat*, for the purposes of *socialism*, that its effect upon the peasant economy must be quite different and distinct in character, that its whole attitude towards the village economy must be different and distinct. Capitalism effected the *debasement* of agriculture. Socialist industrialization, however, is not a parasitic process in its relations with the village (under capitalism, despite the devel-

opment of agriculture under the influence of industry, the elements of such a parasitism are present), but a means of its great *transformation and upswing*. The industrialization of the country therefore signifies also the industrialization of agriculture and thereby it prepares the abolition of the antagonism between city and village.

To be sure, the process of industrialization cannot go with equal smoothness at all stages of development. It is also clear that it sets for us the most difficult problems. In a half impoverished country it is necessary to gather enormous sums of 'capital' and to employ them productively, on the basis of a new technology, new buildings, etc. The problem of *capital construction* for that reason moves into the foreground. Here we encounter the most difficult and complicated tasks, which can not be settled by shouting slogans, nor by 'intuition,' nor any similar means. What we need is a thoughtful study of the problems; here there is no room for any dilletantism; here we need a collective working out of the problem, we need *calculation*.

We should strive for the fastest possible tempo of industrialization. Does that mean that we ought to put everything into capital construction? The question is quite a meaningless one. But behind this meaningless question there is hidden another that is quite meaningful: namely, the question of the limits of accumulation, of the upper limit for the sum of capital investment.

The Material Prerequisites for Industrialization

Above all, when we are drawing up our program of capital construction we must keep in mind the directive of the party on reserves (of valuta, gold, grain, goods). Of late it has become the fashion to keep quiet about the question of reserves. . . . Though silence may be golden and we short of gold, still we cannot afford to play at silence in this. We not only have no reserves; but in meeting the current supply problem itself 'waiting one's turn' and 'queuing up' have become our 'way of life,' which to a significant degree also disorganizes our *productive* life.

[After discussing the extreme importance of reserves and the failure to carry out the decisions of two congresses in that regard, Bukharin continues:]

I have the impresion that the People's Supreme Economic Council in drawing up its Five-Year Plan has forgotten the policy of reserves altogether . . . and that the excessive demands put upon the budget

make it 'unrealistic.' But 'lack of realism' is 'quite' an essential deficiency in a plan.

It's clear that the question of reserves is tied up with the question of consumption, both productive consumption (including capital construction) and personal consumption (the personal consumption of the masses). And we all know that in this the bow is already drawn at high tension. *To increase this tension still further, and increase still more the goods famine is impossible. . . .*

Unfortunately, in the matter of the goods famine and the five-year perspectives in industry, we find the same treatment as in the matter of the reserves. The report in *Economic Life*, when it speaks of the draft of the Five-Year Plan for industry, observes that here *a balance is lacking between demand and supply* (see the speech of Comrade Mezhlauk). When a plan drawn up during a crisis in supply is not thought through from the standpoint of the balance of supply and demand, this is, of course, no 'external' oversight, but a fundamental *internal defect*. *The acuteness of the goods famine must be decisively alleviated, and not in some remote future but in the next few years. The first steps in that direction must be taken at once.*

It is further necessary to raise the question of the *material elements* needed for capital construction. In order that the industrialization of the country should be carried out in life and not remain on paper, in order that it should become a reality and not a 'bureaucratic playing with figures' (Lenin), we need not only to gather the requisite sums of *money* corresponding to the demand for construction materials etc., but also a corresponding *supply* of these materials themselves, assure their actual physical existence and availability, not their future theoretical 'availability' but their present real existence. For out of 'future bricks' no present factories can be built. . . .

But we suffer from a kind of 'fetishism of money,' which assumes that if money is there, everything will be there. But if we lack this or that material in the requisite quantity (with due allowance for thrift in its use), and if it will require a longer period to produce it than the period in which it is supposed to be productively consumed, then no amount of money will help. We may beat our breasts and swear by the god of industrialization and curse all our enemies, but not get one step further in such a situation. . . .

Our Mounting Deficits

[Here Bukharin gives tables on the existing deficits in cement, bricks, glass, wire, etc. etc. and concludes:]

If this estimate of the deficit is correct . . . how are we going to build according to the plan when there is a 20% less quantity of building materials than it requires? Can we not make a more exact calculation, and draw up a program based on *real* beams and iron and not imaginary ones?

[Here Bukharin analyses the gap between production and demand in metals during each of the last three years, breaking up the demand by divisions of the national economy and including "home industries, small crafts and trades, and personal requirements, as well as the major branches, and concludes:]

So we see that the deficit (*the deficit!*) is growing (*growing!*) for all significant categories of consumption.

In order to understand how such a paradox is possible that (with the rapid growth of production) there grows in every category both of personal and productive consumption, a mounting deficit, and one which has grown more acute than ever in the year 1928-29, we must examine the question of how our figures for the increase of capital construction are being estimated.

What were the directives issued by the Fifteenth Party Congress on this?

'In the question of the rate of development . . . the extreme complexity of the task must be taken into account. In this field we must take as our point of departure not the maximum tempo of accumulation for *next* year or the next few years, but such a proportion as will guarantee the greatest speed of development *permanently and over the long run.*

'In the relations between the development of *heavy and light industry*, we must also proceed from the optimal combination of both of these branches. While keeping in mind the correctness of the shift of the center of gravity to the production of the means of production, we must at the same time remember the dangers involved in tying down too much state capital in the building of large enterprises whose production cannot be realized on the market for many years to come. And on the other hand, we must keep in mind the fact that a more rapid circulation of the products of light industry (the production of objects of prime necessity) will permit the use of its capital funds also for the construction of heavy industry along with the development of light industry.'

As we see, the Fifteenth Congress was quite careful. In the question

of tempo it *directly opposed* a wild chase in the tempo of the first few years, with a consequent inevitable drop later. And how has *this* party directive been carried out in practice?

The Need for Steady Increase in Tempo

[Here Bukharin adduces figures, “unfortunately not recent . . . and fortunately not finally adopted by the Supreme Council of National Economy,” which show a planned increase of capital investment for the first year, 1929-30 of nearly 40%, for the second year only 7.3% and then a mounting decrease to minus 1% and minus 8.3% in the addition of new capital for the last two years of the plan. And he asks:]

What premises led to such an acrobatic *salto mortale* in such a serious matter as capital construction? We are unable to find even an approximately satisfactory answer to this question. . . . Isn't it possible here too to demand a *precise carrying out of the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress?*

The overstrain on capital expenditure: 1) is not accompanied by an *actual* construction of the same sweep; 2) will inevitably lead in a short time to the breaking off of the building already begun; 3) will react very unfavorably on other branches of industry; 4) will intensify the goods famine in every field; 5) and in the end will actually *lower the tempo of growth.*

Such a state of affairs under the conditions of stable or semi-stable prices will have a negative effect upon *the monetary system.* But this is a separate theme, although one of *the highest importance.*

Every communist understands that it is necessary to go forward at the fastest *possible* speed. And it is natural to regret a slowing down of the tempo which we *have already achieved.* This tempo, we must bear in mind, was achieved by means of a severe strain on the budget, the absence of accumulated reserves, the reduction of the share of consumers' goods etc. We are moving ahead under *enormous* strain. And we have to understand that if we are to *maintain* this speed . . . and at the same time: 1) alleviate the goods famine; 2) make some progress in the matter of reserves; 3) insure an economic development more free from crises—then we must take a series of decisive measures to insure greater efficiency in construction, *greater productivity in all our units of production and much greater productivity still in the new enterprises entering into production*—an efficiency and productivity far exceeding our present demands.

Where Economies Can Be Made

The concrete investigations made by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection have shown that we have a great deal of unproductive expenditure. These *faux frais*, linked up with a number of organizational problems, must be reduced to a minimum.*

We must put enormous effort into reducing the production time (what they build in America in two months takes us about two years!) . . . We must greatly alter the *type* of building (our buildings are needlessly heavy, etc.). We must use our materials much more economically. . . . All these improvements combined can yield *gigantic* savings. . . .

The sums thus released should go: 1) into relieving the strain on the market which is detrimental alike to industry, to the whole socialized sector, to the workers, to the peasants . . . and to our monetary system; 2) into the formation of reserves; 3) into the maintenance of the tempo attained by us.

At the same time the productivity of our enterprises must be raised in every way, the costs of production must be reduced (we must secure genuine mass production). The latest inventions, the most important technical achievements, a serious rationalization of labor, the active participation of the masses, the development and application of the sciences, the role of which must now be *raised several times* above the present level—all these things should be at the center of our attention. We must put an end to Russian provincialism: we must follow carefully every movement in technical-scientific thought of Europe and America and utilize each of their genuine advances; we must put on a solid scientific basis our statistical calculations; we must put an end to all the muddling, jerkiness etc. in the system of our economic administration, and do it quickly. We must learn *the art and science of directing our economy in the complicated conditions of the reconstruction period*. . . .

Our Hypercentralization

We must mobilize and put in motion the maximum number and kind of economic factors which work in favor of socialism. This requires a most complicated combination of personal, group, mass, social and state initiative. We have *too much* overcentralized everything. We must ask ourselves: ought we not now take some steps in

* The Twentieth Congress, and the technical press of the current year are still concerned with this problem of unproductive expenditure which would seem to have grown considerably since the thirties.

the direction of the Leninist commune-state? This does not by any means signify "letting go of the reins." Quite the contrary. The fundamental leadership, the solving of the more important problems, are matters which must be dealt with more firmly, more severely—but *for that reason more carefully thought out* 'at the center.' But within the strict framework of these decisions the lower organs must act on their own initiative and be responsible for *their own* range of problems, etc. Supercentralization in a number of fields had led to our depriving ourselves of *additional forces, means, resources and possibilities*. And we are in no position to utilize the entire mass of these possibilities thanks to a number of bureaucratic barriers. We could act with more elasticity, more maneuverability, more successfully, if, beginning with the individual state enterprises, we were in a position to adapt ourselves to the real, concrete conditions, and thereby avoid the thousand small and large stupidities we are committing. . . .

The grain supply crisis has served as a sign to warn us of great dangers. Economics here has turned into a class question.

These dangers are still not outlived, and much work is still needed to outlive them. Undoubtedly, hostile forces are abroad in the land: the kulaks in the village, remnants of old and new bourgeois groupings in the cities. In the pores of our gigantic apparatus also nest elements of bureaucratic degeneration with their complete indifference to the interests of the masses, in their way of life, their material and cultural interests. If the active ideologists of the petty and middle bourgeoisie are stretching out their tentacles and quietly trying to shake our political line (I mean such as the opponents of industrialization, the opponents of the sovkhoz and kolkhoz, etc.), on the other hand there are the complaisant officials "at your service" who are ready to work out any plan whatsoever, even one of superindustrialization, only to laugh at us tomorrow in their own 'close circle,' and the day after go arm in arm with our opponents. The working class, however, has a great many trumps in its hand. In its struggle with class enemies who are increasing their political activity, the proletariat will rely on the support of the village poor and organize their forces against the kulak. It will develop a bold self-criticism in its ranks, and will overcome ever more successfully its own deficiencies. We are growing, and we can and will continue to grow with fewer disturbances, as we become more cultured and teach ourselves better the art and science of administering things. It was precisely on this subject that Lenin spoke in the closing period of his life.

APPENDIX E
HOW BERIA DIED.

(As narrated by Nikita Khrushchev to Senator Pierre Commin, a leader of the French Socialist Delegation that visited Moscow in May, 1956.)*

Very soon after the death of Stalin we in the Presidium began to get reports of some double game which Beria was playing. We began to have him followed and in a few weeks we established the fact that our suspicions were justified. He was clearly preparing a conspiracy against the Presidium. After waiting for a favorable moment, we designated a special session of the Presidium, to which, of course, Beria was invited, too. He appeared, apparently not suspecting that we knew anything. And right there we began to cross question him, to adduce facts, data, to put questions to him, in other words, we put him through a cross examination which lasted four hours.

For all of us it was clear that he was really guilty, and that this man could be dangerous to the party and the country.

We left him alone in the room, in this very room in which we are now conversing, with him sitting on the very chair on which you are sitting now. And we went into another room and there had a discussion of what should be done with him.

Our inner conviction of his guilt was unshakable. But at that time we did not have at our disposal a sufficient amount of juridical evidence of his guilt. And we found ourselves in a difficult position.

* The above account is translated from *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 7-8, July-August, 1936, p. 146. The *Vestnik* account withholds the name of Senator Pierre Commin, merely stating that Khrushchev narrated the "Settlement of Accounts with Beria" to "one of the leading members of the Delegation of the French Socialist Party," and that he did not bind the latter to secrecy. From a reliable correspondent in France, the author was able to establish that the "leading member of the French Delegation" was Senator Commin.

Evidence for his consignment to a court we still did not have, yet to leave him at liberty was impossible.

We came to the unanimous decision that the only correct measure for the defense of the Revolution was to shoot him immediately. This decision was adopted by us, and carried out on the spot.

But we felt much easier when, some time after his condemnation we received sufficient and irrefutable evidence of his guilt.

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